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Abstract 
 
Philosophical theories of evidence have been on offer, but they are mostly evaluated 
in terms of all-or-none desiderata — if they fail to meet one of the desiderata, they 
are not a satisfactory theory. In this thesis, I aim to accomplish three missions. 
Firstly, I construct a new way of evaluating theories of evidence, which I call a tool-
based view. Secondly, I analyse the nature of what I will call the various relevance-
mediating vehicles that each theory of evidence employs. Thirdly, I articulate the 
comparative core of evidential reasoning in the historical sciences, one which is 
overlooked in major theories of evidence.  
 
On the first mission, I endorse a meta-thesis of pluralism on theories of evidence, 
namely a tool-based view. I regard a theory of evidence as a purpose-specific and 
setting-sensitive tool which has its own strengths, difficulties and limitations. Among 
the major theories of evidence I have reviewed, I focus on Achinstein’s explanationist 
theory, Cartwright’s argument theory and Reiss’s inferentialist account, scrutinising 
and evaluating them against the purposes they set out and the scope of their 
applications.   
 
On the second mission, I note that there is no such thing as intrinsically ‘being 
evidence’. Rather, I hold that relevance-mediating vehicles configure data, materials 
or claims in such ways that some of them are labelled evidence. I identify the 
relevance-mediating vehicles that the theories of evidence employ. 
 
On the final mission, I argue that the likelihoodist account is an appropriate tool for 
explaining the evidential reasoning in poorly specified settings where likelihoods can 
be only imprecisely compared. Such settings, I believe, are typical in the historical 
sciences. Using the reconstruction of proto-sounds in historical linguistics as a case 
study, I formalise the rationale behind it by means of the law of likelihood. 
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1  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Relevance-Mediating Vehicles 
 
Messy, chaotic and disorderly is the typical impression of a crime scene. 
Police officers and investigators working at a crime scene have to seek 
materials, gather eyewitnesses and collect anything that is thought relevant. 
The materials could be duct tape, bloodstains or fibres, some of which will be 
sent to a laboratory for further identification. The materials, witness or expert 
testimony, video tape or anything found relevant will be brought to court. 
Across different stages, evidence detection, identification and comparison 
proceed back and forth. If the materials, testimonies and images are viewed 
as evidence in this case, the reason is not that there are things inherently 
labelled ‘evidence’ that await discovery. Instead, it is because certain kinds 
of relevance-mediating vehicles mould those things into a web of evidence. 
 
Relevance-mediating vehicles can be construed as configurers. They 
configure materials or claims in such ways that some of them are labelled 
evidence. Evidence is realised within arrangements rather than existing in 
the form of mysteriously metaphysical entities: this kind of realisation is 
ubiquitous in our daily lives and scientific practices. Inspired by Nancy 
Cartwright’s (1999, ch. 2) suggestion for an appropriate way of 
understanding abstract scientific concepts, I also regard multiple kinds of 
abstract concepts are realised through physical entities or activities. Stir-
frying egg rice is a case in point, illustrating concepts functioning as 
shorthand for a set of relatively concrete concepts. We pour some oil into a 
preheated wok, and when the oil gets very hot, we crack an egg into the wok, 
add rice, and start to stir the mixture until completely heated through. Then 
we season the dish with soy sauce and sugar and stir for a further minute 
before bringing the dish to the table. Stir-frying is not an additional existing 
activity which is attached to, as well as operating independently of, other 
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smaller activities, including heating, adding oil, cracking an egg, adding rice, 
stirring and seasoning. Nevertheless, the stir-frying makes sense of the 
entire cooking process: it places the action of adding oil into the wok in the 
cooking context instead of in the context of maintaining a wok.  
 
Similarly — though in a relatively complicated manner, regarding evidential 
relations between evidence and hypothesis — materials or claims can be 
configured via relevance-mediating vehicles that bring them together and 
establish their relevance. For example, the police want to know whether the 
victim was murdered by his relative, and at the crime scene they found a 
piece of duct tape with some bloodstains and distinct isotopic characteristics. 
There is no ‘evidence’ label on this piece of duct tape; for it to be evidence, a 
relevance-mediating vehicle is required to distil evidence from a web of facts. 
The relevance-mediating vehicles, depending upon different configurations 
and perspectives, could be a sound argument, a probabilistic model, an 
explanatory relation or some other discipline-specific vehicle.  
 
Viewing evidence as a convenient shorthand can be understood as an 
epistemic view of evidence. Such a way of characterising important 
philosophical concepts is not uncommon. For example, Michael Wilde and 
Jon Williamson (2016) propose an epistemic view of causality. On this view, 
causality is ‘purely epistemic in the sense that our causal claims enable us to 
reason and interact with the world in certain ways; they are not claims about 
some causal relation that exists independently of us and our epistemic 
practices’ (Wilde and Williamson, 2016, p. 36). They use the trihoral relation 
as an analogy to explicate the epistemic view of causality. Suppose there is 
an arrive-within-three-hour destination map in which places represented by 
nodes link to one another with a line. Every single line means a three-hour 
journey. There is no real geographical distance between nodes, but the 
information on the map is useful for people to plan breaks. The three-hour 
relation between nodes is obtained based on physical positions, the journey 
time and some other relevant travel conditions. The trihoral relation does not 
refer to any worldly place that we call ‘trihorality’. Likewise, in Wilde and 
Williamson’s view, causal claims are useful for explanation, prediction and 
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control; this explains our having the concept of causality without reference to 
causal relationships existing independently of us. Causality represents ‘a 
complex array of facts about the presence and absence of mechanisms, as 
well as the presence and absence of difference-making relationships and 
their magnitude’ (Wilde and Williamson, 2016, pp. 36–37). 
 
A host of philosophical theories of evidence are concerned with the nature of 
evidence and evidential relationships between true claims, or between claims 
we already accept (E) and claims to be established (H). The nature of 
evidence can be understood in terms of evidential relationships. To stand in 
an evidential relationship, these claims must be connected by a relevance-
mediating vehicle that links evidence (E) and hypothesis (H). I propose that 
we categorise the evidential relationships established by relevance-
mediating vehicles into three different types:  
 
I. OS (objective support): in what sense E guarantees H, or how 
plausible H is given E (e.g. the materials, testimonies and images 
labelled as evidence are good reasons for belief in the claim labelled 
as the hypothesis). This relationship is independent of one’s beliefs: E 
is or is not a good reason for H whether one takes it to be or not.  
 
II. SA (subjective acceptance): when we are justified in believing H given 
E, and how confident we should be of H given E (e.g. given the same 
array of evidence, rational agents should all be justified in believing 
the same conclusion, or agents holding contrasting values should 
follow the same measures to evaluate evidence irrespective of 
reaching the same conclusion). 
 
III. GD (guidance): how E guides us in further investigating H (e.g. a 
certain brand of duct tape indicates that someone is a suspect whose 
movements or bank account should be looked into). 
 
Put plainly, objective support is concerned with the world itself, subjective 
acceptance with beliefs and justification, and guidance with a fair guess.  
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1.2 The Desideratum View versus the Tool-Based View 
 
I begin with some prerequisites for a good theory of evidence from the 
desideratum perspective before introducing a tool-based view of theories of 
evidence. Achinstein (2014) identifies two desiderata that a theory of 
evidence must fulfil, namely the good-reason-to-believe desideratum (A1) 
and the empirical desideratum (A2). With respect to (A1), Achinstein 
maintains that E is evidence for H given background knowledge (B) only if E 
given B provides a good reason to believe H, where E is a good reason to 
believe H given B only if P(H/E&B)>1/2. The empirical desideratum further 
requires that whether E is evidence for H, given B, be a matter of empirical 
fact beyond E and B’s being empirical facts. The good-reason-to-believe 
desideratum defines an objective standard by which H can be considered 
more certain than not-H given E as well as a subjective standard of one’s 
justification for accepting H as true when knowing E. The empirical 
desideratum prohibits any a priori evidential relationships. For example, the 
hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account does not satisfy this desideratum, since 
for it, the relation between evidence and hypothesis is deductive entailment 
(given that E and B are true, E is evidence for H given B if and only if H in 
combination with B entails E), which is decidable a priori.  
 
What is at stake is to articulate prerequisites that cover a whole landscape of 
evidential relationships and demarcate it into sensible divisions, even though 
I will later put forward a different view that no one theory of evidence should 
be expected to meet all requirements. Let us consider a more all-
encompassing set of desiderata urged by Reiss (2015b, p. 37). He argues 
that a theory of evidence should be informative about how to gather evidence 
and when to be justified in believing a hypothesis on the basis of evidence in 
non-ideal scenarios as well as ideal ones. He puts forward four desiderata 
for a theory of evidence. It should:  
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(R1) be a theory of support;  
(R2) be a theory of warrant;  
(R3) apply to non-ideal scenarios;  
(R4) be descriptively adequate.  
 
For support, (R1) requires that a theory of evidence explain the role of 
evidence as a truth indicator where it is important that this does not require 
that evidence be a truth guarantor. For warrant, (R2) requires that evidence 
provide a reason, strong or weak, to believe in H to a certain degree or that 
demonstrates H. In short, an account of support is informative for gathering 
relevant facts to form evidential claims, whilst an account of warrant relates 
to assessing a statement in light of evidence and determining whether to 
believe it.  
 
Perfect experiments, ideally conducted randomised controlled trials (RCTs) 
or anything that could be called flawless evidence are scarce. Typically, 
whatever studies practising scientists conduct are imperfect, for example, 
well-controlled experiments, well-conducted RCTs or observational studies. 
This reality, Reiss argues, should be taken into account for a theory of 
evidence. Grant that a theory of evidence takes a form like this: E is 
evidence for H if and only if certain conditions are satisfied. In this form, what 
satisfies the conditions listed is legitimately termed evidence. What matters 
here is that whether a theory of evidence fits scientific practice hinges upon 
whether it is possible to tune the content of the conditions to accommodate 
so-called imperfect evidence that was, according to these conditions, 
previously not taken as evidence. This is what (R3) requires. It stipulates that 
a theory of evidence should allow some principles that make sense of non-
ideal scenarios, say, where for causal hypotheses, ideal controlled 
experiments (in an attempt to exclude known interfering factors) and ideal 
RCTs (in an attempt to balance known and unknown interfering factors) are 
rarely found or background knowledge is unreliable or insufficient. On a 
theory that meets (R3), it is recognised that evidential statements that are not 
conclusive evidence can be appraised in terms of degrees of evidential 
support, and statements that would not have been labelled as evidence can 
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otherwise become evidence under certain conditions. For instance, as Reiss 
(2015b, p. 57) notes, an H-D theorist can adjust background knowledge (B) 
to the extent that the hypothesis (H) and its new background knowledge (B′) 
deductively entail the claim (E), and ‘describe ideal as well as non-ideal 
situations of evidence gathering’.  
 
(R4) requires that even if the conditions listed in a theory of evidence have 
been tuned as (R3) demands, their relations and contents should actually be 
used by scientists. Take the H-D account as an example again. The adjusted 
component of background knowledge is not necessarily accepted by 
scientists, especially when it is manoeuvred ad hoc or its truth is impossible 
or implausible to ascertain. Furthermore, the deductive entailment (H&B 
entails E) is not a sufficient condition for evidence in actual use. Any trivial 
existential claim entailed by a hypothesis in question is not legitimate to be 
evidence for scientists (Achinstein, 2014, p. 387). For example, the claim 
‘calcium exists’ is not evidence that calcium helps build strong bones. 
 
Note that, compared to the three evidential relationships, objective support 
(OS), subjective acceptance (SA) and guidance (GD), (R1) is concerned with 
GD, and (R2), the justification function of evidence, with SA; the OS 
relationship is not explicitly allowed for in Reiss’s desiderata. Neither (R3) 
nor (R4) fully or partly corresponds to OS, SA and GD, but the former are 
compatible with the latter. This brings to light the chief concern of Reiss’s 
desiderata: a theory of evidence should work for us rather than articulating 
the objective evidential relationships that might not be useful for us.     
 
On Reiss’s account, the two desiderata that Achinstein identified for 
adequacy in a theory of evidence do not do justice to the full set of 
desiderata that a theory of evidence should satisfy. Where a good reason 
refers to sufficiently strong evidential warrant, Achinstein’s good-reason-to-
believe desideratum (A1) is similar to (R2) to the extent that both demand a 
certain degree of reason for H or to believe H. Nevertheless, (R2) can 
accommodate more degrees of reason regarding warrant strength, not 
restricted to P(H/E&B)>1/2, as required in (A1), and (R2) does not 
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necessarily invoke probabilities, which is otherwise required in (A1). A theory 
of evidence that fulfils Achinstein’s two desiderata (A1) and (A2) may 
nonetheless fall foul of the desideratum (R1) insofar as (A1) and (A2) do not 
consider the indicator role of evidence. For example, a piece of duct tape 
may indicate that someone is suspected of committing murder, or in a 
medical examination, the test for abnormality of liver function can signify liver 
cancer even if (A1) or (A2) are not met.  
 
Suppose that a man is discovered to have an abnormal liver function and the 
clinician, given this evidence, estimates that the probability of the patient’s 
contracting liver cancer is 1 / 1,000, since the occurrence of liver cancer in 
men is probabilistically low, say P(H) = 1 / 10,000 and there are more 
plausible causes (e.g. liver cirrhosis or other hepatic diseases) that equally 
explain the abnormal figures. In this case, the probability of H given E does 
not surpass half (~A1), yet the clinician, with knowledge of the result of the 
liver function test, can arrange a further medical imaging examination to try 
to detect the real problem. The measure of liver function given by the initial 
test serves an indicator role even if it is not decisive to the extent that (A1), 
the good-reason-to-believe criterion, demands.  
 
Consider a card case in which claims do not meet Achinstein’s empirical 
desideratum (A2) but still provide evidential information. There is a known 
statement that a card drawn at random from a standard deck is a king (K), 
which follows deductively from a hypothesis that ‘a card drawn is the king of 
diamonds’ (KD). With information K, support for hypothesis KD is higher than 
without the information, though the evidential relationship between K and KD 
is not a matter of empirical fact (~A2). Then again, even if P(H/E&B) < 1/2 
and E is a priori evidence for H (~A1&~A2), some information can still 
indicate the truth of the conclusion of interest. Consider for example the card 
case. P(KD/K) < 1/2 and, as stated above, the relationship between K and 
KD is a priori, but K plays a role in indicating KD.    
 
Still, an important question remains unanswered: namely, whether a theory 
of evidence must satisfy all of the desiderata. When Achinstein and Reiss set 
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out their desiderata, they intend them to be used in this way: invoking 
desiderata to judge whether a theory is legitimate is an all-or-none 
judgement. A theory is good if and only if it meets all of the desiderata; a 
theory that fails to meet one of them is otherwise considered unsatisfactory. 
Desiderata for a theory of evidence are by no means something invented or 
even fabricated by us merely with the intention of listing what we want. They 
need to and do take into account real evidential relationships. However, 
requiring a theory of evidence to satisfy all of the desiderata is something 
more than to simply cover evidential relationships. Clearly, Reiss’s four 
desiderata not merely cover a considerable variety of real evidential 
relationships of the sort that I have outlined but also impose upon any theory 
of evidence a normative standard that should apply as an all-or-none 
requirement.  
 
There is one other consideration that should not be ignored: desiderata for a 
theory of evidence, for the most part, do not include all dimensions of the 
evidential functions. Evidence can provide an explanation for natural or 
social phenomena or past events, can help with assessing the credibility of a 
causal hypothesis, and can also be useful for decision-making and 
prediction. In Achinstein’s and Reiss’s desideratum views, these types of 
evidential functions are either not involved or not characterised in detail. 
 
The desideratum view essentially takes the form of ‘E is evidence for H if and 
only if…’, and some expression on the right-hand side such as: ‘It is highly 
likely that there is an explanatory connection between E and H’, ‘There is an 
argumentative relation between E and H’, or ‘There is an inferential relation 
between E and H’. Advocates for this type of definition seek a universal 
account that covers all cases of evidence: invoking desiderata to judge 
whether a theory of evidence is legitimate is an all-or-none judgement. A 
theory is good if and only if it meets all of the desiderata; a theory that fails to 
meet one of them is considered unsatisfactory. 
 
In contrast to this kind of all-or-none judgement, I endorse a meta-thesis of 
pluralism on this matter, which I call a tool-based view. The tool-based view 
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does not demand that E is evidence for H, only if certain conditions are met. 
This view takes the ‘if’ side, that is, if a theory of evidence can establish 
evidential relevance by a particular relevance-mediating vehicle and thus can 
account for certain aspects of evidence use in the scientific practices it 
intends to explain, then it is a good theory of evidence. From the tool-based 
view, a theory of evidence is a purpose-specific tool: a theory of evidence 
has its own strengths, difficulties and limitations. When considering 
strengths, it is appropriate to evaluate whether a theory of evidence operates 
positively against its own merits in relation to the purpose it is intended to 
serve. By difficulties, I mean to what extent an account does not accomplish 
the objectives it sets out for itself. For limitations, I seek to define the scope 
of its application by considering where else an account does not perform 
well. 
 
According to the tool-based view, criteria for evaluating theories of evidence 
are comprised of, but not limited to, the evidential relationships (including 
OS, SA and GD) and the evidential functions (including explanation for 
natural or social phenomena or past events, warrant for causal relationships, 
and prediction). A theory of evidence can legitimately cover only certain 
evidential relationships or functions of the domain; it should not be faulted if it 
does not fulfil all of the desiderata that Achinstein or Reiss identifies. 
Theories of evidence may meet the same criterion, but this has no material 
consequence, as one theory may do the job better or meet more criteria than 
would another theory. By analogy, both a hammer and a Swiss army knife 
can drive nails, but the former carries out this function far more effectively 
and efficiently than the latter.  
 
As an advocate for the tool-based view, I would not consider a theory of 
evidence inadequate unless it unequivocally fails to account for the evidence 
use it intends to explain. While I recognise proper theories of evidence when 
they are appropriately applied, is there a common core among the different 
concepts of evidence? Is there something linking them together and enabling 
them to serve as evidence? Although I would claim that evidence is the 
grounds upon which our hypotheses or theories are rationally confirmed or 
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refuted, this broad definition contributes little to our understanding of different 
uses of evidence in diverse domains. This is similar to a broad definition of 
the tool: a tool is identified by its function(s). While a screwdriver and a 
hammer both have their own function(s), this means of expression does not 
distinguish between their particular functions designed for performing 
particular tasks. The tool-based view aims to clearly articulate different uses 
of evidence in various settings. 
 
It is worth noting that the tool-based view, a meta-thesis of pluralism, does 
not subscribe to relativism — any arbitrary theory of evidence should be 
acknowledged. One might worry that now that there is no fine-grained 
common core connecting different concepts of evidence, something meeting 
the conditions of an arbitrary theory of evidence is labelled evidence by virtue 
of that theory; if a theory of evidence can be formulated arbitrarily, anything 
in accordance with a correspondingly appropriate theory can be evidence for 
a hypothesis, be it scientifically desirable or not. For the tool-based view, one 
primary aim of a theory of evidence is to account for the aspects of evidence 
use in science it sets out to explain. The tool-based view does not prescribe 
what evidence should be; instead, by making explicit the conditions on the ‘if’ 
side, it analyses the rationales behind the evidence use judged by scientists 
in different aspects in diverse domains in science. If an arbitrary theory of 
evidence is used to account for actual evidence use in science, it is likely to 
face numerous counter-examples. However, the tool-based view does not 
rule out the following possibility: a theory of evidence specifically devised to 
account for the use of evidence in support of a scientifically undesirable 
theory (e.g. the flat-earth theory) may be taken as a good theory of evidence 
for certain communities, though not for the scientific community. However, 
although the tool-based view is open to this possibility, articulating the 
methodology of confirming scientifically undesirable theories is not typically 
the aim of philosophical theories of evidence.    
 
What is at issue is discerning which meta-thesis concerning evidence of 
theories we should take: the desideratum view or the tool-based view. Here I 
do not argue that the tool-based view is correct and that the desideratum 
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view is mistaken. Instead, I wish to construct a new way of evaluating 
theories of evidence whereby we can measure them against the shared 
criteria and the purposes that they have set for themselves. More 
importantly, a good theory of evidence in the desideratum view advocates’ 
mind is a ‘super’ theory of evidence likened to an all-encompassing and all-
round ‘super’ Swiss army knife. But from the perspective of the tool-based 
view, we do not need a ‘super’ Swiss army knife — we need a toolkit. The 
super theory might not be accessible. In the subsequent chapters, I will 
argue that the theories of evidence under discussion have their own 
difficulties and limitations. The tool-based view can accommodate not only 
the evidential relationships and the functions that the desideratum approach 
has taken into account, but more relationships and functions in multiple 
dimensions, without regard to the all-or-none requirement.  
 
In opposition to the desideratum view, the tool-based view is favourable in 
terms of breadth and depth. From the breadth point of view, a meta-thesis 
should cover, as far as we are concerned, all kinds of evidential relationships 
and functions, although a theory of evidence need not do so. For instance, 
Reiss’s four desiderata are silent about objective support (OS). From the 
depth point of view, suppose T1 is a theory of evidence that distinguishes 
between different degrees of evidential warrant (that is, how much we are 
warranted in believing H given E) in relation to probabilities, and suppose T2 
uses, in a rough way, probabilities to do this task, but additionally 
distinguishes between different degrees of evidential support, in a rough way 
as well. According to the desideratum view, it should be accepted that T2 is 
superior to T1, since T2 meets more desiderata than T1 does. However, T2 
may be so coarse-grained as to perform the first task less satisfactorily than 
T1, which can otherwise be explained well in the meta-thesis of pluralism.    
 
The defence of the desideratum view could be that OS is pertinent to 
metaphysics and far from the actual use of evidence, and that the 
characterisation of the desiderata can be developed and given more detail to 
do justice to the complexity of evidential relationships. Advocates of the 
desideratum view might claim that desiderata, by nature, must be fully 
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satisfied. Although there are, to my knowledge, no positive reasons for the 
desideratum view as it stands, advocates of this view could further argue that 
a small leak may sink a great ship: non-fulfilment of just one desideratum 
may undermine a promising theory of evidence. Alternatively, they could 
argue that a theory achieving multiple important purposes all at once would 
be even better than one that meets fewer desiderata. For the purposes of 
this thesis, however, I set these issues aside.  
 
For this thesis, the tool-based view is indispensable for critically examining 
theories of evidence. If the desideratum view were to be applied to analyse 
the theories of evidence under consideration, none of these theories would 
be deemed satisfactory or correct. For instance, according to their respective 
desiderata, Achinstein regards the Bayesian theory as problematic, and 
Reiss considers Achinstein’s, Cartwright’s and the Bayesian theories wrong. 
Accordingly, these theories should be dismissed unless they satisfy all of the 
desiderata, no matter how many strengths they have, how many holes they 
may patch and how many limitations they may overcome. I would not judge 
them wrong simply by revealing their problems while ignoring their abilities to 
capture certain facets of evidence. Until a ‘super’ theory of evidence is 
invented, it seems reasonable to let ‘qualified’ theories live side by side. If my 
analysis in the following chapters is correct in showing that the theories of 
evidence under consideration more or less have difficulties and limitations, 
we may have no good theories at all. This concern brings me to the tool-
based view; a theory of evidence is analogous to a tool that performs 
particular functions and accounts for particular aspects of evidence use by 
the scientific community. In order to properly evaluate the strengths (where a 
theory can be applied), difficulties (where a theory is intended to be 
applicable but is done poorly) and limitations (where a theory cannot be 
applied) of theories of evidence, I adopt and endorse the tool-based view for 
the purposes of this thesis.  
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1.3  Outline 
 
In this thesis, I aim to accomplish three missions. Firstly, I apply the tool-
based framework to several contemporary theories of evidence, and analyse 
their strengths, difficulties and limitations. Secondly, I identify their relevance-
mediating vehicles at work. Thirdly, I spell out evidential reasoning in 
historical linguistics by means of likelihoodism.  
 
I proceed with the appraisal of each theory of evidence by checking whether 
it succeeds in the task it takes upon itself, rather than by invoking a full set of 
desiderata.  
 
In Chapter 2, I discuss Peter Achinstein’s explanationist theory of evidence 
as a springboard for further investigation into other theories of evidence, 
including the H-D account, the error-statistical account, the satisfaction view, 
the subjective Bayesian theory and the objective Bayesian theory. I follow 
Achinstein’s (2014) analysis and focus on their difficulties by employing 
counter-examples. I argue that the explanationist theory encounters a 
difficulty that the merged objective Bayesian account of evidence (MOB) can 
avoid. In addition, I point out that Achinstein’s explanationist theory employs 
explanatory connection as the relevance-mediating vehicle by which it 
captures OS (objective support) and SA (subjective acceptance), but with the 
omission of GD (guidance). 
 
In Chapter 3, I examine Nancy Cartwright’s argument theory of evidence, in 
which the mediating vehicle for evidential relevance is a sound argument. I 
argue that because of its demand for deductive entailment, the argument 
theory faces a number of difficulties that boil down to a failure to account for 
the transmission of epistemic warrant in specific types of cases. One of the 
major limitations is that looking for a valid argument and checking the truth of 
the premises fall outside this theory’s job description. Nevertheless, it can 
remind us of inferential gaps and explain why what was previously accepted 
as evidence may no longer serve as evidence when some other premise 
 14 
turns to be false or the argument becomes invalid. The argument theory 
emphasises metaphysical evidential relationships which amount to OS, but 
may be irrelevant to SA and GD. 
 
In Chapter 4, I scrutinise Julian Reiss’s inferentialist account, which 
harnesses loose implication and elimination as the relevance-mediating 
vehicles. I argue that its real difficulty is that it has to curtail the application 
scope that it originally attempts to reach in the biomedical and social 
sciences in accord with the quantitative evidence use, and that its limitations 
arise from its inability to make full use of information about probabilities. I 
also show that this account explicates why a variety of sources of evidence 
are deemed legitimate in the biomedical and social sciences. Although the 
inferentialist account delivers an account of SA and GD, it pays little attention 
to OS. 
 
In Chapter 5, I argue that the likelihoodist account of evidence excels at 
spelling out evidential reasoning in poorly specified settings such as the 
historical sciences. By virtue of the comparison core built into the law of 
likelihood as the relevance-mediating vehicle, I formalise the reconstruction 
of proto-sounds in historical linguistics, illustrating that the likelihoodist 
account can make sense of the methodology, whilst the explanationist 
theory, the argument theory, the inferentialist account and the Bayesian 
approach all fail to do so. I also argue that the likelihoodist account is not well 
suited to composite hypotheses and well-specified and fully specified 
settings. This account is concerned with OS but is silent about SA and GD.  
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2  
Necessitating Explanatory Connection:  
Achinstein’s Explanationist Theory of Evidence 
 
 
Why have scientists paid little or no attention to philosophical theories of 
evidence? In The Book of Evidence, Peter Achinstein (2001) posits that it is 
because theories of evidence are of little or no scientific importance and 
practical value. A challenge from a dean of science, Achinstein 
characterises, expresses the concerns. The dean’s utilitarian mind demands 
that a theory of evidence should resolve scientists’ disputes about evidence, 
such as whether the data suffice to say that a hypothesis is true. His 
analytical mind desires a theory of evidence that brings to light the rationale 
behind how practising scientists reason evidentially. 
 
Taking on the dean’s challenge, Achinstein (2001, 2010a, 2014) attempts to 
proffer a satisfactory theory of evidence that can make sense of objective 
support (OS) and, less importantly, subjective acceptance (SA), both of 
which are evidential relationships which I have articulated in Chapter 1. The 
approach he offers calls for an explanatory connection between a hypothesis 
and claims to confirm the hypothesis. For this reason, I will call it the 
explanationist theory of evidence, which is as follows: 
 
E is evidence for H given B if and only if  
(a) P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) > 1/2;  
(b) E and B are true;  
(c) E does not entail H,1 where H is a hypothesis, B is background 
knowledge and Exp(H,E) means that there is an explanatory 
 
1 Achinstein (2010a, p. 5) rejects E as evidence for H by E’s entailing H, for example, the 
fact that she is a female student does not evidence the hypothesis that she is a student, 
since ‘it is too good to be evidence’. In opposition to his view, I argue in Chapter 3 that if E 
entails H, E can be evidence for H if and only if E succeeds in transmitting an evidential 
warrant to H. To illustrate this point, let us consider a simple example. Suppose there are 
366 people in the room (E), we can guarantee that there must be a pair having the same 
birthday (H) on the basis that there are 365 days in a non-leap year. Intuitively, E is 
evidence for H, though E entails H. 
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connection between H and E. That is, H correctly explains the truth of 
E, or E correctly explains the truth of H, or some hypothesis correctly 
explains both the truth of E and the truth of H.  
 
Different explanatory directions are exemplified as follows: (1) H explains E: 
smoking as a cause of lung cancer (H) explains the correlation between 
smoking and lung cancer (E); (2) E explains H: Tom’s having no heartbeat 
(E) explains his death (H); (3) another hypothesis (H′) explains both E and H: 
100 tosses of a coin are all heads (E) and the hypothesis (H) is that the 
101st toss will land heads; the fact that the coin is extremely biased (H′) 
explains both E and H. Achinstein’s definition of evidence is a threshold 
concept, shown in the requirement that the probability should be higher than 
half, which he names potential evidence. I will return to the threshold concept 
and potential evidence in due course. 
 
I begin by explicating the concept of explanatory connection and the 
constituents of a correct explanation. I will discuss Achinstein’s four concepts 
of evidence, with potential evidence providing a foundation for the other 
three, and I will analyse Achinstein’s good-reason-to-believe assumption and 
his empirical assumption. Following that, I will use Darrell Rowbottom’s 
(2013) criticisms to clarify Achinstein’s empirical assumption. Armed with the 
two assumptions that a theory of evidence should have, following 
Achinstein’s analysis, I will present the unsatisfactory aspects of five theories 
of evidence. Finally, from the perspective of the tool-based view I endorse, 
according to which a theory of evidence is equipped with some relevance-
mediating vehicle(s) and is purpose-specific as to capturing particular 
different kinds of evidential relationships in distinct settings, I shall argue that 
the explanationist theory encounters difficulties relative to its purpose and 
scope.     
 
2.1 Explanatory Connection  
 
Several terms of Achinstein’s definition of evidence should be unpacked. I 
begin with ‘correctly explain’. Achinstein (2010a, pp. 24–25) demands that a 
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correct explanatory connection should comply with objectivity, context 
insensitivity and non-circularity.2 An example of a theory of explanation that 
satisfies these conditions is Carl Hempel’s D-N (deductive-nomological) 
model of explanation. To elucidate these conditions, I briefly introduce the D-
N model.  
 
Hempel (1965) believes that the standard form of all scientific explanations is 
the D-N model, which takes the form of a deductive argument:  
 
  C1, C2, … , Cn 
  L1, L2, … , Lm 
      P 
 
The D-N model is composed of two core components: explanandum and 
explanans (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948, p. 136). An explanandum is a 
sentence ‘describing the phenomenon to be explained (not that phenomenon 
itself)’ and an explanans is ‘the class of those sentences which are adduced 
to account for the phenomenon’ (Hempel, 1965, p. 247). C1, C2, … , Cn are 
initial conditions describing relevant empirical facts and L1, L2, … , Lm are 
general laws of nature. The sentences in the two groups together are the 
premises called the explanans. Conclusion P, a statement reporting the 
phenomenon of interest, is the explanandum. Any phenomenon to be 
explained should be entailed by the explanans, consisting of a law, or laws, 
of nature in addition to some initial conditions involving verifiable empirical 
content. Moreover, the explanans should be true. The inverse holds as well: 
if a phenomenon is a deductive consequence of an explanans consisting of 
true claims that contain at least one law, then the explanans constitutes an 
admissible scientific explanation for the phenomenon. The requirements of 
deductive entailment and of the explanans containing a law of nature reveal 
 
2 Achinstein (2010a, p. xi) distinguishes between ‘correct explanation’ and ‘good 
explanation’, asserting that correctness and goodness are both crucial in assessing 
explanations. From his viewpoint, correctness is determined independently of epistemic 
situations, whereas goodness varies depending on different epistemic situations. However, 
since the basic concept of evidence used among scientists is, as he claims, required to be 
objective, the concept of explanation that underwrites the objective concept of evidence, if 
there is one, should also be objective.  
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the origin of the name of the deductive-nomological model, also called the 
‘covering law’ model. A case of a D-N explanation can be seen in Kepler’s 
laws, which explain the motion of Mars, insofar as Kepler’s laws entail the 
statements about Mars’ motion. 
 
Now let us turn to the three features that Achinstein (2001, p. 160) requires 
of a correct explanation used to define (potential) evidence:   
 
1. Objectivity: Whether an explanation is correct is free from one’s 
subjective beliefs. The explanatory connection in a D-N explanation is 
an illustration. It is objective insofar as no one’s knowledge or beliefs 
affect whether the deductive entailment in the D-N explanation holds 
or the explanans and the explanandum are true. Whether the motion 
of Mars is a deductive consequence of Kepler’s laws and whether 
Kepler’s laws and the statements describing how Mars moves in the 
solar system are true do not depend on what we think or believe.  
 
2. Context insensitivity: A correct explanation is context-free rather than 
being appropriate for one context but inappropriate for another. The 
notion of correct explanation is analogous in certain respects to a D-N 
explanation, like both are not determined by the different standards of 
various contexts and crosses over all of them. Once Kepler’s laws 
plus certain initial conditions correctly explain the motion of Mars in 
the proper D-N manner, it is a correct explanation thereafter, whatever 
the more profound understanding of the universe Newton’s laws may 
provide. 
 
3. Non-circularity: The required notion of correct explanation should not 
draw on the notion of evidence, which avoids circularity when defining 
evidence. This is analogous to the way that Hempel defines 
‘explanation’ by the D-N model, which requires only deductive 
entailment as well as the explanans that is true and consists of a law, 
without appeal to the notion of explanation itself. Recall that 
Achinstein uses ‘correct explanation’ to define the notion of evidence, 
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so if, upon spelling out what counts as a correct explanation, he stows 
away the notion of evidence beforehand, it would be circular. It might 
be thought that the notion of evidence enters the D-N account as the 
premises in a D-N explanation are supposed to be true, and that if 
Achinstein adopts the D-N model to define the notion of correction 
explanation, how else is truth to be ascertained other than by 
evidence? This is not the case, however, since Hempel requires only 
that the premises of a D-N explanatory argument be true, not that we 
(empirically) know them to be.3 
 
As Achinstein (2010a) pointed out, despite explanations in Hempel’s D-N 
model being objective, non-contextual and non-circular so that it appears to 
serve the purpose of providing a suitable definition of correct explanation, 
this model of explanation has its own problems that make it too 
unsatisfactory to be integrated into the definition of evidence that the 
explanationist theory requires.4 For the D-N model, all considerations are a 
priori except the truth of explanans: considerations of they are whether the 
explanans deduces the explanandum and whether sentences contained in 
the explanans are lawlike. Neither is determined empirically: the former is 
determined by logic, and in Hempel’s view, the latter ‘depends only on [a 
sentence’s] syntactical form and the semantical interpretation of its terms 
(Achinstein, 1983, p. 165). For instance, take the premise (a) that Mr. X 
drank a moderate amount of water every day of his life is true and the lawlike 
premise (b) that anyone who drinks water every day dies before the age of 
150 is also true. It follows from both premises that (c) Mr. X died before the 
 
3 Hempel (1965, p. 248) stipulates that the premises must be true rather than highly 
confirmed, the latter of which of course means that they are supported by evidence. The 
reason for this stipulation is to avoid awkward consequences, where ‘a certain phenomenon 
was explained at an earlier stage of science, by means of an explanans which was well 
supported by the evidence then at hand, but which has been highly disconfirmed by more 
recent empirical findings, [so] we would have to say that originally the explanatory account 
was a correct explanation, but that it ceased to be one later, when unfavourable evidence 
was discovered’. 
4 I am not concerned here with all of the well-known problems with the D-N account. They 
include the eclipse problem, Bromberger’s flagpole example, the barometer problem, the 
moon and the tides problem, the syphilis and paresis problem, the hexed salt problem and 
the birth-control pills problem. See Salmon (1989, pp. 46–50) for more details. Below the 
drinking-water-every-day example illustrates the problem of explanatory irrelevancy, which is 
pertinent to the last two problems.  
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age of 150. In the D-N model, the premises should correctly explain (c) in the 
sense that supposing (a) and (b) are true, it follows a priori that (c) is true, 
regardless of whether other empirical information enters. However, drinking 
water is not normally regarded as a reason for fatality, and thus does not 
correctly explain that Mr. X died before he was 150 years old. This shows 
that legitimate D-N style explanations do not guarantee that they are correct 
explanations.  
 
Wishing to avoid both the D-N account and viewing the concept of 
explanation as a fundamental one without further clarification, Achinstein 
instead proposes a content-link account of explanation, which he maintains 
suits the requirements of the concept of potential evidence. He distinguishes 
between potential explanation and correct explanation. A proposition p, if 
true, is a potential explanation if and only if p is a correct explanation 
(Achinstein, 2001, p. 148, 2010a, p. 31). In this sense, the correct 
explanation is a derivative of potential explanation, the latter of which should 
be fleshed out first.  
 
For Achinstein, an explanation is a propositional relationship between the 
explanans (content-giving proposition p) and the question raised by the 
explanandum (content-question Q).5 Suppose there is a question of interest: 
why did Peter’s car have a breakdown? The form of an answer to a why-
question can always be expressed as: the reason is _____ (the blank should 
be filled in with the content of reason). Accordingly, the reason that Peter’s 
car broke down is that, say, the battery was faulty, where ‘reason’ is dubbed 
a content-noun N and ‘the battery was faulty’ is a sentence giving the content 
to the content-noun N. Moreover, it can be seen that this why-question 
presupposes a variety of propositions including ‘Peter had a car’, ‘Peter’s car 
broke down’ and ‘Peter’s car broke down for some reason’. A complete 
presupposition of a question is then defined as ‘a proposition that entails all 
and only the presuppositions of that question’ (Achinstein, 2010a, p. 27). We 
may stipulate that the three presuppositions noted collectively exhaust all of 
 
5 For more details, refer to Chapter 2 in Achinstein (1983).  
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the presuppositions of the question ‘Why did Peter’s car have a breakdown?’ 
and it seems that the third entails the first two. If so, then the proposition 
‘Peter’s car broke down for some reason’ is a complete presupposition of this 
question. By omitting ‘for some reason’ and adding ‘the reason that’ and ‘is’ 
followed by a blank, we obtain a complete answer form for the question ‘Why 
did Peter’s car break down?’: The reason that Peter’s car broke down is 
_____.  
 
With the notions outlined above, Achinstein (2010a) gives a definition of a 
complete content-giving proposition:     
 
p is a complete content-giving proposition with respect to question Q if 
and only if  
(a) p is a content-giving proposition (for a concept expressed by some 
noun N);  
(b) p is expressible by a sentence obtained from a complete answer 
form for Q (containing N) by filling in the blank;  
(c) p is not a presupposition of Q. (Achinstein, 2010a, p. 27, italics in 
original) 
 
Q is a content-question if and only if there is a complete content-giving 
proposition p to answer Q. Therefore, ‘The reason why Peter’s car broke 
down is that the battery was faulty’ is a complete content-giving proposition 
relating to the content-question ‘Why did Peter’s car break down?’. Now we 
have the essential ingredients for Achinstein’s account of explanation: a 
complete content-giving proposition p provides a potential explanation for Q 
(or its indirect form q ‘the car broke down’) and if p is furthermore true, then p 
provides a correct explanation of Q (or q) (Achinstein, 2001, p. 163). If ‘the 
reason why Peter’s car broke down is that the battery was faulty’ is true,6 it 
provides a correct explanation of why Peter’s car broke down. By contrast, 
the proposition that ‘the battery was faulty’ alone (without ‘the reason why 
Peter’s car broke down is that‘) does not necessarily provide a correct 
explanation for the question ‘Why did Peter’s car break down?’, because it is 
not a complete content-giving proposition relative to the question. ‘The 
 
6 Achinstein (2001, p. 166) permits a substitution of ‘cause’ for ‘reason’, as in the case where 
the cause of Peter’s car’s breakdown is the faulty battery.  
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reason why Peter’s car broke down is that the battery was faulty’ guarantees 
that the breakdown was a result of the faulty battery, whilst even if the 
proposition that ‘the battery was faulty’ is true, the breakdown may stem from 
other reasons. Thus, Achinstein’s account of explanation can avoid 
propositions in a legitimate form of explanation, which permit irrelevant 
reasons to be correct explanations.  
 
As noted above, whilst the D-N model is prone to permission for irrelevant 
reasons presented as correct explanations, Achinstein’s content-link account 
of explanation seems to forestall this criticism. However, the D-N model 
meets the requirements for correct explanations by virtue of being objective, 
contextually insensitive, and not circular. Let us examine whether 
Achinstein’s model meets all three requirements. As regards objectivity and 
contextual insensitivity: the fact that the reason Peter’s car broke down is 
that the battery was faulty provides an explanation of why Peter’s car broke 
down, which is neither dependent upon Peter’s or anyone else’s beliefs and 
knowledge, nor is it subject to a more profound understanding of the 
mechanisms. Achinstein’s definition of explanation is not circular and can be 
used to define the notion of evidence, because content-giving propositions 
and content-questions are not defined by any notion of explanation nor by 
any notion of evidence. Admittedly, the concepts of reason and explanation 
are intimate; however, Achinstein’s definition of explanation is still not circular 
in this respect. Although Achinstein does not explicate the truth conditions for 
‘the reason is ___’ when defending his account of explanation, his definition 
of correct explanation does not rely on ‘reason’ and provides no conditions 
for determining the truth of claims containing ‘reason’ such as ‘the reason 
why Peter’s car broke down is that the battery was faulty’. Accordingly, 
Achinstein’s definition of explanation is objective, non-contextual and non-
circular.  
 
Note that Achinstein’s content-link account of explanation does not block 
normal use of the explanans. The fact that ‘the battery was faulty’ (i.e. a 
content-giving proposition) is still acknowledged in his account to provide a 
correct explanation of Q ‘Why did Peter’s car break down?’, only if the former 
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can be transformed into a complete content-giving proposition with respect to 
Q. In case the proposition ‘the battery was faulty’ cannot be furnished with a 
complete content-giving form, it is possible that when the proposition ‘the 
battery was faulty’ and the question Q are laid out, the proposition to answer 
Q is true but it does not correctly explain Q. Seeing as there may be one 
reason or another that provides a correct explanation for Q, the link between 
the proposition and Q is not strong enough to tie both into an explanatory 
relationship. By contrast, it is impossible that the proposition ‘the reason why 
Peter’s car broke down is that the battery was faulty’ is true but it does not 
provide a correct explanation for Q. Within Achinstein’s framework, it is not 
necessarily the case that given only Q and the explanans with respect to Q, 
the explanans does not correctly explain Q.  
 
2.2 Four Concepts of Evidence  
 
Achinstein (2010a, 2014) argues that his theory of evidence can 
accommodate the four evidence concepts: epistemic-situation, subjective, 
potential and veridical evidence. He claims that these concepts are used in 
scientific practice and daily lives and must be taken into account when we 
develop an account of evidence.  
 
Prior to the exploration of the four concepts, an important conceptual 
distinction should be made between justification and good reason to believe, 
the latter of which is concerned with the core of Achinstein’s theory of 
evidence, namely potential evidence. One has justification for believing H 
(viz. an inference that H is true is rational) with respect to a specific epistemic 
situation in which any rational agent would believe that H is true. By contrast, 
something constitutes a good reason for H if it is sufficiently strong for one to 
believe that H is true from the perspective of an omniscient God. To see the 
distinction between justification and good reason, consider the following 
situations.  
 
(a) Justification does not imply good reason:  
Suppose an investigator A, from a piece of duct tape that contained 
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K’s DNA and was left in the crime scene, constructed the profile of a 
killer and is justified in believing that K is the killer. Any experienced 
investigators in this epistemic situation would come to the same 
conclusion. However, improbable as it might seem, K’s DNA, 
unbeknown to A, had been transferred accidentally onto the duct tape. 
This indicates that the contaminated piece of duct tape is not a good 
reason for believing that K is the killer who investigator A mistakenly 
believes K to be. Something justifying a belief does not necessarily 
amount to something being a good reason.  
 
In a different case, a bloodstain is a good reason to suppose that 
victim V did not commit suicide but was murdered. However, an 
experienced judge J, with the testimonies heard and the samples 
gathered by the investigator A, who neglected the bloodstain, under 
the carpet, containing someone’s DNA, formed a judicious judgement 
and concluded that V died by suicide, and acquitted the defendant K. 
Although the bloodstain escaped A’s and J’s notice, the belief that V 
died by suicide is regarded as justified, because a well-informed 
epistemic agent, according to the available information, would believe 
the same hypothesis as the judge. A relevant good reason may be 
overlooked even if a belief is justified to be true, but is in fact false. 
 
(b) Good reason does not imply justification:  
Pursuing the above example, suppose that a bloodstain collected at a 
crime scene containing someone’s DNA provided a strong indication 
of and thus a good reason for the identity of the perpetrator, and that 
the death of V occurred before the 1980s, and therefore before the 
invention of DNA profiling. Since A and J lacked a reliable technique 
for identifying DNA that allowed for the matching of the bloodstain and 
K, they could not be justified in believing that K was the perpetrator, 
merely on account of the bloodstain. Just as a good reason need not 
be regarded as a good reason for someone to believe. 
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Moreover, knowledge of good reason does not imply justification. 
Suppose footage caught on a surveillance camera shows a homicide 
and the murderer’s face, which is regarded as a good reason to 
believe that M is the murderer. Initially, the footage justified the 
police’s belief that M was the murderer, but afterwards they found out 
that M had a twin brother M’, who had in fact committed the crime. 
Though the police no longer have justification for this belief, they still 
know and believe that the footage provides a good reason that M is 
the murderer. 
 
Now let us turn to the four concepts of evidence that Achinstein 
distinguishes. The first concept of evidence is designated as epistemic-
situation evidence. This is relativised to a situation limited to certain 
epistemic conditions due to, for example, measurement techniques or 
background knowledge. If anyone is in the same epistemic situation or given 
the same epistemic premises (not necessarily good reasons), they should be 
justified in believing the same hypothesis. From this point of view, epistemic-
situation evidence is impersonally objective. Epistemic evidence is 
something like the duct tape that makes investigator A’s belief justified or the 
testimonies and the samples that enable Judge J to reach the judgement that 
any rational agents would agree to if they had an identical body of evidence.  
 
The second kind of evidence is subjective evidence. Whether E is evidence 
is determined by one’s beliefs and community judgement: E is someone’s or 
some community’s evidence. Subjective evidence E for a hypothesis H for a 
person or community G is what is judged good evidence for H by G’s beliefs 
and judgement. The fact that E is judged to be evidence in this community 
does not guarantee that a person who has E has a good reason or is justified 
in believing H. This can be demonstrated with reference to a previous court 
example. The spectators in the court may believe that the accused is guilty 
mainly on the basis that the accused has a previous conviction for assault. 
The previous criminal record is subjective evidence. The spectators’ 
judgement relies on their personal beliefs, or even the stereotypes, and lacks 
a real sense of good reason and justification. Good reason and justification 
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are based on rationality, which should not be influenced by the standards 
that vary with different psychological states or social contexts. 
 
By contrast, the last two concepts of evidence are concerned with a 
completely objective notion of evidence, namely, good reason to believe. As 
correct explanations, potential evidence and veridical evidence are objective 
and contextually insensitive: both are independent of whether or what we 
know and not relativised to any epistemic situation (Achinstein, 2010a, pp. 4–
5).  
 
Potential evidence requires that  
(a) E does not depend upon anyone’s beliefs about H, E or anything 
about the relationship between H and E;  
(b) E is true;  
(c) E is evidence for H even if H is false;  
(d) E does not entail H. 
  
Veridical evidence requires not only what potential evidence requires 
but also the truth of the targeted hypothesis.  
 
In the scenario discussed above, when investigator A is claimed not to have 
a good reason that the suspect is the killer, this is due to the erroneous 
information used to infer the killer K. The erroneous information, by 
Achinstein (1995, p. 458), is generated from a flaw in the procedure, called 
evidential flaws. Despite the absence of a clear definition of what constitutes 
evidential flaws, the definition can be characterised as follows:  
 
The procedure yielding E is evidentially flawed if and only if E is not 
sufficiently informative about the truth of H (i.e. E does not provide a 
good reason for H).  
 
More specifically, this insufficiency is mainly due to the mismatch between 
so-called evidence and its target hypothesis. For example, suppose specific 
representative values individually contained in two datasets for two variables 
 27 
are used to compute a Pearson correlation coefficient, obtaining 0.9. This 
information sufficiently supports a hypothesis that there is a strong 
correlation between the two variables; hence the procedure yielding the 
information is not flawed. But if the information about these values is taken 
as evidence to infer that the two variables are causally related, the procedure 
yielding the information becomes flawed: the evidential claim is false that the 
correlation coefficient is (potential) evidence that both variables are causally 
related. As other reasons (e.g. a common variable that causes the two 
variables) can explain the correlation, the correlation coefficient is not 
sufficiently informative about the truth of the causal hypothesis. Accordingly, 
whether or not E is evidence is relativised to H (plus background knowledge): 
once H varies, E may or may not be evidence for H.  
 
Note that for the explanationist theory, bona fide evidence, whether potential 
or veridical, can by no means be yielded by a procedure that is flawed. 
Evidence statements, if true, objectively support a hypothesis, regardless of 
our beliefs and knowledge. While the truth of (presented) evidence is 
required in the explanationist theory, it is not the case that the truth of 
presented evidence entails, or even strongly suggests, that the presented 
evidence is genuine. Let us consider the duct tape example again. K’s 
biological trace left on the duct tape is real (or the claim about this 
information is true), but it does not necessarily mean that it is evidence of K 
being the killer. Since the duct tape does not actually provide sufficient 
evidence that K is the killer, the procedure yielding this evidence is flawed. 
Although whether E is evidence for H is independent of us, perhaps from the 
perspective of Achinstein, all scientists can do is approximate genuine 
evidence as closely as possible. 
 
If the procedure yielding the information at hand were not flawed, then this 
item of information would be potential evidence. In addition to the procedure 
that is not flawed, if the hypothesis under investigation is true, the information 
used to infer the hypothesis is veridical evidence. Since the footage 
recording information E about M being the murderer is not flawed, E is 
 28 
potential evidence.7 E is not veridical evidence unless M, rather than his twin 
brother M’, is the murderer.  
 
Achinstein’s definition of evidence, which I outlined at the outset, refers to the 
concept of potential evidence. Although scientists aim to seek veridical 
evidence, it is rarely obtained in the typical absence of knowing that H is true 
and that H and E are correctly explanatorily connected. Instead, potential 
evidence is a relatively achievable goal. The formal definitions of the four 
concepts of evidence can be given with his definition of potential evidence:  
 
E is potential evidence for H given B if and only if  
(a) P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) > 1/2;  
(b) E and B are true;  
(c) E does not entail H. 
 
The notion of veridical evidence demands more: 
E is veridical evidence for H given B if and only if E is potential 
evidence for H given B, in addition to the conditions:  
(d) H is true;   
(e) there is an explanatory connection between H and E.  
 
The notion of epistemic-situation evidence can be defined as: 
E is epistemic-situation evidence for H given B if and only if anyone in 
the same epistemic situation would believe that E is true and have 
justification for believing that E is veridical evidence for H given B. 
 
 
 
 
7 A formal way that fits Achinstein’s definition of evidence shows that the footage (E) is 
potential evidence that M is the murderer (H). Let B represent background knowledge about 
the reliability of the surveillance camera and about the birth rate of identical twins etc. and 
therefore let us assume P(H/E&B) = 0.95. As will be proved later, P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) = 
P(Exp(H,E)/H&E&B) x P(H/E&B). Since in the murder case, if H, E and B are true, H 
correctly explains E, that is, that M is the murderer (in fact M is not) correctly explains the 
murderer’s face in the footage. We obtain P(Exp(H,E)/H&E&B) ≈ 1, and thus 
P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) ≈ 1 x 0.95 = 0.95, which is much greater than 1/2.  
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Finally, the definition of subjective evidence is as follows: 
E is subjective evidence for H given B if and only if a person or 
community believes that E is veridical evidence for H given B.  
 
Achinstein’s notions of evidence cover two principal evidential relationships: 
objective support (OS), which is independent of one’s belief and concerned 
with the plausibility of H given E, and subjective acceptance (SA), which 
pertains to one’s justification in believing in H given E. But his notions of 
evidence are silent about how E guides us in further investigation H, which is 
the third principal evidential relationship, guidance (GD). In what follows, I 
will use the notion of potential evidence, which is the core of Achinstein’s 
theory of evidence, to discuss and evaluate his theory.8   
 
2.3 Good-Reason-to-Believe and Empirical Assumptions  
 
Achinstein (2014) examines the five standard theories of evidence, namely, 
the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account, the error-statistical account, the 
satisfaction view, the subjective Bayesian theory and the objective Bayesian 
theory. He concludes that they are not satisfactory candidate theories of 
evidence, since they do not meet one or two assumptions that a theory of 
evidence should meet, i.e. the good-reason-to-believe assumption and the 
empirical assumption.  
 
Good-reason-to-believe assumption:  
E is evidence for H given B only if P(H/E&B) > 1/2. 
 
Empirical assumption:  
Whether E is evidence for H given B is a matter of empirical fact 
beyond E and B’s being empirical facts.       
     
 
 
8 Rehg (2009, p. 85) holds a similar view, claiming that ‘[t]he category of potential evidence 
constitutes the realist core of Achinstein’s normative model of evidence’.   
 30 
The two assumptions show that what makes the giving of good reasons and 
the justification of a hypothesis work is that the evidence raises the 
probability of the truth of the hypothesis to a sufficient degree and that the 
evidential relationship is built on empirical investigation. With respect to the 
good-reason-to-believe assumption, potential evidence and veridical 
evidence, as noted above, are objectively good reasons to believe 
hypotheses to the extent that the ‘degree of reasonableness is an objective, 
non-physical, normative fact determined by … physical and mathematical 
facts’ (Achinstein, 2001, p. 97). Moreover, Achinstein’s definition of evidence, 
P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) > 1/2, entails P(H/E&B) > 1/2, which will be proved in 
Section 2.5.  
 
How much is good enough?9 Achinstein maintains that E is evidence for H 
given B only if, given B, E provides a good reason to believe H, and that E is 
a good reason to believe H given B only if P(H/E&B) > 1/2, which is 
sufficiently high for the threshold. The function of the threshold is in ensuring 
that it is not the case that E is evidence for H and ~H simultaneously. If the 
threshold is set at not greater than 1/2, an unfavourable result might occur. 
To illustrate this point, consider Achinstein’s (2001, p. 7) own coin example. 
Flipping a fair coin does not lean towards the probability of landing heads nor 
the probability of landing tails as the fair coin equally supports both, which 
equals not providing a good reason for either. However, if the threshold is set 
greater than 1/2, E begins to play an evidential role in supporting a 
hypothesis rather than its negation.  
 
It is worth remarking here that Reiss (2015) argues that a piece of putative 
evidence can play a role in indicating the truth of hypothesis H1 and the truth 
of its rival hypothesis H2. For example, a correlation between two variables 
(E) can be evidence not only for a causal relationship between the two 
 
9 Achinstein opposes slightly increased probability as evidence for a hypothesis. In the words 
of Achinstein (2010a, p. 38): ‘[A]lthough the fact that I am entering an elevator increases my 
chances of being in an elevator accident, it is not evidence that this will be so, even a little 
bit of evidence, since by itself it fails to provide any reason to believe this hypothesis’. 
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variables (H1) but also for selection bias (H2).10 In Reiss’s sense of evidence, 
even if P(H1/E) < 1/2 and P(H2/E) < 1/2, which do not meet the good-reason-
to-believe assumption, E is (direct) evidence both for H1 and H2 insofar as E 
is expected supposing that either H1 or H2 is true. Reiss’s definitions of 
evidence will be further discussed and examined in Chapter 4. The 
correlation, Reiss may claim, is evidence for either rival hypothesis 
simultaneously. However, in Achinstein’s framework, if E is evidence for H1, 
then it cannot be evidence for H2, which is incompatible with H1, since 
Achinstein (2001, p. 7) holds that ‘if e is a good reason to believe h, then it 
cannot also be a good reason to believe not-h or some proposition 
incompatible with h’.11  
 
Conciliation can more or less be made available, perhaps, in terms of further 
disambiguation of ‘evidence for what hypothesis’. Suppose the hypothesis of 
interest (H3) now is that there are some non-coincidence reasons that two 
variables are correlated (including, for example, causal relationship and 
selection bias). Let us assume that there is a mechanism linking the two 
correlated variables and that given this mechanism and correlation E, the 
probability that there is an explanatory connection between E and H3 is so 
high as to exceed Achinstein’s threshold of 1/2. In this case, Achinstein and 
Reiss should both agree that correlation E is evidence for H3, when 
relativised to a hypothesis in which the correlation arises from sheer 
coincidence; for example, the correlations between Venetian sea levels and 
British bread prices does not imply causation (Sober, 2001). Despite 
indicating that there are some non-coincidence reasons, in which the 
correlation indicates H1 and H2 equally, the correlation may not evidentially 
support H1 and H2 equally within the candidates for non-coincidence reasons. 
Thus, for Reiss, correlation is evidence of a causal relationship and selection 
bias simultaneously in a relatively loose sense, whereas, Achinstein and 
Reiss should agree, once the evidential settings are carefully specified, 
 
10 Selection bias is an error which occurs when subjects are not allocated at random to 
treatment groups and control groups. The outcomes of the study result in part from the 
systematic differences in characteristics between both groups. Hence the causal conclusion 
cannot be drawn from the outcomes (Last, 2001, p.166). 
11 Lower case nomenclature is used in the original. 
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correlation is evidence for one but not for the other, or is not evidence for 
either.        
 
This empirical assumption is proposed, mainly because Achinstein counters 
the view that whether E is evidence for H is a priori. Achinstein (1995) 
articulates the a priori thesis as follows:  
 
The only empirical fact that can affect the truth of evidential claims of 
the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h more than h’, or ‘e 
confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e. All other considerations are a 
priori. (Achinstein, 1995, pp. 448–449) 
 
The a priori thesis has been assumed in a host of theories of evidence, for 
example, the H-D account of evidence, the satisfaction view of evidence and 
Carnap’s objective Bayesian theory of evidence, all of which I shall discuss 
later. In short, presented with H and the truth of E, it is fully decidable a priori, 
via logical and/or mathematical calculations, whether E is evidence for H.  
  
Note that Achinstein (2010a, p. 42) does not declare that ‘all evidential 
statements are empirical’. On the contrary, he acknowledges that there are 
certain well-specified situations where the claim ‘E is evidence for H’ is 
decidable a priori. The birthday problem noted earlier offers a case in point. 
Suppose there are fifty people in a room (E). Let H represent at least two 
people who share the same birthday. Since P(H/E) is approximately 0.97, E 
is evidence for H a priori. Achinstein (1995) states that  
 
[i]f we insist that at least some (very basic) evidential claims are not 
subject to [unexpected flaws which falsify evidence statements], then 
we can say, more guardedly, that any evidential claim—and these will 
be numerous—whose truth-value can be affected by the existence of 
evidential flaws is an empirical claim.12 (Achinstein, 1995, p. 461) 
 
 
12 See also: ‘Although there are some a priori objective evidence claims, for the most part, 
objective evidence claims are empirical’ (Achinstein, 2005, p. 48). 
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Although he does not make it explicit what ‘very basic’ means, fully specified 
situations such as the birthday case should, at least, be part of evidential 
claims invulnerable to flaws. 
 
Achinstein is somewhat inconsistent here insofar as his empirical assumption 
states that whether E is evidence for H is a matter of empirical fact. I 
therefore modify the assumption as follows:  
 
Empirical assumption (*):  
Whether E is evidence for H given B is mostly a matter of empirical 
fact beyond E and B’s being empirical facts.    
 
Strategically, one can remain neutral about (*) while refuting the a priori 
thesis with a single evidential claim withdrawn on the basis of further 
empirical facts that shows that the procedure yielding the evidence is flawed. 
A drug example will be provided later, as a case in point.  
 
In Achinstein’s view, evidential relations are objective to the extent to which 
they are independent of us, with no bearing on whether we can know them a 
priori. The pair of concepts, a priori versus a posteriori, does not necessarily 
co-occur with the pair, objective versus subjective. When a claim is a priori, it 
means that such a claim can be known prior to experience, hence an 
epistemic topic. Objectivity, by contrast, is an ontological topic, which is 
concerned with dependence on or independence from us. If a claim is 
objectively true, it may or may not be true a priori. The logical truth that P 
entails P or the mathematical truth that 1+1 = 2 is objective and known a 
priori. By contrast, a claim that DNA samples can identify biological 
relationships between parent and child is a posteriori true and independent 
of our beliefs. The reverse may hold as well: if a claim is a priori true, it may 
or may not be objectively true. A form of a subjective a priori thesis is as 
follows: ‘The only empirical facts that can affect the truth of evidential claims 
of the form ‘e is evidence for h for subject S’ (or ‘e confirms h more than h′ 
for S’, or ‘e confirms h to degree r for S’) are: (a) the truth of e; and (b) the 
fixed values of S’s conditional degrees of belief (such as P(h, e)) 
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(Rowbottom, 2013, p. 2824, lower case nomenclature in the original). This a 
priori thesis is subjective, in that the evidential claim that E is evidence for H 
is dependent on individuals.  
 
Achinstein and many a priori theorists agree that the evidential claim that E is 
evidence for H is objective.13 That is, whether E is evidence for H (or E 
confirms H) does not depend upon anyone’s beliefs or knowledge 
(Achinstein, 1995, p. 448). For example, the fact that a certain DNA sample 
examined by DNA paternity testing shows that two male individuals having a 
biological relationship between parent and child is evidence that they are 
father and son, without regard to what anyone believes or knows. No matter 
whether the claim that the DNA is evidence for the biological relationship is a 
priori or not, depending upon different theories of evidence, this claim is 
objective rather than subjective. In addition, Achinstein and many a priori 
theorists agree, or can in principle agree, that whether E is evidence for H 
rests partly on the empirical fact of E’s truth. If no such fact exists concerning 
the DNA sample, it is false, or at least questionable, that the claim about the 
sample is evidence that one is the father of the other. This illustrates that the 
truth of evidential claims should be presupposed even on a priori accounts of 
evidence.14    
 
13 Not all a priori theorists agree that evidential claims are objective. Some subjective 
Bayesians, for example, Bruno de Finetti (1937 pp. 106–107), take probabilities as degrees 
of belief, whose values are fixed. Suppose P(H/E1) and P(H/E1&E2) are accessible purely a 
priori within one’s mind. After receiving an additional piece of information from experience, 
someone updates the degree of belief about H from P(H/E1) to P(H/E1&E2). In this update, 
P(H/E1) is not refuted and instead, as the evidence mounts up, is simply replaced by 
P(H/E1&E2). The values of P(H/E1) and P(H/E1&E2) themselves remain unchanged. This 
entire updating process conforms to Bayes’ theorem. 
14 Achinstein (1995, p. 448) asserts that 'normally a claim of the form “e is evidence for h” (or 
“e confirms h to degree r”) entails or presupposes that e is true. … But if the truth of “e is 
evidence for h” requires the truth of e, then since e is empirical (theorists in question are 
concerned only with empirical evidence), the a priori thesis is obviously false from the 
outset’. To avoid this obviously trivial falsehood, he articulates the a priori thesis, with the 
requirement of the truth of E, noted above in the main text. Having said this, a priori theorists 
may or may not subscribe to the view that E is evidence for H only if E is true. For example, 
a proponent of the H-D account might simply say that if H entails E, E is evidence for H, 
irrespective of the truth of E. That two people are genetically related given background 
knowledge entails that their DNA samples have a particular pattern in common. For the H-D 
account, before DNA was discovered (or constructed), DNA samples were still evidence for 
genetical relationships, no matter whether DNA had been discovered or not. By analogy, 
consider statements with a universal quantification, such as ‘all men are mortal, which can 
be paraphrased as ‘if S is a man, S is mortal’. There can be no existential import in this 
universally quantified statement, that is, this statement does not imply the existence of men. 
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In spite of the agreements both parties may reach, Achinstein (1995) 
contends that the a priori thesis is erroneous: it cannot account for cases 
where a claim that was previously taken as evidence turns out to be found 
yielded by a flawed procedure and therefore can no longer serve as 
evidence. According to the a priori thesis, once claim E is, or is labelled as, 
evidence for H, however many empirical facts stream in, it will not change 
the role or the label of being evidence. If E is true and is evidence for H a 
priori, there need not be further empirical inquiry into whether or not E is so. 
This resembles logical or mathematical truths: they are knowable without 
empirical investigation. Sometimes one may be mistaken about them, but 
they will not turn out to be false, even if one believes that they are. The 
original and the (*) empirical assumptions, despite also deeming an 
evidential relation (‘E is evidence for H’) objective, both hold that E could 
mistakenly be labelled as evidence, which may be revealed by further 
empirical facts. 
 
To illustrate, consider Achinstein’s (1995) own example of a study that was 
designed to find whether a new drug D relieves symptoms S and which 
obtained a positive result: 
 
E1: 1000 patients presenting with S were given D, with 950 of them 
having their S relieved. 
 
There are a hypothesis of interest and background knowledge: 
 
H: Hilary’s symptoms S will be relieved after she takes D. 
B: Hilary, with symptoms S, takes D.   
 
 
This view bears on the concept of empty domain and free logic. For further discussion, see 
Leonard (2002, Chapter 2). However, as far as the concept of evidence in common use is 
concerned, it seems not problematic when one says that a DNA sample is, or would be, 
evidence for their genetic relationship but there is no such DNA sample. Yet it is bizarre 
when one says that the DNA sample is evidence for their genetic relationship but there is no 
such DNA sample. In the latter situation, when saying E is evidence for H, we presuppose 
the existence of E. 
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At first glance, E1 seems to be strong evidence for H. The overwhelming 
majority of patients given D in the study were relieved of S, so it is expected 
that Hilary’s symptoms S are very likely to be relieved by drug D. At this 
stage, if a priori theorists adopt, for example, Rudolf Carnap’s confirmation 
function c* based on the empirical and logical factors, they would conclude 
that E1 confirms H to the degree 0.92, and that E1 is evidence for H insofar as 
P(H/E1) is sufficiently high or P(H/E1) > P(H) (=0.375)  (Achinstein, 1995, pp. 
472–473).  
 
Nevertheless, upon allowing for the new information, we will find the 
ostensibly strong evidential relationship between E1 and H to be debunked.     
 
E2: A companion study of equal size of patients with S who were not 
given D reported that 990 of them experienced relief of S, even more 
quickly than in the first study. 
 
Contrasting the new item of information E2 with the preceding information E1, 
it is indicated that the drug D is not causally efficacious in relieving symptoms 
S. If D were clinically effective, the percentage of relief in the treatment arm 
should be greater than that in the control arm. In effect, 95% of the patients 
taking D feel relieved, but 99% of the patients not taking D had the same 
effect. There is another explanation for H (e.g. if H were true, H because of 
the immune system resilient to D) that is more likely than E1’s explaining H, if 
H were true. In this regard, the study yielding E1 is flawed by virtue of not 
being sufficiently informative about H. Information E1 is, in the light of E2, 
shown not to be evidence or good evidence for H.  
 
The first study does not include and is not compared to the control group, 
which can give a baseline clinical assessment to test whether drug D has 
causal efficacy for symptoms S. Evidently, E1 fails to serve as evidence for H 
when E2 is factored in. This additional empirical information E2, Achinstein 
argues, leads us to the conclusion that the a priori thesis should be 
repudiated: this thesis maintains that E1, once being true and identified as 
evidence for H, remains evidence for H perpetually on the basis that E1 and 
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H are in an evidential relationship a priori, unchanged by any empirical facts, 
which clearly does not make sense in the drug example. For this reason, 
Achinstein (1995) insists that the empirical assumption that whether or not E 
is evidence for H, given B, is a matter of empirical fact beyond E and B’s 
being empirical facts should be presupposed, or at least applied for most 
cases, in any theory of evidence.      
 
In defence of the possibility of the a priori thesis, Rowbottom (2013) argues 
that cases in support of the empirical assumption can also be explained from 
the a priori perspective by changing background knowledge B.15 In doing so, 
he considers a way of laying bare necessary background information, 
instead of burying this in elliptical evidential claims.16 The background 
knowledge can be expressed as: the study referred to in E1 was not flawed, 
which Rowbottom (2013, p. 2827) coins the working assumption. The basic 
idea is that E and B are manoeuvrable and jointly constitute evidence — 
evidence is not necessarily restricted to E itself.  
 
To see how this idea works, consider the possible expressions of the drug 
example along the lines of Achinstein’s and Rowbottom’s thoughts 
respectively. For Achinstein, the procedure yielding E1 is considered flawed, 
because E2 comes in exposing the insufficiency of E1 (and B jointly) as 
evidence for H; E1 was evidence for H but becomes non-evidence for H. The 
case Achinstein wishes to make is that whether or not E1 is evidence is 
determined by empirical information other than E1. One may defend the a 
priori thesis by asserting that given that the truths of E1 and E2 are empirically 
decidable, it is a priori true that E1 is evidence for H and E1&E2 is not 
 
15 Rowbottom’s (2013, p. 2828, italics in original) position is as follows: ‘[T]here is no 
evidence from the way that science is done (in the sense of scientific method) which tells in 
favour of either view of evidence, a priori or empirical. Conversely, I also hold that neither 
view of evidence has any direct consequences for scientific method’.   
16 Achinstein (2001, p. 10) anticipated this kind of defence of the a priori thesis and replied: 
‘There are cases … where enough information is packed into the e-statement to make the 
claim that e is evidence that h a priori. But these cases are the exception, not the rule. Nor 
am I denying that it is possible to transform an empirically evidential claim into an a priori 
one by incorporating a sufficient amount of additional information of a sort that might be 
used in defending the empirically evidential claim. But even if this is possible, that will not 
suffice to alter the empirical character of the original evidential claim, or demonstrate that the 
original claim is incomplete until this transformation occurs’.  
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evidence for H, or the degree of support that E1 confers upon H is fixed at r1 
and the degree of support that E1 and E2 confer upon H is fixed at r2. 
However, this line of defence is not satisfactory. It cannot explain that once 
E1 (for example, to the degree 0.92 according to Carnap’s favourite 
confirmation function c*) is obtained and is regarded as evidence, we still 
have a motivation for seeking new information such as E2 (Achinstein, 1995, 
pp. 452–453). For Achinsein, the a priori thesis is therefore wrong. 
 
There is another equally convincing interpretation in Rowbottom’s analysis. A 
priori theorists actually regard background knowledge as working 
assumptions B*, i.e. the procedure yielding E1 is not flawed. Rowbottom 
(2013) remarks that:  
 
Clearly, the advocate of the a priori theory will say, this conditional 
probability is positive, and indeed equal to unity. After all, [H] is 
entailed by the conjunction of [E1 and B*]. (Rowbottom, 2013, p. 2827) 
 
From the quote above, we can see that Rowbottom attaches an entailment 
condition to an a priori theory of evidence if the theory is intended to meet 
Achinstein’s challenge. At the very least, E1, coupled with B*, sufficiently 
shows the truth of H. There is no E as evidence alone for H, so on this 
reading, the a priori thesis, with a new addition of B*, is understood as:  
 
The only empirical fact that can affect the truth of evidential claims of 
the form ‘E, given B*, is evidence for H’ is the truth of E and B*, where 
E and B* in tandem guarantee the truth of the evidential claims. All 
other considerations are a priori.  
 
A story different from Achinstein’s can be told. In Rowbottom’s interpretation, 
the reason that E1 is not evidence is that B contains no working assumptions. 
No matter whether E1, coupled with B, guarantees or sufficiently ensures the 
truth of H, it is undecidable a priori whether or not E1 is evidence for H. 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to claim that E1, coupled with B*, is evidence 
for H. In the drug example, B* may represent perfectly designed and 
perfectly conducted trials for the treatment and control groups. Even so, 
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according to Rowbottom, the truths of E1 and B* are a matter of empirical fact 
and the way to determine their truths is not so different from the way that 
scientists delineated by Achinstein determine the truths of E and an 
evidential claim that E is evidence for H. Both ways call for empirical 
investigations.    
 
From the a priori viewpoint, similar to the logical and mathematical truths, the 
truths of evidential claims are never refutable. The claim that E1, coupled 
with B*, is evidence for H is a priori true, thereby remaining unchanged and 
persisting. It is impossible that there be another piece of evidential 
information left out showing any flaw in E1 coupled with B*. All the necessary 
evidential information about E1 and B* is integrated into a compact package 
called ‘evidence’ that amounts to E in Achinstein’s version of the a priori 
thesis. In this regard, E, namely E1&B*, is empirically decidable, and the 
evidential claim that E is evidence for H is decidable a priori. Likewise, 
E1&E2, coupled with B*’ (namely, there are no flaws in the studies that yield 
E1 and E2), is not evidence for H. As such, the drug example does not violate 
the a priori thesis. If Rowbottom’s defence can be applied to every evidential 
claim, then not only is the a priori thesis true, but Achinstein’s empirical 
assumption also cannot hold. Alternatively, on a less radical note, 
Rowbottom’s defence minimally implies that the empirical assumption does 
not prevail over the a priori thesis by virtue of the drug example.17 
  
It is unclear what an a priori theory of evidence Rowbottom has in mind. The 
‘working assumption’ strategy requires a theory in which E, coupled with B*, 
entails or at least sufficiently ensures the truth of H. Which existing a priori 
approach enjoys the privilege remains uncertain. The H-D account is 
formulated reversely: E is evidence for H given B if and only if H&B entails E. 
Glymour’s (1980b) bootstrap theory is not a candidate either: it holds that E 
 
17 Rowbottom anticipates the possible objection that B* requires further evidence from a non-
flawed procedure to ensure B*, which leads to an infinite regress. He replies: ‘[A]ll this 
shows is that we have to stop somewhere, which is old epistemological news. This is just a 
special case of the well-known regress problem. It is not ultimately pertinent to the a priori 
thesis. In asking whether e is evidence for h we do not require that there is further evidence 
for e. We require only that e is true’ (Rowbottom, 2013, p. 2827). 
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is evidence for H relative to theory T if and only if an instance of H is derived 
from E in concert with T. Carnap’s objective Bayesian approach seems 
promising for this strategy as long as B* is taken into account. In the drug 
example, even though the degree of confirmation is sufficiently high at 0.92 
in Carnap’s system, it is unclear whether E1 is evidence for H, since B* is not 
included in the calculation. At any rate, it may be worth incorporating B* into 
Carnap’s confirmation function c* in terms of logical-linguistic properties of 
sentences. Perhaps Rowbottom would consider an a priori subjective 
Bayesian approach to evidence whereby P(H/E&B*) is fixed a priori within 
one’s mind and updating the degree of belief with a new piece of information 
E′ amounts to moving from P(H/E&B*) to P(H/E′&B*’), which is also fixed a 
priori within one’s mind. Going back to the drug example, if P(H/E1&B*) is 
sufficiently high or higher than the prior probability of H for researchers, E1 is 
evidence for H for them. Supposing that the study result is not E1 but E1’: 
1000 patients presenting with S were given D, with only 50 of them having 
their S relieved, if researchers believe that E1’ is not sufficiently high nor 
higher than the prior, then E1’ is not evidence for H.  
 
The debate is not easily settled. Achinstein and Rowbottom individually 
provide an alternative explanation for the drug example. However, granted 
that Achinstein’s counter-example to the a priori thesis is intuitively 
appealing, the fact that the a priori thesis is refuted is one thing and the fact 
that the empirical assumption generally holds is another. The empirical 
assumption (consider (*) here) requires more: whether E is evidence for H, 
given B, is mostly a matter of empirical fact beyond E and B’s being empirical 
facts. Rowbottom (2013, pp. 2831-2833) argues that the empirical 
assumption does not square with evidential reasoning in a particular 
circumstance, namely artificial intelligence, where algorithms, parameters 
and probability distributions are pre-set, pre-written and installed into the 
programmes that are employed to conduct empirical investigation such as 
scientific discovery. The programmes adjust the probabilities of hypotheses 
in response to new information. Whether E, coupled with B, is evidence for H 
is the a priori ramification. It should, nevertheless, be acknowledged that the 
case of artificial intelligence does not directly refute the empirical 
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assumption: it only indicates one inapplicable setting for this assumption. 
However, positive reasons for the empirical assumption are also wanting. 
The upshot is that this assumption had better be regarded as prescription 
rather than description.  
 
2.4 Examining Five Theories of Evidence  
 
Following Achinstein’s analysis (2014), let us bear in mind the good-reason-
to-believe assumption and the empirical assumption and examine the five 
theories of evidence in sequence. The H-D account of evidence holds that E 
is evidence for H given B if and only if (a) H in combination with B entails E 
and (b) E and B are true. It fails both the good-reason-to-believe assumption 
and the empirical assumption. To see why the H-D account may violate the 
good-reason-to-believe assumption, suppose that there is a fabricated law 
called Lepler’s first law, which mistakenly states that the planets revolve 
around the sun in square orbits and that this law entails the fact that the sun 
exists. The existence of the sun, according to the H-D account, counts as 
evidence for Lepler’s first law; however, it is not evidence for Lepler’s first law 
in that P(Lepler’s first law / the existence of the sun) is almost zero. The truth 
condition of (a) is independent of any empirical matter and can be 
determined a priori and thus it also does not meet the empirical assumption.  
 
The error-statistical account of evidence developed by Deborah Mayo (1996) 
states that data E from test T is evidence for hypothesis H if and only if H has 
passed a severe test T with a result of E. Passing a severe test is 
determined by two criteria: fit and severity. To meet the ‘fit’ criterion, P(E(T); 
H) is not low or at least greater than P(E(T); ~H), where E(T) denotes the 
data E yielded by test T and P(E(T); H) denotes the probability of E(T) under 
the assumption that H is true. To meet the ‘severity’ criterion, T would yield a 
result that fits H less well than E if H were false, construed as P(E(T); ~H) 
being low.18 Mayo wishes to draw researchers’ attention to the control and 
 
18 E(T), instead of E, is used here to emphasise the key role of severe testing. For example, 
if the severity criterion is understood merely as P(E; ~H) being low, which may subject the 
criterion to an unfavourable situation: a rigged hypothesis can maximally fit the data, even if 
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assessment of a test’s severity rather than just the fit. Her definition of 
evidence can be framed as: 
 
E is evidence for H relative to T if and only if P(E(T); H) > P(E(T); ~H) 
and P(E(T); ~H) is low.19 
 
Priors and posterior probabilities, if any, are not responsible for the 
identification of evidence in this definition.  
 
Note that the symbol ‘;’ in P(E; H) representing a frequentist probability 
contrasts with ‘/’ in P(E/H), the notation which Bayesians and other 
conditionalists typically employ for a conditional probability.20 For a 
conditional probability, we need to condition only upon ‘random variables or 
their values’ (Mayo, 2018, p. 205); however, frequentists, including error 
statisticians,21 maintain that P(E; H) should be interpreted as: the probability 
of E under the assumption that H correctly describes the data generation 
procedure. Here H is framed in terms of an unknown, constant parameter 
that defines the data-generating procedure, so there is no such thing as 
conditioning on a random variable or event, for example, P(Y = y/X) or P(Y = 
y/X = x), where X and Y denotes random variables, x and y denotes their 
values, and X = x and Y = y are events.22 The frequentist probability is not 
 
it is false. A severe test must come into play and rule out ways that the hypothesis may be 
false, which can be encapsulated in the claim that P(~E(T); ~H) is low. 
19 Here I use Mayo’s (2005, p.124, footnote 3) minimal requirement for the fit probability, 
which will not affect the point I wish to make. 
20 Overall, frequentists and Bayesians construe ‘probability’ in a distinctive way, which has 
been described by the statisticians David Draper and David Madigan (1997, p. 18): ‘In the 
frequentist definition of probability, you restrict attention to phenomena that are inherently 
repeatable under identical conditions, and define probability as a limiting proportion in a 
hypothetical infinite series of such repetitions. In the Bayesian approach, you imagine 
betting with someone about the truth of a proposition (which can be anything—not just an 
aspect of a repeatable process—whose truth value is not yet known), and ask yourself what 
odds you would need to give or receive to make the bet fair’.   
21 Though belonging to the frequentist camp and speak the same probabilistic language as 
other frequentists, error statisticians are contrasted with classical statisticians, Fisherian or 
Neyman-Pearsonian (Mayo, 2018, p. 55). 
22 Hypotheses and data are accorded different inferential meanings in accordance with 
which approach is taken: ‘When we reason in a frequentist way, … we view the data as 
random and the unknown as fixed. When we are thinking Bayesianly, we hold constant 
things we know, including the data values, … — the data are fixed and the unknowns are 
random’ (Draper and Madiganv, 1997, p. 18).  
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akin to the formal Bayesian computation. For the sake of argument, let us 
assume that error statisticians and conditionalists have common ground to 
continue the discussion on evidence, for which error statisticians would 
provisionally grant the conditional probability symbol ‘/’.23  
 
To examine whether this theory meets the good-reason-to-believe 
assumption and the empirical assumption, consider an example modified 
from Colin Howson (1997). Suppose that a subject undergoes a test that can 
detect whether one has disease D. If the subject has the disease (Hs), the 
test yields a positive result (E(T)) 95% of the time; therefore P(E(T)/Hs) = 
95%. If the subject does not have disease D (~Hs), the test yields a positive 
result (E(T)) 1%; therefore, P(E(T)/~Hs) = 1%. P(E(T)/Hs) > P(E(T)/~Hs) 
shows that the positive result fits the hypothesis that the subject has D, and 
P(E(T)/~Hs) being low shows that the test yielding the positive result has high 
severity. The positive result, nevertheless, may not count as evidence for the 
hypothesis that the subject has disease D. Suppose that the prevalence of D 
in a certain population is very low, say 1/100,000. This can reasonably be 
taken as the prior probability, P(Hs) = 1/100,000, meaning that the subject is 
very unlikely to have D before the test. The posterior probability is then 
expressed as: 
 
 P(Hs/E(T)) 
 = P(E(T)/Hs)P(Hs) / [P(E(T)/Hs)P(Hs)+P(E(T)/~Hs)P(~Hs)] 
 = (95% x 1/100,000) / [(95% x 1/100,000 + 1% x (1−1/100,000)] 
 ≈ 0.095%. 
 
The positive result counts as evidence in the error-statistical account, but this 
example blatantly violates Achinstein’s good-reason-to-believe assumption.24 
The empirical assumption, however, is satisfied in the error-statistical theory 
since the test is an empirical matter and P(E(T)/Hs) is also empirically 
 
23 Mayo (2005, p. 112) in fact took this strategy when claiming that ‘we use the conditional 
probability symbol “/”, since Achinstein is mounting a Bayesian criticism’. 
24 This exemplifies the so-called base-rate fallacy, which occurs when the prior probability of 
the disease (the ‘base rate’) is ignored (Howson and Urbach, 2006, p. 24). 
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decidable.   
 
It is disputable whether the error-statistical account does not meet the good-
reason-to-believe assumption (see Achinstein, 2001, pp. 134–140; Mayo, 
2005). Note that Mayo (2005, p.113) eschews prior probabilities, holding that 
priors ‘are nearly always unavailable or irrelevant for scientific contexts’. She 
doubts whether the argumentative move that equates the priors concerning 
the population and the priors concerning the individual of interest is 
defensible. Regarding the foregoing example, despite accepting that P(H) 
can be objectively obtained through a random sampling from the given 
population with a particular relative frequency of disease D, 1/100,000, Mayo 
rejects the assumption: P(H: a person randomly selected from the population 
has D) = P(Hs).25 Mayo (2005) considers such an assumption fallacious, 
which she calls the fallacy of probabilistic instantiation; given P(H) = 
1/100,000, it does not follow that P(Hs) = 1/100,000. From the frequentist 
perspective, Hs is either true or not, even if this, not another, subject is 
randomly selected from the population; there is no such thing as assigning 
probability to a unique event. By contrast, H concerning some subject 
randomly selected from the population is viewed as a generic type of event, 
or a random variable, such that P(H) is admissible (Mayo, 2018, p. 407). 
Instead of pursuing the debate,26 I simply wish to point out that in this kind of 
well-specified case, many medical scientists nevertheless accept the figures 
based on the frequencies (e.g. a clinician estimates the post-test probability 
of a unique patient by using sensitivity, specificity and prevalence) 
(Florkowski, 2008). Those who accept priors concerning the individual would 
agree that the good-reason-to-believe assumption fails here.  
 
This does not mean that Mayo’s conception of evidence is inferior to 
Achinstein’s. In terms of the good-reason-to-believe assumption, Mayo’s 
account looks unsatisfactory, but this is because this assumption has 
equated a necessary condition for evidence with high posterior probability, 
 
25 This is called an empirical or frequentist prior (Mayo, 2018, p. 185).   
26 Achinstein and Mayo’s debate ensued (See Achinstein, 2010b; Mayo, 2010). 
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one that is objected to by Mayo in the belief that the priors regarding unique 
events are dubious. Mayo (1997, p. 325, italics in original) defends the error-
statistical account elsewhere writing: ‘Since calculating posterior probabilities 
via Bayes’ theorem requires the introduction of prior probabilities (to an 
exhaustive set of hypotheses) and since these are unavailable in testing 
scientific hypotheses regarded as true or false, posteriors are quite 
deliberately not made the goal of NP tests’. Furthermore, in the diagnosis 
example, P(E(T)/H) / P(E(T)/~H) is extremely high. In Bayesian terms, the 
high likelihood ratio still boosts the probability of H even with the extremely 
low prior probability. This conception of evidence is in part captured by 
Carnap’s (1962, p. xvi) confirmation as increase in firmness: E 
(incrementally) confirms H relative to B if and only if P(H/E&B) > P(H/B). 
 
The satisfaction view of evidence is illustrated by Hempel’s theory of 
confirmation and Glymour’s bootstrap theory. Glymour’s (1980b) bootstrap 
theory advocates Hempel’s core idea that evidence is a positive instance of a 
hypothesis and resolves some problems that Hempel’s theory of confirmation 
encounters. Theoretical terms for example, are not included in Hempel’s 
theory of confirmation, which is enumerative induction, so that instances 
cannot be used to confirm a theory containing theoretical vocabulary. The 
claim ‘a raven is black’ confirms ‘all ravens are black’ but in Hempel’s 
account, the claim ‘the sun produces certain types of lines in a spectrograph 
of light’ cannot confirm the hypothesis ‘all stars contain Helium’. For now, I 
shall concentrate on Glymour’s bootstrap theory and discuss whether it 
meets the good-reason-to-believe assumption and the empirical assumption.  
 
Glymour’s bootstrap theory holds that E is evidence for H relative to theory T 
if and only if an instance of H is derived from E in concert with the 
hypotheses (H′, H′′, etc.) other than H in T. T is comprised of H, H′, H′′ and so 
forth, which involve theoretical (unobservable) vocabulary. To see whether E 
confirms a particular H amounts to checking whether other Hs within T, 
combined with E (observational), derive an instance of H. Appealing only to 
certain portions of T itself to establish evidential relevance between E and a 
targeted H, repeating this procedure to other Hs, and eventually confirming T 
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as a whole are as much as ‘T’s pulling itself up by its own bootstraps’.  
 
Glymour’s (1980b, p. 150) main example from the history of science presents 
a brief sketch of how this theory operates. Newton’s law of universal 
gravitation (H) describes the inverse-square property of forces between 
bodies. In support of the law, Newton considered Kepler’s laws as evidence 
(E), which, however, do not contain the theoretical term ‘force’. Appealing to 
his second law of motion (other H in T), which mentioned the term ‘force’ (by 
stating that the force acting upon a body is the product of its mass times its 
acceleration), Newton eventually derived the law of universal gravitation from 
Kepler’s laws combined with the second law of motion. According to 
Glymour’s bootstrap theory, Kepler’s laws are evidence for Newton’s law of 
universal gravitation.  
 
However, Achinstein’s (1983, pp. 358–359) example indicates that Glymour’s 
bootstrap theory does not satisfy the good-reason-to-believe assumption. 
Consider theory T, which consists of the following two equations, or 
hypotheses:  
  
H1: A (the total force acting on a particle) = C (the quantity of God’s 
attention focused on a particle); 
 H2: B (the product of a particle’s mass and acceleration) = C. 
 
The values of A and B are measured by experiments. According to 
Glymour’s bootstrap theory, a claim E describing both A and B is evidence 
for H1 relative to T, on the basis that B and H2 jointly determine the value of 
C, equal to that of A obtained experimentally and in turn, H1 is derived. But 
there is no support that P(H1/the values of A and B) is greater than half. Nor 
does Glymour’s theory satisfy the empirical assumption, because an 
instance of H being derived from E in concert with T is a priori decidable. 
 
On the view of the subjective Bayesian theory of evidence, E is evidence for 
H given B if and only if P(H/E&B) > P(H/B), where a probability is interpreted 
as the degree of belief and the only constraint is that the degree of belief 
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should obey the probability axioms. It does not satisfy the good-reason-to-
believe assumption. For instance, the fact that Robert buys a lottery ticket is 
insufficiently strong to be evidence that he will win even though, according to 
the subjective Bayesian theory, it increases the probability of Robert winning 
the lottery. The subjective Bayesian theory, however, generally meets the 
empirical assumption, because a probability is viewed as the degree of 
belief, which is determined by a matter of empirical fact.27  
 
The final standard theory of evidence, the objective Bayesian theory of 
evidence, does not meet the good-reason-to-believe assumption and the 
empirical assumption if we adopt Carnap’s interpretation of probability.28 For 
Carnap (1962), the probability is fixed by the relationships between the 
logical-linguistic properties of sentences, for instance, H and E.29 When it 
comes to an evidential relation, two definitions of evidence can be 
considered. The first is concerned with Carnap’s qualitative concept of 
confirmation, same as in subjective Bayesianism: E is evidence for H given B 
if and only if P(H/E&B) > P(H/B). The second is Carnap’s quantitative 
concept of confirmation, in which E is evidence for H given B if and only if 
P(H/E&B) attains a certain high degree r. The first definition does not fulfil the 
good-reason-to-believe assumption, just as subjective Bayesianism fails to 
do. However, there is an example to illustrate that the second definition fulfils 
the good-reason-to-believe assumption but does so in a trivial manner. Given 
that people die under the age of 150 (B), the fact that Mr. Y drinks water 
every day (E), according to objective Bayesianism, counts as evidence that 
he will die before the age of 150 (H) because P(H/E&B) is equal to one, 
 
27 This is not always the case. Some, like de Finetti (1937 pp. 106–107), may take an a priori 
subjective Bayesian position. 
28 Objective Bayasians can adopt different interpretations. For example, one is that objective 
Bayesianism should conform to the three norms: probability, calibration and equivocation 
(Williamson, 2010). For more details, see Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
29 The logical-linguistic relations can be explicated by the following example. Suppose that 
there are four collectively exhaustive descriptions (state descriptions in Carnap’s 
terminology) of H and E, namely, (H&E), (H&~E), (~H&E) and (~H&~E). The degree of 
confirmation is expressed in terms of logical measure functions m( ⋅ ), which assign numbers 
to each description under the constraint that the sum of the measures should be equal to 
unity. Assume m(H&E) = 1/3, m(H&~E) = 1/6, m(~H&E) = 1/6 and m(~H&~E) = 1/3. Then 
P(H/E) = r is obtained: P(H/E) = m(H&E) / m(E) = m(H&E) / m([H&E] v [~H&E]). In this case, 
the value of P(H/E) = (1/3) / (1/3+1/6) = 2/3. 
 48 
though P(H/B) already equals one. Carnap’s objective Bayesian theory 
nonetheless fails to meet the empirical assumption, because whether P(H/E) 
attains a certain level is a priori, depending only upon logical-linguistic 
relations and calculation. 
 
2.5 Explanation as Evidential Relevance 
 
Relevance matters when it comes to evidential reasoning. Even if there is an 
account of evidence that regards drinking water as evidence for dying before 
the age of 150 and that meets the good-reason-to-believe assumption and 
the empirical assumption, we may still feel reluctant to call it evidence. This 
is because the maximum life span for humans does not exceed 150, 
regardless of whether one drinks water or not. Achinstein thus offers his 
explanationist theory of evidence that he believes meets the two 
assumptions and avoids irrelevance of H to E. For convenience, I repeat his 
theory here: E is evidence for H given B if and only if (a) P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) > 
1/2; (b) E and B are true; (c) E does not entail H. Achinstein argues that the 
high probability condition is a necessary but not a sufficient component to an 
account of evidence, and thus employs the explanatory connection between 
E and H to secure the relevance between E and H. This is, in my terms, 
where a relevance-mediating vehicle comes into play. The explanationist 
theory employs explanatory connection as the relevance-mediating vehicle 
by which E is labelled evidence. 
 
In order to appropriately characterise potential evidence, the kind of 
explanatory connection required should be clarified. Regarding the 
clarification, two considerations should be applied. For one thing, it is too 
stringent to require only the common uni-directional explanation in which H 
explains E (Achinstein, 2001, p. 150). The examples of no heartbeat and the 
101st toss of a coin in the opening of this chapter are cases in point. For 
these reasons, Achinstein urges multi-directional explanatory relationships 
between H and E, namely, H explains E, E explains H, or another hypothesis 
explains both.  
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Furthermore, it is too stringent to require that there exist an explanatory 
connection between H and E (Achinstein, 2001, pp. 150–151). To illustrate 
this point, consider the example of a treatment. Suppose that treatment T 
was confirmed to be 95% effective in relieving symptoms S (E) in well-
controlled trials. With E, it was predicted that Henry’s symptoms S would be 
relieved after he took T (H). His symptoms S ended up being relieved not 
because of treatment T, but because his immune system adapted its 
response. Nevertheless, E should be regarded as (potential) evidence for H 
regardless of whether or not E does explain H. Like the footage example 
above, it is sufficient that there is likely to be a constant explanatory 
connection between H and E. 
 
By synthesising the two considerations, Achinstein (2001, p. 151) concludes 
that ‘[w]hat is needed for potential evidence is not that there is an 
explanatory connection between h and e, but that, assuming the truth of both 
e and h, there probably is such a connection’. That there is likely to be an 
explanatory connection is formalised with an apparatus shown in the 
condition (a) P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) > 1/2, as noted at the outset of this chapter. 
The condition (a) entails that P(H/E&B) > 1/2, the latter which is a necessary 
condition of E being good reason for H. Achinstein (2001, p. 153, italics in 
original) holds that ‘from the definition of explanatory connection, “there is an 
explanatory connection between h and e” entails h’, which amounts to 
Exp(H,E) entailing H. It can be shown that P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) = P(H/E&B) x 
P(Exp(H,E)/H&E&B).30 The proof is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
30 P(H/E&B) > 1/2 is entailed with the following proof: given that p = qr, p > 1/2, 0 £ q, r £ 1, 
we obtain q = p/r ≥ p > 1/2. By substituting P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) for p, P(H/E&B) for q, and 
P(Exp(H,E)/H&E&B) for r, we obtain P(H/E&B) > 1/2.  
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 P(Exp(H,E)/E&B)  
 = P(Exp(H,E)&E&B) / P(E&B) 
 = [P(H&E&B) / P(E&B)] × [P(Exp(H,E)&E&B) / P(H&E&B)] 
 = P(H/E&B) × [P(Exp(H,E)&H&E&B) / P(H&E&B)] 
   [since Exp(H,E) entails H] 
 = P(H/E&B) × P(Exp(H,E)/H&E&B). 
 
If, given E and B, it is more than 50% likely that there is an explanatory 
connection between H and E, then, given E and B, E is a good reason to 
believe H. However, if only P(H/E&B) is high, it, at most, shows that there is 
some good reason that H is true, but not necessarily as a result of E (i.e. E 
may not be that reason). Moreover, the fact that P(H/E&B) and 
P(Exp(H,E)/H&E&B) are both high does not ensure P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) > 1/2. 
Suppose P(H/E&B) = 0.8 and P(Exp(H,E)/H&E&B) = 0.6. It follows that 
P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) = 0.8 × 0.6 = 0.48, which is smaller than 0.5, meaning that 
E is not a good reason to believe H.  
 
The empirical assumption is met by (a) P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) > 1/2 and (b) E and 
B are true. The truth of E and of B is an empirical matter. Whether a high 
probability exists of there being an explanatory relation between H and E is 
neither a matter of logic relations nor a matter of mathematical relations, so 
(a) fulfils the empirical assumption. 
 
Equipped with the relationship between explanatory connection and 
probability, we can understand the distinction between veridical evidence 
and conclusive evidence within Achinstein’s framework. Conclusive evidence 
guarantees the truth of H, yet veridical evidence does not necessarily do so 
(Achinstein, 2001, p. 27). Speaking of conclusive evidence is of use to avoid 
a misunderstanding, i.e. that veridical evidence requires that H be true and 
therefore verifies H with certainty. Conclusive evidence can be defined as:  
 
E is conclusive evidence for H given B if and only if  
(a) E is veridical evidence; and  
(b) P(H/E&B) = 1.  
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Consider the birthday example to illustrate the distinction between veridical 
evidence and conclusive evidence. If there are fifty people in a room (E), how 
likely is the hypothesis (H) that at least two people share the same birthday? 
Very high; P(H/E) equals to approximately 0.97. Suppose no other reasons 
for H (e.g. both are picked deliberately) are available, it is obtained that 
P(Exp(H,E)/H&E&B) = 1. Suppose further that there are two people’s 
birthdays on the same day in the room (i.e. H is true) and that there is an 
explanatory connection between H and E. It follows that E is veridical 
evidence for H. However, since P(H/E) is not equal to unity, E, as per the 
definition given above, is not conclusive evidence for H. 
 
2.6 Examining Achinstein’s Theory of Evidence  
 
Several difficulties with Achinstein’s account of evidence should be 
discussed here. Achinstein (2014, p. 383) asserts that ‘Thomson’s later 
experimental results were evidence for Thomson’s charged particle 
hypothesis in all four senses of “evidence”’. We need not know everything 
about Thomson’s experiment to see why Achinstein must be mistaken. It 
seems impossible for Achinstein to ensure whether the evidence Thomson’s 
experiment presented lacks any flaw and the hypothesis is true, since Larry 
Laudan’s (1981) pessimistic induction argues that once-successful past 
theories have typically turned out to be false, illustrating that any theory can 
possibly be falsified unless we are God. Achinstein might insist that Thomson 
excluded the interfering factors to select the only one possible explanation 
that electrical effects occur, so this is the only true explanation for the 
phenomenon. However, Hertz also thought he excluded any interfering 
factors in his experiment and found no electrical effect, so we do not know 
whether we have potential evidence and veridical evidence although finding 
them is our aim.  
 
Perhaps Achinstein just wanted to illustrate the notion of veridical evidence 
by supposing that Thomson was right, rather than arguing that Thomson was 
in fact right. However, we should be careful to read his relevant sentences, 
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such as ‘[W]hat the scientist seeks is veridical evidence. Usually, when a 
scientist claims that some experimental result is evidence that a hypothesis 
is true, he can be construed as making a claim using this concept’ 
(Achinstein, 2014, p. 391). It is misleading, and can be true only on this 
subjective reading: the scientist believes that the experimental result is 
veridical evidence for the hypothesis. Veridical evidence is rarely 
recognisable particularly when hypotheses of interest involve unobservable 
entities (e.g. quarks, intelligence and economic inequality), unobserved 
entities (e.g. extinct organisms and languages), and unobserved processes 
(e.g. the process of a certain murder). If there is any veridical evidence for 
the unobserved, it is likely to be obtained only with hindsight. For example, 
irregularities in Uranus’s orbit were observed, which were not explained by 
Newton’s law of gravitation. The irregularities were explained by the 
hypothesised existence of a perturbing body and were therefore potential 
evidence for the existence of the planet Neptune. With advances in 
astronomical technologies, the hypothesis that Neptune exists has been 
confirmed to be true, at this point the irregularities have been converted from 
previous potential evidence into veridical evidence. 
 
Another difficulty is that Achinstein (2014, p. 391) argues that his definition of 
evidence rather than the aforementioned theories of evidence ‘can be used 
to define each of the four concepts of evidence distinguished’ because the 
definition captures the core sense of evidence and thus forms a basis for the 
four concepts. If we combine Carnap’s qualitative and the quantitative 
concepts of confirmation, we will have a new objective Bayesian account that 
satisfies both the good-reason-to-believe assumption and the empirical 
assumption: 
 
The Merged Objective Bayesian Account of Evidence (MOB):  
E is evidence for H given B if and only if  
(i) P(H/E&B) > P(H/B);  
(ii) P(H/E&B) attains some certain high level above 1/2. 
 
This definition meets the good-reason-to-believe assumption by virtue of the 
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condition (ii). The MOB account also does not make trivial cases evidence as 
seen in the drinking-water example, where P(H/E&B) = P(H/B) although 
P(H/E&B) = 1, because the account requires condition (i). As for the 
empirical assumption, conditions (i) and (ii) are both empirically decidable if 
the a priori Bayesian interpretation of probability is not adopted.   
 
The MOB account seems as favourable as the explanationist theory of 
evidence. To illustrate this point, consider the Monty Hall problem, that is a 
special case because it is often cited as a stumbling block for theories of 
evidence (e.g. Fitelson, 2007): 
 
Suppose you‘re on a game show, and you’re given the choice of 
three doors: Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You 
pick a door, say No. 1, and the host [Monty Hall] who knows what’s 
behind the doors, opens another door, say No.3, which has a goat. 
He then says to you, “Do you want to pick door No.2?” Is it to your 
advantage to switch your choice? (vos Savant, 1990) 
 
In the following argument, the letters Hi and Ej mean the following: 
 
 H1: The prize is behind door 1.  
 H2: The prize is behind door 2.  
 H3: The prize is behind door 3.  
 E1: The contestant randomly picks door 1.  
 E3: The host opens door 3, which is not the location of the car.  
 
Since the contestant’s initial choice is independent of the place of the car, 
P(H1/E1) = P(H2/E1) = P(H3/E1) = 1/3, but when the host’s opening door 3 is 
added in, P(H1/E1&E3) = 1/3, P(H2/E1&E3) = 2/3 and P(H3/E1&E3) = 0.31 The 
probability of H3 conditional on E1 becomes zero when E3 is further 
considered on the basis that E3 eliminates H3. As for the remaining two 
 
31 The direct calculation with Bayes’ theorem proceeds as follows: P(E3/H1&E1) = 1/2 (the 
prize is behind door 1, so the host can randomly pick and open either door 2 or door 3); 
P(E3/H2&E1) = 1 (the prize is behind door 2 and the contestant already chooses door 1, so 
the host must open door 3); P(E3/H3&E1) = 0 (the prize is behind door 3, so it is impossible 
for the host to open door 3). Therefore, P(H2/E1&E3) = P(E3/H2&E1)P(H2&E1) / P(E1&E3) = 
[P(E3/H2&E1)P(H2&E1)] / [P(E3/H1&E1)P(H1&E1)+ P(E3/H2&E1)P(H2&E1)+ 
P(E3/H3&E1)P(H3&E1)] = 1 / (1/2+1+0) = 2/3. 
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doors, the contestant, on the basis of a new piece of evidence E3, should 
switch to door 2 to win the car.32  
 
The explanationist theory can account for E3’s being evidence for H2. Given 
that the contestant initially picks door 1 (E1), the prize’s being behind door 2 
explains the host’s opening door 3 as the host must open door 3 with the 
intention of not exposing the location of the car. Thus, P(Exp(H2,E3)/E1&E3) = 
P(H2/E1&E3) × P(Exp(H2,E3)/H2&E1&E3) = 2/3 × 1 = 2/3, which is greater than 
1/2, as required in the definition of evidence in the explanationist theory.  
 
While it may be difficult to compute the probability of an explanatory 
connection for real-life cases, the apparent difficulty of computing that for H1 
and E3 can be cleared up, once the explanatory connection is fleshed out. 
P(Exp(H1,E3)/E1&E3) = P(H1/E1&E3) × P(Exp(H1,E3)/H1&E1&E3) = 1/3 × 
P(Exp(H1,E3)/H1&E1&E3). Seemingly, P(Exp(H1,E3)/H1&E1&E3) is 
underdetermined, because when the prize is behind door 1, the host can 
open either door 2 or door 3 freely, which corresponds to the random 
opening of door 3. That is, the prize’s being behind door 1, relative to the 
contestant’s random picking of door 1, does not seem to explain why the 
host opens door 3. Where one claim explains another, the explanation does 
not require that its explanans all be present for the explanatory purpose. 
What is required is that one member of the explanans set should make a 
difference to the explanandum, other necessary members in the explanans 
set being equal. For example, suppose a window is broken (W) as a ball with 
certain momentum hits it (B) and the window is made of glass (G). B and G 
in tandem explain W, but usually multiple factors influence the occurrence of 
W. When other necessary members are present (G in this example), it is not 
necessary to mention all of them to sufficiently explain an event. Instead, it 
 
32 These probabilities baffle many, as they think that P(H1/E1&E3) = P(H2/E1&E3) = 1/2, which 
indicates that regardless of whether the contestant switches doors, the chance of winning 
the car remains unchanged because the probability of the car being behind the door opened 
should be divided and distributed equally between the remaining two options (Falk, 1992). 
This is correct if the scenario is rewritten: There is an alien with a UFO landing onto the 
stage when the host opens the door, and this alien facing two unopened doors is asked 
‘which door do you choose?’. The chance to win the car is 1/2 whichever door is chosen. 
However, ‘that’s because [this alien] lacks the advantage the original contestant had—the 
help of the host’ (vos Savant, 1990). 
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can be claimed that B explains W relative to G. Since no reasons are 
available other than the prize being behind door 1, relative to the 
contestant’s picking of door 1, to explain the opening of door 3, 
P(Exp(H1,E3)/H1&E1&E3) = P(E3 because of H1 given H1, E1 and E3), which is 
one.33 It follows that P(Exp(H1,E3)/E1&E3) = P(H1/E1&E3) × 
P(Exp(H1,E3)/H1&E1&E3) = 1/3 × 1 = 1/3.   
 
The MOB account also allows us to claim that E3 is evidence for H2. For its 
two conditions are met as P(H2/E1&E3) = 2/3, which is greater than 1/2 and 
P(H2/E1&E3) > P(H2/E1) (=1/3). In addition, as mentioned above, the MOB 
account meets the good-reason-to-believe assumption and the empirical 
assumption and avoids trivial cases, so according to Achinstein’s 
characterisation of evidence, no reason favours the explanationist theory 
over the MOB account with respect to this case. 
 
What is worse is that some intuitively acceptable evidence is covered by the 
MOB account but is not covered by the explanationist theory. Let us consider 
the murder of Russia’s mad monk, Rasputin.34 A version of the whole 
process is described as follows:  
 
Rasputin was invited to visit Yusupov's home and, once there, was 
given poisoned wine and tea cakes. When he did not die, the frantic 
Yusupov shot him. Rasputin collapsed but was able to run out into the 
courtyard, where Purishkevich shot him again. The conspirators then 
bound him and threw him through a hole in the ice into the Neva 
River, where he finally died by drowning. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 
2019) 
 
33 Achinstein does not provide details about how to calculate the probability of explanatory 
connection. He simply assumes figures to illustrate his point. For example, Achinstein (2001, 
p. 154, italics in original) writes: ‘Suppose that 70% of those with symptoms S have relief of 
those symptoms in a week. Writing R for getting relief in a week, and S for having 
symptoms, we have p(R/S) = .7. [Footnote omitted] Suppose that 70% of those with S who 
take medicine M get relief in a week, so p(R/S&M) = .7. Suppose finally that among those 
with S who take M and get relief in a week, 60% get relief because they took M (while 40% 
do so for other reasons), so p(R because of M/R&S&M) = .6. From the previous theorem 
p(R because of M/S&M) = p(R because of M/R&S&M) × p(R/S&M) = .6×.7 = .42. That is, 
42% of those with symptoms S who take medicine M get relief because of M. M is effective 
in relieving S only 42% of the time. (And, in fact, taking M doesn’t increase the chances of 
relief in a week, since p(R/S&M) = p(R/S) = .7’.        
34 Michael Strevens (2008) uses this case when discussing causal and explanatory 
relevance.   
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For simplicity’s sake, let us consider only the two actions that the assassins 
would anticipate when plotting the assassination: shooting and drowning.  
  
H:  Rasputin died. 
 E1: Shooting had been carried out. 
 E2: Drowning had been carried out. 
 B:  Rasputin had been invited out to Yusupov's home. 
 
Suppose P(H/E1&B) = 1/2 and P(H/E2&B) = 1, from which it follows that 
P(H/E1&E2&B) = 1.35 Suppose also that drowning would be carried out 
immediately after shooting, that there was no way to know whether the 
target, from being shot at to being thrown into the river, was dead or alive, 
and that the post-mortem could not be conducted due to his body being 
missing. The assassins should have been completely confident of Rasputin’s 
death when they decided to carry out the shooting and drowning. Intuitively, 
E2 alone suffices as evidence that Rasputin died as the success rate of 
murder by drowning is unity. E2 is regarded as evidence, relative to E1 as 
background knowledge, for the MOB account, because P(H/E2&E1&B) = 1, 
which is greater than 1/2, and P(H/E2&E1&B) > P(H/E1&B).  
 
However, E2 is not evidence for the explanationist theory, since P(Exp(H, 
E2)/E2&E1&B) = P(Exp(H,E2)/H&E2&E1&B) × P(H/E2&E1&B) = 1/2 x 1, which 
is not greater than half. For the explanatory connection, 
P(Exp(H,E2)/H&E2&E1&B) is equal to the probability of drowning explaining 
Rasputin’s death, given that Rasputin died and the shooting and drowning 
had been executed. The question is: how much do the shooting and the 
drowning individually explain Rasputin’s death, given all of the above 
conditions? Clearly, neither of them can fully explain his death on its own. 
Rasputin had a fifty-fifty chance of being shot dead, and even if Rasputin 
survived the shooting, he would end up being drowned. The probability for 
 
35 Proof: P(H/E1&E2&B) = P(H&E1&E2&B) / [P(H&E1&E2&B) + P(~H&E1&E2&B)] = 1, since 
P(~H&E1&E2&B) = P(~H/E2&B)P(B/E2)P(E2) P(E1/~H&E2&B) = [1− P(H/E2&B)]  ×  
P(B/E2)P(E2) P(E1/~H&E2&B) = 0 ×  P(B/E2)P(E2) P(E1/~H&E2&B)  = 0. 
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each situation is half and thus P(Exp(H,E2)/H&E2&E1&B) = 1/2, with E2 alone 
not entailing H. This is a counter-example to the explanationist theory, but 
not to the MOB account.  
 
It seems that the MOB account is more favourable than the explanationist 
theory, because it not only meets the two assumptions and avoids trivial 
cases, but also makes sense of some evidence-related cases when the 
explanationist theory cannot do so. However, the defence of the objective 
Bayesian account of evidence may not be decisive. I offer an example here: 
suppose that there are a total of 1,000,000 lottery tickets and Robert has 
900,000 of them (B). Robert obtains another lottery ticket from his friend (E), 
so P(H: Robert will win the lottery/E&B) > P(H/B) and P(H/E&B) > 1/2. 
According to the MOB account, the fact (E) that Robert obtains one more 
lottery ticket counts as evidence that he will win the lottery (H) relative to B. 
However, it is problematic that E counts as evidence for H here. Achinstein’s 
theory of evidence should exclude the case as evidence on the basis that E 
and H lack an explanatory relevance between them because the lottery ticket 
adds a mere extra 1/1,000,000 probability of winning the lottery. The 
additional lottery ticket does not correctly explain that Robert will win the 
lottery. Nor does Robert’s winning explain his obtaining ticket; nor do both 
have any reason in common that explains them. The MOB account, rather 
than the explanationist theory, is subject to this counter-example. 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
To conclude, without the aim of involving evidence as guidance on further 
investigation into a hypothesis, Achinstein’s explanationist theory of evidence 
attempts to provide a framework that employs explanatory relations to 
connect hypothesis and evidence and can inform us about when E is strong 
enough to be evidence for H. In the purpose-specific spirit, I have evaluated 
his theory and have identified several of its difficulties: the notions of 
potential evidence and veridical evidence are hardly epistemically attainable 
and the MOB account of theory that meets the good-reason-to-believe and 
empirical assumptions in a non-trivial manner can make sense of other 
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sources of evidence that do not count as evidence for the explanationist 
theory. So far I have not discussed the limitations of the explanationist 
theory. In some settings, its relevance-mediating vehicles of explanatory 
threshold do not consider what should be labelled as evidence. This issue 
will be illustrated in Chapter 5 with cases of historical linguistics.  
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3  
Metaphysical Approach:  
Cartwright’s Argument Theory of Evidence 
 
 
There is no evidence simpliciter. Evidence does not exist in a one-place 
relation in a way that an electron or a tree is recognised by its characteristics. 
Nor is evidence identified relative only to a hypothesis in a two-place relation, 
as assumed in specific versions of the hypothetic-deductive (H-D) theory, 
which stipulates that any claim, without background knowledge, directly 
deduced from a hypothesis is evidence for the hypothesis. Instead, many 
philosophical theories of evidence subscribe to a view that evidence is a 
three-place relation;36 evidence for a hypothesis is always relative to a 
relevance-mediating vehicle, which I have defined in Chapter 1.   
 
In this chapter, I pay particular attention to Nancy Cartwright’s argument 
theory, in which the mediating vehicle for evidential relevance is a sound 
argument.37 Cartwright (2013) holds that a good argument ties some 
empirical claims together: the claim or claims in the form of the premises and 
the claim appearing as the conclusion are evidence and hypothesis 
respectively. From the tool-based view I endorse, I shall identify the 
strengths and limitations of the argument theory. Upholding the same spirit, I 
will show that the difficulties that the argument theory encounters mostly 
arise from its Platonic characterisation of evidence, i.e. that metaphysical 
relations are built on sound arguments.  
 
 
 
 
36 I list some three-place theories of evidence: (some versions of) the H-D confirmation 
(Achinstein, 2014; Sprenger, 2011), subjective Bayesianism (de Finetti, 1937; Ramsey, 
1926;), objective Bayesianism (Jaynes, 1968; Williamson, 2010), the bootstrap theory 
(Glymour, 1980b), the explanationist theory (Achinstein, 2001, 2014), the error-statistical 
account (Mayo, 2004) and the inferentialist account (Reiss, 2015a).  
37 A sound argument refers to one that is a valid argument and in which its premises are all 
true.  
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3.1 Dissection of the Argument Theory by RCTs   
 
Cartwright (2013) develops her argument theory in the course of her work on 
what randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are evidence for. To understand 
what the theory looks like in concrete terms, and to see what her motivation 
for it is, it is useful to follow her here. Within many special sciences, such as 
medicine and psychology, the establishment of causal claims rests largely on 
RCTs, which are normally characterised in these terms: random assignment 
and blinding in the hope of balance, at least in the mean, of the net effects of 
other causal factors. Cartwright then asks: under what conditions can RCTs 
clinch causal conclusions? Why do many results of well-conducted RCTs fail 
to extrapolate to the target setting? Cartwright (2012) argues that the key to 
answering these questions is to recognise that the foundation for evidential 
claims is the argument.  
 
The movements of evidence-based medicine (EBM) and of evidence-based 
policy (EBP) have invested enormous resources and effort in apprising us of 
a hierarchy of evidence of different quality, which is considered to improve 
the quality of decision-making. Among these standards, RCTs are widely 
heralded as the gold standard for evidence that is taken to establish causal 
claims in health, medicine, social sciences and policy deliberation. These 
claims are of two kinds: claims about efficacy and claims about 
effectiveness. A study that establishes efficacy, or internal validity, is one that 
‘confers a high probability of truth on the result of the study’ (Cartwright, 
2010, p. 60). When a study is internally valid, it, by reducing bias, draws a 
causal conclusion that the changes in interventions (e.g. a medical 
treatment) bring about the differences between different groups (e.g. 
treatment group versus control group). Effectiveness, or external validity, 
relates to ‘whether the result that is established in the study will be true 
elsewhere’ (Cartwright, 2010, p. 60). In contrast to internal validity, external 
validity is of more pragmatic value: evidence from high-quality systematic 
reviews, meta-analyses of RCTs or more than one low-risk-of-bias RCT is 
ranked highest in terms of using causal claims established to make 
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predictions about whether a claim that seems to hold in one study will hold 
elsewhere.  
 
Investigating the preconditions for establishing causal claims using RCTs 
and the predictive success of RCTs, Cartwright extends the concept of 
necessary premises in a valid argument to any relationship between 
hypothesis and evidence. This is the central thesis of her argument theory of 
evidence. Evidence is a three-place relation in which a claim E is evidence 
for hypothesis H relative to an argument A if and only if E figures essentially 
in A and A is a valid and sound argument for H: 
 
A well-established empirical claim e is evidence for hypothesis h 
relative to a good argument A (or A, A′, A′′…) if and only if e is a 
premise in A, which is itself a good argument for h (or, is a premise in 
A′ which is a good argument for a premise in a good argument A for h, 
etc.), where a good argument has true premises and is deductively 
valid. (Cartwright, 2013, p. 5)  
 
When we reconstruct an argument underpinning evidential relationships, it 
becomes apparent where the gaps that prevent us from reasoning from 
evidence to conclusion are located. 
 
In science and policy making, rigour is essential when it comes to evidence. 
In the argument theory of evidence, rigour matters in two distinct respects: 
material and formal. This distinction is thought to originate with Rudolf 
Carnap (1937, pp. 302–303), according to whom the material mode of 
speech is about the world and the formal mode of speech is about language 
itself. When this distinction is applied to evidence, the material mode has to 
do with ‘what facts of Nature there are and what other facts can ensure they 
obtain’ (Cartwright, 2013, p. 5), whilst the formal mode concerns ‘our 
hypotheses about what facts obtain and the further hypotheses that provide 
warrant for them’ (Cartwright, 2013, p. 6). It can be seen that the argument 
theory emphasises the formal mode in requiring true premises and deductive 
entailment. However, this thematisation corresponds to facts and their 
relationships in the material mode; the relationships in the world are fixed 
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and can, in some cases, be conceived of as causal relationships.38 It is both 
— these facts, rendered as true premises, and these material-mode 
relationships, rendered as valid arguments — that mediate evidential 
relationships. Both modes are concerned with the metaphysical level in my 
sense: these fixed relations in the world hold independently of us. These two 
modes are distinct from the claim that ‘an agent is justified in believing in H’, 
which indicates an epistemological attitude.    
 
3.2 Argument of Efficacy of RCTs 
 
The argument theory provides a framework for appraising how RCTs show 
evidence for causal efficacy. RCTs can be internally valid because if the 
confounding factors were actually balanced between the treatment and 
control groups, positive results of an RCT imply the causal conclusion that 
treatment T brings about outcome O in some subset of the study population. 
Confounding factors are ones that cause O via causal pathways except the 
pathway(s) along which T causes O. In an RCT, confounding factors must be 
controlled if we are to be assured of the causal conclusion that T causes O, 
drawn from the fact that the probability of O in the treatment group is greater 
than in the control group. 
 
To put this point in my terms, what the argument theory demonstrates is that 
a relevance-mediating vehicle that enables the causal conclusion to be 
drawn from evidence of an ideal RCT can be an argument. Suppose an ideal 
RCT is performed in which treatment T and outcome O take binary values 
(e.g. ±), where T is the cause under test (treatment) and O, the putative 
effect (outcome). By ‘ideal’ I mean that the treatment and control groups are 
balanced with respect to the net effect of all other causal factors. As such, 
certainly this is far from any real experiment when the best we can hope for 
is balance in the long run, and imbalance is to be expected in any real RCT. 
 
38 The standard philosophical view is that the causal relata are events, which has been 
challenged by a number of philosophers. Some champion facts as the ideal candidate for 
the causal relata (Bennett, 1988; Mellor, 1995), but this is not the point here, so I make no 
further enquiry into the causal relata.     
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Suppose that the RCT result shows that the probability of O (outcome) in the 
treatment group (treatment T is given) is greater than in the control group 
(treatment T is not given). The result can be obtained with a sufficient sample 
size and a statistical chi-square test, from the data of the RCT (the frequency 
of the occurrence of O in the treatment group is greater than in the control 
group). However, as almost any premise whose foundation need not be 
continually tracked down, let us assume that the evidence under discussion 
is the RCT result given by a statistical test rather than the organised data 
from the RCT. The hypothesis of interest is that T causes O in population σ. 
 
Let Ki = a population that is causally homogeneous with regard to O except 
for T and its downstream effects.39 In other words, Ki represents a particular 
combination of confounding factors (C1, C2, … ,Cn). Call the study population 
σ, in which the Ki’s are sub-populations (Ki  Í σ).   
 
Argument of Efficacy: 
P1. For any Ki, P(Ki/T&σ) = P(Ki/~T&σ). [by the balance assumption 
of an ideal RCT]40 
P2. P(O/T&Ki) > P(O/~T&Ki) iff T causes O in Ki, and T causes O in 
some σ iff T causes O in some Ki  Í σ. [by the probabilistic 
theory of causality] 
P3. E: the frequency of the occurrence of O in the treatment group 
(T&σ) is greater than in the control group (~T&σ) and the 
sample size is large enough. [the RCT result]  
P4. P(O/T&σ) > P(O/~T&σ). [from P3 and the RCT result shown 
statistically significant, say, by a chi-square test] 
P5. For some Ki  Í σ, P(O/T&Ki) > P(O/~T&Ki). [from P1 and P4]41 
 
39 A causally homogeneous group is one whose variables have the same values for each 
individual in the group. Suppose the causally relevant set in the study population σ includes 
only two confounding factors C1 and C2. Ki consists of an exhaustive set of subpopulations 
that are causally homogeneous with regard to O except for T and its downstream effects in 
σ. Each Ki can be one of these: {C1, C2}, {C1, ~C2}, {~C1, C2}, {~C1, ~C2}.      
40 The balance assumption: ∀Ki are distributed identically in the treatment and the control 
group. That is, ‘[i]n an ideal RCT each Ki will appear in both [study] wings with the same 
probability’ (Cartwright 2010, p. 64). 
41 Proof:  1. P(O/T&σ) > P(O/~T&σ) P4 
 2. P(Ki/T&σ) = P(Ki/~T&σ) P1 
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 Con.   H: T causes O in σ. [from P2 and P5] 
 
As long as these assumptions are met, from an ideal RCT, the conclusion ‘T 
causes O in the test population σ’ can be deduced from the RCT result, 
which is labelled evidence relative to other premises and the hypothesis.  
 
On their own, RCTs are not enough to draw causal conclusions. For RCTs to 
establish causal claims about the study population, a clincher argument is 
required, which calls for not only the positive results of RCTs but also some 
additional preconditions, to reach a causal conclusion. Cartwright (2007) 
distinguishes ‘clincher’ arguments from ‘voucher’ arguments as different 
kinds of warrants for (causal) claims. Clinchers have an argumentative 
structure wherein, as the argument theory requires, the premises deductively 
entail the causal claims. For example, Cartwright argues, along the lines I 
have just sketched above, that a positive result, i.e. P(O/T&σ) > P(O/~T&σ), 
of an ideal RCT exemplifies a clincher for the causal claim ‘T causes O in the 
study population’. The truth of the conclusion drawn from an ideal RCT is 
guaranteed given the fulfilment of the preconditions (P1, P2 and P3). 
According to Cartwright (2007, p. 14), the types of methods of inquiry that 
can clinch causal claims include ‘econometric methods, Galilean 
experiments, probabilistic/Granger causality, derivation from established 
theory, tracing the causal process [and] ideal RCTs’. Vouchers, by contrast, 
speak in favour of claims without establishing them with deductive validity. 
The following methods typically establish evidence that vouches for causal 
claims: H-D method, ‘qualitative comparative analysis, or looking for quantity 
and variety of evidence’ (Cartwright, 2007, p. 12). Contrary to clinchers, 
vouchers often come with a broad scope of application but lack such 
deductive certainty.  
 
 3. ~∃Ki[P(O/T&Ki) > P(O/~T&Ki)] AIP 
 4. ∀Ki[P(O/T&Ki) ≤ P(O/~T&Ki)] from 3 
 5. ∀Ki[P(O/T&Ki) P(Ki/T&σ) ≤ P(O/~T&Ki) P(Ki/~T&σ)] from 2&4 
 6. ∑P(O/T&Ki) P(Ki/T&σ) ≤ ∑P(O/~T&Ki) P(Ki/~T&σ) from 5 
 7. ∑P(O/T&Ki&σ) P(Ki/T&σ) ≤ ∑P(O/~T&Ki&σ) P(Ki/~T&σ) from 6 
 8. P(O/T&σ) ≤ P(O/~T&σ) from 7  
 9. [P(O/T&σ) > P(O/~T&σ)] & [P(O/T&σ) ≤ P(O/~T&σ)] from 1&8 
 10. ∃Ki[(P(O/T&Ki) > ∃KiP(O/~T&Ki)) from 3–9 IP  
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Lacking deductive certainty, do vouchers provide some lesser degree of 
evidential support? Cartwright (2007, p. 12) doubts this, and claims that 
‘[t]hat is hard to say since the relation between evidence and conclusion in 
these cases is not deductive and there are no general good practicable 
“logics” of non-deductive confirmation, especially ones that make sense for 
the great variety of methods we use to provide warrant’. Clearly any voucher 
can be turned into a clincher by adding the additional premises needed to 
form a deductive argument. For instance, if an RCT fails to satisfy the 
preconditions for ideal studies, the RCT can at best vouch for a causal 
conclusion; it will be a clincher only if these ideal conditions are met. So 
Cartwright must more or less intend the distinction between clinchers and 
vouchers to be: methods generally come with a set of conditions that say 
what is for them to be carried out in the ideal. The hypotheses clinchers 
support can be deductively inferred from the results plus the assumption that 
the ideal conditions hold.  
 
As noted, in order for an RCT to be a clincher, it must meet ideal conditions. 
We can rarely, if ever, expect that any particular RCT succeeds in providing 
grounds for claiming that the causal claim has been clinched. However, 
despite the result that P(O/T) > P(O/~T) arising from a well-conducted RCT, 
we are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge that the result has successfully 
established a causal claim. In the British Medical Journal, Leonard Leibovici 
(2001) reported an RCT that John Worrall (2007a) described as impeccably 
randomised and double blind and that corroborates that there is a correlation 
between remote, retroactive intercessory prayer and length of stay in 
hospital. However, as Worrall points out, it is questionable whether the 
causal conclusion elicited from such an RCT is admissible.  
 
The case was well summarised by Worrall. As he describes it, the medical 
information about 3,393 inpatients who caught blood infections at the Rabin 
Medical Centre in Israel between 1990 and 1996 contains ‘(i) those patients’ 
mortality; (ii) their length of stay in hospital; and (iii) the duration of the fevers 
they had suffered’ (Worrall, 2007a, p. 1005). In 2000, a study was carried out 
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retrospectively to know whether a remote, retroactive prayer can have a 
positive effect on (i)–(iii). The inpatients were randomly assigned to two 
groups, with 1,691 to the treatment group and 1,702 to the control group. 
There was no significant baseline imbalance between the two groups, which 
had been checked with known ‘main risk factors for death and severity of 
illness’ (Worrall, 2007a, p. 1005). The study was double blind; the patients 
and the doctors treating them had no way of knowing to which group they 
had been assigned. Prayers were made on behalf of the treatment group, 
and while the result showed that there was no statistically significant 
difference in mortality rates between the two groups, their length of stay in 
hospital and duration of fever were significantly reduced, which implies that 
prayer has a miraculous power to change the past.42  
 
Federica Russo and Jon Williamson (2007) suggest a strategy for blocking 
this type of specious inference: they use evidence of difference-making in a 
well-conducted RCT alongside evidence that there is a mechanism 
connecting cause and effect.43 Apparently the RCT of the effects of 
retroactive prayer is an exception. The Russo-Williamson Thesis (RWT) is 
expressed as follows: 
 
In order to establish A is a cause of B in medicine one normally needs 
to establish two things. First, that A and B are suitably correlated—
typically, that A and B are probabilistically dependent, conditional on 
B’s other known causes. Second, that there is some underlying 
mechanism linking A and B that can account for the difference that A 
makes to B. (Clarke et al., 2014, p. 343)  
 
With no conceivable physical mechanism explaining the correlation in this 
case,44 the claim that the miraculous power of prayer brought about a shorter 
 
42 There was a difference, though not statistically significant, between the treatment group 
and the control group in terms of morality, with 28.1% and 30.2% respectively (p-value = 
0.4). By contrast, the treatment group saw a statistically significant drop in length of stay in 
hospital (p-value = 0.01) and the duration of their fevers (p-value = 0.04) (Leibovici, 2001).    
43 Clarke et al. (2014) claim that well-devised and well-conducted RCTs can, in principle, 
provide evidence of difference-making and evidence of a mechanism in tandem. From the 
perspective of the argument theory, every well-done RCT provides evidence of a 
mechanism only via the assumption that this RCT has established the causal relationship 
between T and O. By adding the assumption that there can be no causation without a 
connecting mechanism, we can draw the conclusion that there is a mechanism.  
44 Leibovici (2001, p. 1451) holds a similar view: ‘No mechanism known today can account 
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length stay in hospital is physically implausible. But a religious person who 
believes that God is so omnipotent as to be able to change the past as well 
as the future might assert that there is in fact some mechanism at work. 
Even so, at least for those who grant that there is no conceivable 
mechanism, they will not believe that retroactive prayer is an effective 
remedy. Furthermore, even supposing the RCT, had it been ideal, had 
revealed that there must have been a reasonable mechanism at work, and 
supposing this experiment had approximately, as best it possibly can, 
attempted to satisfy the ideal conditions (e.g. double-blinding, randomised 
design, etc.), a causal claim would not follow deductively, because even our 
best efforts cannot assure the ideal conditions are met to form a sound 
argument. Indeed, imbalance is to be expected in any single run of the 
experiment.  
 
3.3 Argument of Effectiveness of RCTs 
 
The argument theory is well suited to expose another insufficiency of RCTs 
as the claims made on the basis of RCTs call their external validity into 
question. The argument theory sheds light on the restricted function of RCTs 
in the application of evidence to practical uses in such contexts as education 
schemes, policy deliberation and medical evaluation. The vast majority of 
theories of evidence hardly address the challenges posed by evidence for 
use. Before criticising the effectiveness of RCTs, Cartwright (2012, 2013) 
lays out the strategy whereby RCT advocates attempt to predict an outcome 
in the target setting wherein a policy or treatment were to be applied. 
 
In cases where evidence for use is intended to generate plausible predictive 
claims supported by causal claims established by RCTs, a deductive 
relation, Cartwright (2012) maintains, is required between a sufficient amount 
of the right kinds of evidence and an intended claim about the future. 
 
for the effects of remote, retroactive intercessory prayer said for a group of patients with a 
bloodstream infection’. Nonetheless, Leibovici concludes that now that remote, retroactive 
intercessory prayer has been shown to be effective, undertaking further studies to clarify its 
mechanism would be worthwhile.      
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Cartwright (2013, pp. 14–15) articulates a set of sufficient conditions for an 
argument that is a relevance-mediating vehicle for causal claims established 
to attain external validity: the effectiveness argument. Ideally, the outcomes 
of RCTs can be transported to the target setting by virtue of this argument. 
 
In order to understand this argument, we must first know about support 
factors. The notion of support factors can be elaborated in terms of J. L. 
Mackie’s (1965) INUS condition (Insufficient but Necessary parts of a 
condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient). INUS conditions 
characterise causality in the relations in which, say, x is a cause of y in the 
sense that x, combined with support factor 1, support factor 2 and so forth, is 
sufficient to produce y and in this set every single factor including x itself is 
necessary. No proper subset of the factors is sufficient to bring about y. The 
cause x along with its support team is not a necessary condition for 
producing y as there are other causal sets that are sufficient to produce y as 
well.  
 
To see how INUS operates, consider the ways one can get from New York to 
London. Air or maritime transport allows a passenger to reach her 
destination. If she chooses the air transport mode, she will have to walk and 
take land vehicles (e.g. train, bus, taxi, etc.) to get to an airport before 
arriving in London by plane. Having a flight booked is not enough on its own 
to take her to London: walking and taking land vehicles are all necessary to 
make her arrival in London happen. However, the air option is not an 
exclusive option. She can switch to the maritime transport, which is also 
sufficient to take her to the destination if enough of the other necessary 
conditions are met (e.g. walking, taking vehicles, swimming, etc.). Returning 
to our concern with RCTs, it is rare that treatment variables or policy 
variables (X) are sufficient on their own to bring about the outcome (Y). The 
realisation of the outcome calls for collaboration between these variables and 
their support team.  
 
Although RCTs are widely deemed to be the gold standard of evidence for 
causal claims and to guarantee policy effectiveness, they cannot, without 
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support factors, guarantee that the outcome of an RCT in the study setting 
will work in a new target setting (Cartwright, 2012). The argument theory, as 
discussed below, makes explicit the problem that RCTs can establish only 
one premise in a valid argument that relies on many other premises.    
 
Suppose now that there is a causal claim that T causes O in the study 
population σ (in Cartwright’s (2013) terminology, it works there) and we wish 
to know whether the hypothesis is true that T will make a positive 
contribution to O for some individuals in the target population (it will work 
here). 
 
Argument of Effectiveness: 
P1. E: T causes O in the study population σ. [from the causal claim 
established in the RCT(s)] 
P2. If T plays a causal role in the production of O in the study 
population, T can do so in the target population. [same causal 
role] 
P3. The support factors necessary for T to make a positive 
contribution to O in the target population are present for some 
individuals in the target population.  
Con.   H: T will make a positive contribution to O for some individuals 
 in the target population if T were to be implemented.  
 
Those who believe in the effectiveness of RCTs speculate that in the target 
setting, the treatment will work in the same manner as in the RCTs and the 
outcome will not be very different from that of the test setting. In the target 
setting, they have assumed both the robustness of the causal power of the 
treatment (i.e. T can cause O in the new settings if it can in a study setting) 
and the recurrence of the support factors that make the treatment effective in 
the study setting. Formal results show that the transportability from one 
setting where causal relationships are identified to a target setting is feasible 
only under certain conditions (cf. Bareinboim and Pearl, 2013). For example, 
if the average treatment effect (ATE) is to be the same in a target as had 
been measured in an RCT on a different population, two tasks must be 
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accomplished: (1) if the cause plays a causal role in the original study 
setting, it can do so in the target setting, and (2) the expectation (average) of 
the support factors must be the same in both. Just as a valid, sound 
argument is required when licensing the ATE from the RCT, a valid argument 
and the truth of the assumptions (1) and (2) are required to serve as 
evidence for the same ATE in the target (Cartwright, 2012). 
 
Cartwright’s argument theory calls into question the strategy by which 
advocates argue for RCTs as a basis for establishing external validity. Real 
RCTs are likely to suffer from various sources of known and unknown errors 
that undermine their efficacy. Cartwright (2013) holds that even if ideal RCTs 
are available, the outcomes will not guarantee that decisions based on them 
will bring about the expected results elsewhere, what she refers to as the 
‘from-there-to-here problem’. I reformulate this problem as follows: 
 
Same causal principle shared by treatments: treatments in the 
study population and the target population are governed by the same 
causal principles. This ensures that if T plays a causal role in the 
study, it can do so in the target. 
 
Same support team: treatment does not result in the same effect 
size unless the same expected value for the support factors is 
obtained in both populations.  
 
As Cartwright (2012) points out, causal principles, for the most part, are local 
and fragile, in part due to the way causal principles work, depending on the 
coordination of the components of the underlying causal structure. If the 
arrangement of the causal structure is altered even slightly, the causal 
principle may not apply. If a causal principle is observed to hold in one 
setting, it does not imply that it will operate in a new setting, beyond locality.    
 
The case of the Family Nurse Partnership (FNP) in the UK illustrates the 
failure of the external validity of RCTs. The FNP programme was developed 
in the USA almost 40 years ago, it was imported to and adapted in the UK in 
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2006, and it was carried out in the UK from 2009, with the aim of ‘affect[ing] 
risks and protective factors within prenatal health-related behaviours, 
sensitive and competent care-giving, and early parental lifecourse’ (Robling 
et al., 2016, p.148). In the US, several RCTs showed considerable benefits 
of FNP for ‘improv[ing] birth outcomes, cognitive and socioeconomic 
development, use of preventive health care, and reduc[ing] potential abuse 
(eg, injuries, ingestions, and emergency department attendances) and 
maltreatment’ (Robling et al., 2016, p.147). However, the Building Blocks 
RCT, led by Dr. Michael Robling (2016), which aimed to assess the 
effectiveness of FNP in the UK, showed that in the short term, the FNP 
programme was not as effective in the UK as it was in the US.  
 
Beginning in 2009, the Building Blocks RCT enrolled and tracked over 1,600 
participants (mothers-to-be aged 19 or younger across England) until their 
child reached the age of two. These mothers-to-be were randomly assigned 
to the FNP group involving up to 64 structured home visits, with 
approximately half of the mothers receiving support from FNP as well as 
‘usual’ care from health and social services and the other half only receiving 
‘usual’ care. The results showed no evidence for any ‘additional short-term 
benefit for our selected primary outcomes (smoking in pregnancy, 
birthweight, emergency hospital attendance and admission for the child, and 
subsequent pregnancy)’ (Robling et al., 2016, p.147).45 On the contrary, the 
study reports that there was ‘an incremental cost for FNP of £1,993 per 
participant’ (Robling et al., 2016, p.151). In the end, the study suggests that a 
follow-up evaluation of the longer-term effectiveness of FNP was needed. 
 
After analysing the data, the authors of the report suggested that the 
difference in the short-term effects of FNP between the US and the UK might 
 
45 However, the research revealed some small positive secondary outcomes including 
‘intention-to-breastfeed, maternally reported child cognitive development (at 24 months 
only), language development using a modified maternal-reported assessment (at 12 and 18 
months) and using a standardised assessment (the Early Language Milestone; at 24 
months), levels of social support, partner-relationship quality, and general self-efficacy’ 
(Robling et al., 2016, p.150) and showed that ‘[r]ates of child safeguarding concerns 
documented in primary care records were higher for FNP clients. There were no other 
differences found….’ (Robling et al., 2016, pp. 150–151). 
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have resulted from several factors, such as differences in the enrolment 
criteria and the extent of the care provided (Robling et al., 2016). Compared 
to the situation in England, women with relatively more risk factors were 
enrolled in the FNP programme in the US, which might have led to 
comparatively fewer disadvantages as well as more heterogeneity (Robling 
et al., 2016, p.152). Additionally, supportive health and social services, 
including ‘community based family doctors, midwives, and public-health 
nurses, and, in most trial sites, specialist teenage pregnancy midwives’ were 
more accessible for young mothers in the UK than in the US (Robling et al., 
2016, p.152). So the effect of the FNP intervention may have been diluted by 
these commonly provided resources in the UK. It is evident that the positive 
effects of FNP trials in the US did not validate the effects of FNP in the UK. 
The same support factors such as similar enrolment conditions and health 
and social services should line up with the FNP programme in the UK so that 
the outcome of the target setting would appear to work in a fashion similar to 
the original study setting.       
 
Advocates of RCTs would presumably object that the increasing number of 
RCTs that broaden the application scope of a causal relationship established 
from them can enhance the reliability of a prediction. However, Cartwright 
(2013, p. 16) criticises this strategy on the basis that a prediction based on 
enumerative induction is not a kind of robust inference. Overall, as Cartwright 
points out, enumerative induction relies on whether the property of interest 
spans all inductive objects. For example, a great number of white swans 
observed from many different places in the UK would entitle us to be justified 
in believing that all swans are white under induction by simple enumeration. 
Similarly, advocates of RCTs can argue that a great deal of samples of a 
causal claim ‘T makes O happen’ established from RCTs can entitle us to 
claim that T makes O happen everywhere, whereby they further predict that 
T will make O happen in the target setting. The further inferential move relies 
on whether the property of interest is shared by the inductive base and the 
target hypothesis. According to Cartwright (2013, p. 16), while electron 
charge is generalisable and bird colour sometimes is, causal properties 
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require more additional premises to lead us from ‘it works there’ to ‘it will 
work here’.  
 
Cartwright characterises the relation between evidence and hypothesis as 
that between true premises and the conclusion they entail in a deductive 
argument. The structure of the arguments is analogous to a pyramid, in 
which hypothesis A at the top layer of an argument pyramid is the conclusion 
supported by its premises on the lower layers (A1′, A2′, A3′ …), and each of 
these premises by further arguments (Cartwright and Hardie, 2012, pp. 16–
20). It can be seen that these lower-layer premises (A1′, A2′, A3′ …) should be 
self-evident (e.g. logical or mathematical truth) or well-grounded (e.g. 
sensory experience in normal circumstances); if one of them is not (say, A1′), 
then A1′ also needs a valid, sound argument to support it. The premises 
(A11′′, A12′′, A13′′ …) of this more bottom-down argument should be shown to 
be true. The process continues until the premises are self-evident or well-
grounded, or we are just willing to take them for granted.  
 
3.4 Limitations, Difficulties and Strengths 
 
In what follows, I point out the major limitations of the argument theory and 
its inherent difficulties.46 As regards its limitations, Cartwright (2014) makes a 
fundamental distinction between evidence and justification: a theory of 
evidence is concerned with the conditions under which the data lend support 
to a hypothesis, whereas a theory of knowledge involves the conditions 
under which we are justified in believing claims. The argument theory just 
tells us that if you have such-and-such premises that form a sound and valid 
argument, each of the premises is labelled evidence; what it is not 
responsible for is when we are justified in believing that they are true. The 
argument is objectively there on the metaphysical level; epistemically, the 
 
46 Reiss (2015, pp. 48-52) has argued that the argument theory is unsatisfactory in that it 
does not satisfy all of his four desiderata for a theory of evidence. As I have outlined in 
Chapter 1, I endorse a meta-thesis of pluralism: a theory of evidence should be evaluated 
against the goal it sets out for itself. That means that even if the argument theory fails to 
meet some of Reiss’s desiderata, it can still be a ‘partially’ satisfactory, contrary to ‘fully’ 
satisfactory in Reiss’s sense, theory if accomplishing its goal. 
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truth of the premises relies on the judgement of practising scientists. In 
actual practice, the requirement of true premises in the argument theory is 
difficult to meet: the premises setting out empirical claims are themselves 
fallible and can rarely be proved true. If advocates of the argument theory 
wish to bestow practical value on the theory, they could maintain that the 
truth of the premises (A1′, A2′, A3′ …) can be guaranteed by the bottom-layer 
premises (A11′′, A12′′, A13′′ …), which constitute a valid argument for them. As 
I have mentioned, the truth of premises is guaranteed if they are self-evident 
or well-grounded. It is rare, if ever, that self-evident claims that constitute a 
valid argument on their own, are regarded as evidence. Moreover, it is 
controversial whether the truth of so-called well-grounded claims is verified 
by the reliable mechanisms (e.g. sensory experience) as their foundation. 
Lack of self-evident or well-grounded claims as premises can lead to an 
infinite regress. The absence of guidance on knowing that the premises of an 
argument are true is one of the limitations of the argument theory.  
 
A solution could lie in a different interpretation of what constitutes well-
grounded claims. Foundationalism should be replaced with coherentism, 
whereby the truth of the premises is ensured by the temporarily assumed 
truth of premises which could otherwise be confirmed by other arguments 
possibly drawn from different disciplines. John Norton (2014, pp. 686–688) 
refers to this reciprocal support as scaffolding, likening it to the temporary 
supports that are used when a variety of types of stone buildings such as 
domes, arches and cathedrals are being built and that are removed when the 
buildings are constructed in such a way as to be self-sustaining thereafter. In 
the same vein, the premises of an argument acquire material warrants that 
are domain-specific but may be drawn from different disciplines.  
 
Another limitation is that the argument theory hardly explains the principles 
behind how facts are adduced as evidence in the historical sciences, 
particularly regarding historical linguistics. I will visit this issue in Chapter 5. 
Now let us turn to the difficulties with the argument theory. They arise from 
its overly liberal definition of evidence: it requires merely logical relations 
between claims to identify alleged evidential relations, without requiring that 
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the premises evidentially transmit their warrant to the conclusion.47 
Specifically, it allows any true claim to be evidence for itself (e.g. A is 
evidence for A), for a conjunction to give evidence for its operand (e.g. A&B 
is evidence for A), for the claim obtained by modus ponens (A®B & A is 
evidence for B), or for a logical truth (e.g. A is evidence for B v ~B). 
However, I will argue that these kinds of evidence alleged by the argument 
theory do not seem to be evidence nor are they evidence in many of the 
circumstances mentioned above. One reason against their qualification for 
being evidence could be that they have no bearing on causality.48 Yet it is 
debatable whether evidential warrant embodied in the premises must be 
causal or can be something else; this is beyond the scope of this study. 
Another reason I will rely on instead is the failure to transmit evidential 
warrant by purely logical relations. 
 
Cartwright (2013) defends the alleged evidential relation between any 
arbitrary fact and a logical truth, in which, in her account, the fact will count 
as evidence: 
 
Still I wouldn’t advise spending much to buy information about other 
facts to warrant a logical truth. If you know a claim is a logical truth you 
don’t need to buy information about other facts to warrant the claim. 
And if you don’t know that the claim is a logical truth, you will have 
trouble warranting that the claim is implied by the fact you buy. Still, if I 
don’t know h is a logical truth but I am assured that if e then h, then e is 
surely worth learning. (Cartwright, 2013, p. 7)  
 
Cartwright (2013, p. 8) also holds that A&B is certainly evidence for A. Along 
with the above quoted reasoning, she might argue: if you do not know A with 
the intention of knowing A, it may be worth an investment in information 
about A&B, since A&B can of course provide information about A. 
 
47 It can be argued that the argument theory also defines evidence too narrowly. Logical 
relations do not cover all types of evidential relations. However, in the tool-based view I 
endorse, if the argument theory is modified to provide a sufficient, rather than necessary, 
condition for evidence, it does not need to cover other types of evidential relations.     
48 Cartwright makes a distinction between evidence and explanation; the latter may carry 
causal connotations while the former does not. Cartwright (2013, p. 8) argues that a man’s 
taking birth control pills is evidence that he does not get pregnant and that those who do not 
regard it as evidence confuse ‘the task of providing that a fact obtains with the task of 
explaining why it obtains’. 
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Conversely, if you have known A, it is not worth buying information about 
A&B to know A; it is not advisable to waste money. In short, for Cartwright, 
the fact that A&B is evidence for A is not generally useful for us because we 
generally have to learn A and B individually in order to learn A&B.  
 
Yet I argue that even if non-causal relevance relations could support 
evidential claims, purely logical relations are, in some cases, not genuine 
evidential relations. These cases occur when we have already known the 
conclusion (e.g. A) before or at the same time as we have information that is 
ready to infer the conclusion (e.g. A&B). In such cases, the so-called 
evidence does not work for us. Suppose one hundred people who jumped 
from the top of the Shard, the tallest building in London, died. Would Mr. X 
die if he did the same thing? Yes, it can be inferred that he is very likely to 
die as one hundred people have taught the lesson with their lives. But if he 
was already included in the 100-person sample, it seems inappropriate to 
assert that one hundred deaths are evidence that Mr. X would die if he 
jumped from the top of the Shard. The difference in the availability of 
evidence between the two scenarios stems from whether or not information 
about the conclusion supports the premise.  
 
Clearly, in cases where A is not information available preceding evidential 
inference or where A&B is warranted by theories other than the occurrence 
of A, A&B can be evidence for A. For instance, the information about Mr. X 
being in the 100-person death list is not accessed beforehand, so it is 
evidence for his death. Additionally, according to special relativity, all light 
propagates with speed no more than c = 3.00×108 m/s. This information 
about the maximum speed of light is evidence for a claim that the speed of 
this light propagating in a vacuum is no more than 3.00×108 m/s, even if this 
light is not actually measured in terms of its speed. In other cases, as noted 
earlier, where A is already known before or at the same time as A&B is 
known, A&B is not evidence for A. Likewise, A is not evidence for itself 
insofar as it is not possible that A remains unknown before A is known. 
Arguably, contrary to the argument theory, A&B is not always evidence for A, 
and A is not evidence for itself.   
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Evidence should allow us to infer from observation to unobservable or 
observable but yet-to-be-observed entities, events or regularities. It is not the 
case that evidence is used to infer a claim that is already confirmed by 
observation from other claims about observed events or phenomena. We do 
not need evidence to establish what is already known. Transmission from the 
observed to the observed may involve many kinds of epistemic activities 
other than evidential inference; explanation is one of them. Why did the 
massive earthquake devastate much of the area? Suppose the hypothesis 
that the area was destroyed is known to be true. Although there are many 
plausible explanations for this destruction (e.g. soil liquefaction), there is no 
need to gather evidence for the truth of the occurrence of the destruction 
unless we need evidence to know whether the soil liquefaction did 
exacerbate the destruction. Hence, for purely logical relations, say, A&B 
deduces A, now that A&B is observed, A has been observed, and thus A&B 
is not evidence for A, though the argument theory should admit A&B is. The 
same applies to the case that A is not its own evidence. 
 
There is another situation that should be considered, that is, whether (A®B) 
& A is evidence for B. Here I aim to find a relatively general strategy to object 
to taking evidential relationships as purely logical relations. To put it in a 
broad context, logical relations, in combination with true premises, 
sometimes fail to transmit evidential warrant. In what follows let us consider 
Michael McKinsey’s (1991) argument for the incompatibility of first-person 
authority and externalism about mental content to illustrate this concern: 
  
(P1)    I believe that water is wet. [from privileged first-person 
 authority]49 
 
49 First-person authority means that ‘we have a distinctively first-personal and specially 
authoritative way of knowing that we ourselves have that [mental] property, when we do 
have it, without needing to conduct any detailed empirical investigation either of the 
environment and our relation to it or of our internal cognitive architecture’ (Davies, 1998, p. 
322). First-person authority allows only sincere claims. ‘On any account, first-person 
authority holds only for avowals that are sincere, in the sense of not deceitful, and if we 
allow that non-conscious deceit is possible, then we must allow that some avowals may be 
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(P2)    If I believe that water is wet then I (belong to a community of 
 speakers some of whom) have had contact with water. [from  
 strong mental content externalism] 
(Con)  Therefore, I (or some members of the speech community) have 
had contact with water. 
 
Externalism about mental content holds that ‘whether a person (or other 
physical being) has that property depends, not only on conditions inside the 
person’s skin, but also on the person’s environment and the way that the 
person is embedded in that environment’ (Davies, 1998, p. 322). McKinsey 
(1991) argues that for externalists, first-person authority (P1) and the 
externalist thesis (P2) can be known or warranted a priori, i.e. I do not need 
to look at the external world to know or warrantedly believe both premises. If 
(P1) and (P2) are known or warranted a priori, these jointly entail that (Con) 
is known or warranted a priori. In other words, since knowledge of (P1) and 
of (P2) is non-empirical, knowledge of (Con) follows in a non-empirical 
manner. This means that on externalism, we can know something about the 
external world without looking at it. To say that (Con) is knowable a priori 
would be a preposterous conclusion that externalists would be unwilling to 
accept, since it implies that even without empirical investigation we can know 
that we live in a water world. McKinsey therefore puts forward the 
incompatibility thesis: either externalism is untenable, or we have no 
privileged access to our mental content.   
 
Martin Davies’s (1998) and Crispin Wright’s (2000) novel solution to this 
incompatibility problem is to expose warrant transmission failure.50 This is 
not suggesting that a valid argument’s conclusion is not warranted when its 
premises are warranted. Evidential warrant cannot be transmitted from the 
true premises of a valid argument to its conclusion if the truth of the 
conclusion is a precondition for having evidence for one of the premises. In 
 
insincere, and hence non-authoritative, even though no conscious deception is intended’ 
(Frankish, 2004, p. 224).    
50 What makes their solutions novel is that the preceding solutions attempted to refute (P2). 
See Brueckner (1992) for traditional solutions. 
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other words, the premises of a valid, even sound argument fail to warrant the 
conclusion, if on the supposition that the conclusion were false, the evidence 
warranting one of the premises would not be evidence. This situation is 
viewed as warrant transmission failure because the premises do not provide 
any new information about the truth of the conclusion.  
 
As Wright points out that, while not incompatible, a cogent argument and a 
valid argument are related but distinct. A cogent argument transmits the 
warrant of its premises to the truth of its conclusion, while a valid argument 
may fail to do so ‘where there was warrant for the premises in the first place 
because the conclusion was antecedently warranted’ (Wright, 2000, p. 141). 
A valid argument obeys the principle of ‘closure of warrant’; a cogent 
argument obeys the principle of ‘transmission of warrant’ (Wright, 2000, p. 
140). The principle of closure of warrant is weak in that it ensures only that 
whenever the premises possess a warrant, the conclusion also possesses a 
warrant; however, the warrant for the conclusion might have been obtained 
elsewhere. The principle of transmission of a warrant ensures that in addition 
to the conclusion in possession of a certain warrant, the warrant for the 
conclusion comes from the warrant of the premises.     
 
Wright’s (2000) remarks are worth quoting at length:  
 
Transmission of warrant need not be an absolute characteristic of a 
valid argument. It may be that a particular argument is such that one 
type of possible ground, w1, for its premises is transmissible—can yield 
a novel reason for accepting the conclusion when taken in conjunction 
with recognition of the validity of the inference—while another, w2, is 
not, but can only be possessed in the first place by a thinker whose 
information already includes warrant to accept the conclusion. 
 
Intuitively, a transmissible warrant should make for the possible 
advancement of knowledge, or warranted belief. A warrant is 
transmissible, more specifically, when we may envisage a logically non-
omniscient but otherwise perfectly rational subject coming to believe a 
proposition for the first time in a way which depends on their recognition 
both of the validity of the inference in question and of their possession 
of warrant for its premises. (Wright, 2000, p. 141, italics in original) 
 
Returning to McKinsey’s incompatibility argument, evidence that supports 
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(P1) is my introspective experience, which presupposes (Con) that we have 
had contact with water if we are externalists, who believe that introspective 
experience rests on our interaction with water. It becomes apparent that (P1) 
and (P2) fail to transmit epistemic warrant to (Con) insofar as knowledge 
about the water environment is, on strong externalism about the mental 
content expressed in (P2), the precondition of self-knowledge that I believe 
that water is wet. Valid deduction does not necessarily warrant evidential 
transmission success.  
 
Now let us apply this conclusion to the argument theory. If we are to use E 
as evidence for H relative to argument A, we must at least have reasons for 
E, and these reasons cannot presuppose H. A valid and sound argument can 
still be utilised as a relevance-mediating vehicle as long as it avoids non-
evidential-warrant-transmission claims as its premises. 
 
When does deductive entailment successfully transmit warrant to the 
conclusion? Consider that the claim ‘if it rains the ground gets wet’ and the 
claim ‘it rains’ together deductively entail the claim ‘the ground gets wet’. The 
premises do not necessarily rely on the fact that the ground gets wet 
because the fact that it rains can be observed by other routes, such as 
infrared images of tall, cold clouds that indicate rainfall, or seeing raindrops 
falling from the sky.51 So if the premises gain warrant from elsewhere, the 
truth of the claim ‘the ground gets wet’ is evidentially well-supported. Along 
this line, some trivial logical relations (e.g. any true claim is evidence for itself 
or for a logical truth or A&B is evidence for A), legitimate as evidential 
relations in the argument theory, cannot bestow an empirical warrant of the 
premises upon the conclusion.  
 
Although it is not obvious whether A transmits warrant for the logical truth 
Bv~B and thus whether A is evidence for Bv~B,52 the cases mentioned 
 
51 The conditionals, such as ‘if raindrops fall from the sky, then the ground gets wet’, are 
obtained partly from associations and partly from scientific knowledge. Such conditionals 
are, though fallible, reliable. 
52 Davies (1998) acknowledges that it is possible that not all necessary conditions count as 
preconditions, which unblocks the possibility of knowledge by inference.  
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above should suffice to draw a conclusion that not all valid, sound arguments 
function as moulding evidential relations. Perhaps Cartwright could maintain 
that the argument theory aims only to characterise what evidence and 
evidential relationships there are at the metaphysical level: what facts speak 
for (or give rise to, if understood causally) a fact or what premises ensure a 
conclusion. She could assert that the warrant transmission failure illustrated 
above is irrelevant; after all, ‘warrant’ is an epistemic notion. The epistemic 
claim that we are warranted in believing X on the basis of Y is not the same 
as the metaphysical claim that X is evidence for Y. Since the two kinds of 
claims are distinct, it can be reasonable to make different demands of them. 
This reply could deflect the criticism that epistemic warrant should be 
transmitted from premises to the conclusion, since the argument theory is not 
suited to tackle epistemological issues. This echoes the view that a theory of 
evidence should be assessed on a purpose-specific basis, as indicated in 
Chapter 1.  
 
I have two comments in response to Cartwright’s possible reply. Cartwright 
could argue that claims about evidential relevance must be true, though the 
truth of these relevance claims is not necessarily epistemically attainable. If 
claims about evidential relevance did not have empirical grounds, the 
reasoning would be called “proof”, (typically seen in logic and mathematics) 
the credibility of which derives from axioms and theorems and requires no 
empirical content of the premises.53 Furthermore, one of the virtues of the 
argument theory is the requirement that evidential arguments be sound, 
which provides researchers with guidelines for ensuring that each premise 
 
53 Achinstein (2014, p. 390, italics in original) also holds that ‘entailment would be proof not 
evidence’, which accounts for the reason for the third condition of his theory of evidence, 
namely (c) E does not entail H. Lipton (2004, p. 5) holds a similar view that ‘[i]nductive 
inference is thus a matter of weighing evidence and judging probability, not of proof’. Here, 
two situations should be carefully distinguished. For logical and mathematical proof, 
premises are true in accordance with axioms but not with empirical investigation, and thus 
do not carry evidential meaning. However, once empirical content is bestowed upon logical 
or mathematical premises, such premises may function as evidence. A logical example is 
the ‘if it rains the ground gets wet’ example, as noted above. A mathematical example can 
be illustrated with a birthday example. Suppose there are 367 people in the room (E), we 
can guarantee that there must be a pair having the same birthday (H) on the basis that there 
are 366 days (including the 29th of February) in a year. In this case, E is evidence for H, 
though E entails H. 
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they use has support from its bottom-layer sound argument and that there is 
no inferential gap between premises and conclusion. This indicates an 
epistemic attitude: an expectation that a theory of evidence should work for 
us. If Cartwright wants the argument theory to have this virtue, she has to 
solve the difficulty of epistemic warrant transmission. Otherwise, the 
argument theory would offer at most a Platonic ideal of evidence and 
evidential relationships. This virtue of the argument theory, i.e. it makes clear 
what we need to know, is not much of a virtue if an argument demands us to 
know what we have scant access to. 
 
By requiring deductive entailment, the argument theory admits trivial logical 
relations that transmit no substantial evidential warrant to a hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this difficulty, the argument theory captures the 
intuition that a piece of evidence will not count as evidence if it is found to be 
irrelevant to the hypothesis. Relevance, according to the argument theory, 
hinges on the truth of the premises and the formal relation of deductive 
entailment. To illustrate, consider an example where the suspect’s fingerprint 
on the duct tape, combined with support factors such as his motive for the 
murder and his physical presence at the crime scene, is believed to be 
strong evidence that he committed the murder. But his fingerprint on the duct 
tape no longer counts as evidence that he murdered the victim if one 
premise of the original argument for the hypothesis that he is the murderer is 
found to be false (e.g. the testimony to his presence at the scene turns out to 
be false) or the argument is found to be invalid (e.g. he was set up to leave 
his fingerprint on the duct tape). Evidential relevance may not persist if the 
original argument is found to be invalid or unsound subsequently.   
   
It is worth remarking that the argument theory of evidence is concerned with 
metaphysical issues, involving facts that ensure the truth of a claim in the 
material mode and reasons that ensure the entitlement to believe in in the 
formal mode. In the next chapter, I will consider Reiss’s inferentialist account 
of evidence that, conversely, emphasises the role of judgements in 
inferences from evidence to hypothesis at the epistemological level. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
I conclude this chapter by recapitulating my proposal In Chapter 1. I have 
recommended recognising the value of partial, namely purpose-specific, 
theories of evidence; they solve certain philosophical and practical problems 
about evidence and should be assessed with respect to their scope and 
purpose. I have distinguished three distinct evidential relationships, namely 
objective support, subjective acceptance and guidance, and have proposed 
that these replace the desiderata for any theory of evidence. Desiderata 
require theories to conform wholly, while the identification of evidential 
relationships maps where a theory of evidence is located for the sake of 
further evaluation. In this chapter, I scrutinise the argument theory of 
evidence in accordance with this proposal.      
 
Cartwright (2014) describes the aim of the argument theory of evidence with 
the following remarks: 
  
To figure out whether e is evidence for h, the Argument Theory guides 
you to look for good arguments connecting e and h. Of course it 
doesn’t tell you how to tell if an argument is good. But that’s not in its 
job description. Coming up with an argument is part of the ordinary 
normal science job of scientific discovery. To check that it is valid, 
perhaps one needs a good logician or a good mathematician. To tell if 
the premises are true, we employ the normal methods available in the 
paradigm in which we work for assessing the kinds of claims the 
premises make. (Cartwright, 2014, p. 111)  
   
The above quote reflects one of the major limitations of the argument theory: 
looking for a valid argument and checking the truth of the premises are the 
tasks for which scientists, and not philosophers, are responsible. I have 
examined the argument theory in this spirit, arguing that its difficulties, 
including its inability to ensure the transmission of epistemic warrant and to 
exclude metaphysical evidential relationships irrelevant to our purpose, arise 
from a radical demand for deductive entailment.  
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However, the argument theory has several strengths. It can remind us of 
inferential gaps, such as when we attempt to use the results of RCTs to 
extrapolate to other settings. It can also explain why something previously 
accepted as evidence may no longer serve as evidence when some other 
premise has been shown to be flawed or the argument is invalid.    
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4  
Pragmatist Approach:  
Reiss’s Inferentialist Account of Evidence 
 
 
Forty years ago, Clark Glymour (1980a) famously ruled hypothetico-
deductivism (H-D) ‘hopeless’. Paradoxically, a host of contemporary 
biomedical and social scientists regard the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) 
model of evidential reasoning as a legitimate methodology in science.54 H-D 
may not be utterly futile if additional criteria are supplemented. Philosophers 
endeavour to identify epistemic virtues, including predictability (e.g. Lakatos, 
1976; Hitchcock and Sober, 2004), simplicity (e.g. Quine and Ullian, 1978; 
Kelly, 2007) and explanatory power (e.g. Lipton, 2004). Whether these 
attempts, particularly those concerning epistemic virtues, are successful or 
not is controversial.  
 
This chapter focuses on the ‘add-on’ strategy of eliminativism (e.g. Bird, 
2010a), which avoids the debate between realists and anti-realists, in which 
epistemic virtues are perceived as pragmatic, and truth-irrelevant, virtues by 
anti-realists. Eliminativism can be regarded as having been integrated with 
H-D into Deborah Mayo’s (1996) error-statistical account of evidence. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, it concerns the reliability of test procedures in terms 
of controlling errors by computing specific numerical values concerning data 
given particular hypotheses. The error-statistical account is injected with an 
H-D-like concept, namely fit, and reflects eliminativism in the concept of 
severity. However, this account eschews prior probabilities, which can 
sometimes be profitably employed in medical sciences or otherwise 
appropriate settings. For example, the incidence rate (base rate) of a disease 
functioning as priors, in practice, can contribute to evidential information.  
 
Contrasting with Mayo’s quantitative approach, in this chapter I consider a 
new version of the H-D theory of evidence, which yields categorical yes/no 
 
54 For details, see Reiss (2015b, pp. 60–61). 
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answers to hypotheses without assigning numerical values to them. This new 
version substitutes the deductive component with the expectation/loose 
implication component combined with eliminativism, that is, Julian Reiss’s 
(2015a, 2015b) inferentialist account of evidence, which sets out its mission 
as fitting well with the evidence descriptions of biomedical and social science 
practices. 
 
I begin by laying out three critical constituents of Reiss’s inferentialist 
account: supporting evidence, comprising direct and indirect evidence; 
warranting evidence; and context, ones that demonstrate its mediating 
vehicles for evidential relevance to be expectation/loose implication and 
elimination of possibilities. Subsequently, I will show that direct evidence 
provides a framework for us to understand how claims or objects are thought 
relevant to evidence. This concerns guidance (GD), one of the evidential 
relationships I outlined in Chapter 1. This theory also has a component 
related to what I have called subjective acceptance (SA), viz. warranting 
evidence. To complement the framework, I also formulate the notions of 
inferential consistency and inferential irrelevance. Finally, in terms of 
strengths, difficulties and limitations of purpose specificity from the 
perspective of the tool-based view I endorse, I will argue: (1) that the 
strength of the inferentialist account is explaining why randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs) are deemed to be the gold standard of evidence and why a 
variety of sources of evidence are deemed legitimate in the biomedical and 
social sciences;55 and (2) that its difficulties and limitations stem from the fact 
that supporting and warranting evidence may be too coarse-grained to 
accommodate quantitative evidential reasoning in the scientific sphere.  
 
4.1 Two Paradigms: Experimental vs. Pragmatist  
 
Following the epidemiologist Mark Parascandola’s (2004) distinction between 
two paradigms of reasoning from evidence in the biomedical and social 
sciences, Reiss (2015a, 2015b) aims to articulate both the experimentalist 
 
55 For a more detailed exposition of RCTs, see Chapter 3.  
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and the pragmatist paradigm (especially the latter). According to Reiss, the 
experimentalist paradigm takes RCTs as the gold standard of evidence, and 
it posits that outcomes produced by other methods should be appraised with 
reference to how much resemblance these methods bear to the gold 
standard. However, under the pragmatist paradigm (a relatively vague 
concept in Parascandola’s paper), a hypothesis, according to pragmatic 
criteria, is supported by multiple sources of evidence,56 not limited to RCTs. 
Reiss puts a great deal of effort into clarifying the so-called pragmatic 
criteria. In the belief that the pragmatist paradigm spans diverse and 
manifold other disciplines,57 Reiss contends that this paradigm does better 
justice than the experimentalist paradigm to the complexity of biomedical 
practice and social research, especially regarding the ways that researchers 
gather evidence and reason from the evidence to establish generic causal 
claims (i.e. causal relations between even-types such as ‘smoking causes 
lung cancer’). In order to spell out the pragmatist paradigm, Reiss sets forth 
a new theory of evidence that he calls the inferentialist account of evidence.  
 
Reiss points out that in the biomedical and social sciences, RCTs implement 
the experimentalist paradigm by virtue of being widely deemed the gold 
standard of evidence ‘in all the domains labelled “evidence-based”, which 
 
56 This is a subtle literal difference between my usage and Reiss’s, which is essential to 
highlight. I use ‘multiple sources of evidence’, instead of Reiss’s (2015a, p. 341) ‘diverse 
bodies of evidence‘ in the quote ‘scientific claims are inferred, using pragmatic criteria, from 
diverse bodies of evidence that may but need not include experiments’. As stated in Chapter 
1, I endorse a view that there is no such thing, unless labelled via relevance-mediating 
vehicles, intrinsically being evidence. In other words, on this view, RCTs are not necessarily 
evidence, unless they are already for a certain hypothesis under certain conditions. 
However, the phrase ‘diverse bodies of evidence’ seems to indicate the opposite: RCTs are 
already there as a body of evidence awaiting us to use pragmatic criteria to infer 
hypotheses. I believe that my rewording is consistent with Reiss’s notions of evidence and 
will not affect the points I wish to make.  
57 The arena for discussing the pragmatist paradigm is set in the biomedical and social 
sciences. Reiss, nonetheless, believes that this paradigm can be extended to other 
disciplines, as can be seen from the following quotes: ‘I will focus on scientific domains 
where randomized experiments can be and are frequently employed. This includes the 
domains mentioned above but excludes all those domains where controlled experiments are 
effectively epistemic engines, such as large parts of physics and chemistry and basic/in vitro 
research in the biomedical sciences. I shall also exclude historical sciences such as 
cosmology, astronomy, astrophysics, geology, palaeontology, and archaeology. I do believe 
that the proposed account can be extended, but I will leave the extension to future work’ 
(Reiss, 2015a, p. 342) and ‘I do think that the basic idea of the account given here applies 
mutatis mutandis to other domains and other types of hypothesis, but here I will only be 
concerned with the biomedical and social sciences (Reiss, 2015b, p. 59).  
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include parts of medicine, dentistry, nursing, psychology, education, social 
policy, and criminal justice, but also parts of economics’ (Reiss 2015a, p. 
341). The methods deployed under the experimentalist paradigm are 
therefore applications of Mill’s methods. RCTs, or possibly other methods 
conforming to such a paradigm, operate reliably when several shielding 
conditions are met, such as the blocking or controlling of confounding factors 
to ensure that a variation in outcome stems solely from the adjustment of 
interventions or treatments. From the viewpoint of the experimentalists, these 
methods are ‘intrinsically reliable and therefore epistemically basic’ (Reiss 
2015a, p. 358) and are thus the benchmarks against which the evidential 
status of other methods can be measured. Naturally, experimentalists have 
to address the question: to what extent do other methods used to establish 
evidential claims resemble these orthodox methods?  
 
Natural experiments can acquire a status of ‘credible’ by mimicking these 
orthodox methods. Natural experiments are described as being judged as 
the ‘second best’ method in the RCT-dominated paradigm (Reiss, 2015c, p. 
374) and they resemble RCTs in some essential respects, which can be 
illustrated in terms of the three hallmarks of an RCT:  
 
(1) The response of experimental subjects assigned to receive a 
treatment is compared to the response of subjects assigned to a 
control group. 
(2) The assignment of subjects to treatment and control groups is done 
at random, through a randomizing device such as a coin flip. 
(3) The manipulation of the treatment—also known as the 
intervention—is under the control of an experimental researcher. 
(Dunning, 2012, p. 15) 
 
Natural experiments are a special form of observational study. Both typically 
bear the first hallmark: conventional observational studies compare 
‘outcomes for units bearing different values of independent variables (or 
“treatment conditions”)’ (Dunning, 2012, p. 16), whilst natural experiments 
compare results from treatment and control groups. The second hallmark 
nevertheless differentiates natural experiments from conventional 
observational studies. Observational studies lack the second hallmark: the 
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treatments are assigned neither randomly nor experimentally intentionally. 
By contrast, natural experiments, in which confounding factors may not be 
controlled or balanced to the same extent as they are in RCTs, are still 
capable of providing compelling evidence for hypotheses of interest by 
(approximately) randomly assigning subjects to treatment and control 
groups, and thus bear the second hallmark. 
 
However, as opposed to RCTs, natural experiments lack the third hallmark; 
they obtain their data not from the intervention, but from ‘”naturally” occurring 
phenomena—actually, in the social sciences, from phenomena that are often 
the product of social and political forces’ (Dunning, 2012, p. 16). Examples of 
natural experiments include Galiani and Schargrodsky’s’ (2010) Argentinian 
land-titling study, Angrist and Evans’ (1998) study on the effect of family size 
on labour supply and Angrist’s (1990a, 1990b) study on the effects of military 
service on later income. Although the third hallmark is absent in natural 
experiments, they mimic RCTs in terms of the first and second hallmarks, 
which enables their reliability to be accounted for by the experimentalist 
paradigm. 
 
According to Reiss (2015a), despite its rigorous demand for evidence quality, 
the experimentalist paradigm is uninformative about why evidence of various 
kinds, other than those pieces obtained by RCTs or natural experiments, is 
acknowledged as legitimate in scientific practice. Under this paradigm, it 
remains unclear in what ways certain observational studies other than 
natural experiments count as evidence for hypotheses, in particular the 
studies which seem to be far from these Mill’s methods-based studies. For 
instance, formal consensus is evidentially legitimate, albeit not to a high 
degree of hierarchy of evidence, in evidence-based medicine (Clarke et al., 
2014). Contrarily, within the experimentalist paradigm, formal consensus, 
remarkably dissimilar from the gold standard, is difficult to view as evidence. 
 
Even if the experimentalist paradigm could verify the legitimacy of various 
kinds of evidence, it hardly makes sense that they are mostly considered 
subsidiary or inferior, particularly in the medical sciences. Reiss (2015a, p. 
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359), for example, casts doubt on the paradigm’s ability to cohere with such 
a hierarchy, even by virtue of how much resemblance a kind of evidence 
bears to the gold standard of evidence. For illustration, consider a version of 
hierarchy of evidence recommended by the US Preventive Services Task 
Force (USPSTF) (2017).58 In this evaluation system of the quality of 
evidence in medicine, from highest to lowest quality, the types of evidence 
are enumerated as:  
 
I.   Properly powered and conducted RCT; well-conducted 
 systematic review or meta-analysis of homogeneous RCTs 
II-1.  Well-designed controlled trial without randomization 
 II-2.  Well-designed cohort or case-control analysis study 
II-3.  Multiple time-series, with or without the intervention; results from 
 uncontrolled studies that yield results of large magnitude 
III.    Opinions of respected authorities, based on clinical experience; 
 descriptive studies or case reports; reports of expert committees  
 
It is difficult for the experimentalist paradigm to account for, say, why 
uncontrolled studies with large effects are ranked higher than expert reports, 
since neither is structurally similar to RCTs nor can either be adapted to suit 
the experimentalist paradigm.  
 
The pragmatist paradigm, by contrast, uses a different mode of justification. 
Under this paradigm, RCTs are not regarded as the gold standard, and 
diverse sources of evidence work in tandem to eliminate alternatives (e.g. 
biases), as we shall see in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 — for example, one piece of 
evidence is used to rule out biases that cannot be eliminated by another 
piece of evidence. The paradigm may, in most cases, acknowledge certain 
types of evidence, such as well-designed and well-conducted RCTs, as the 
strongest, or the most reliable form of, evidence, not because of what they 
 
58 Other hierarchy systems include but not limited to the Australian National Health and 
Medical Research Council (NHMRC)’s (1999) hierarchy, the Oxford Centre for Evidence-
Based Medicine (OCEBM)’s (2011) hierarchy and the World Health Organization (WHO)’s 
hierarchy. The kinds of evidence listed in these systems may vary slightly but are classified 
hierarchically in terms of similar levels. 
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are, nor simply because they conform to Mill’s methods. The advocates of 
the pragmatist paradigm instead attribute the emergence of the strongest 
evidence to their propensity to satisfy specific conditions. The primacy of the 
RCTs can be acknowledged in the pragmatist paradigm, but for reasons 
deeply entrenched in a methodological foundation shared with other sources 
of evidence. In what follows, I will introduce the inferentialist account of 
evidence, which Reiss proposes to articulate the methodology of evidential 
reasoning within the pragmatist paradigm.  
 
4.2 Supporting Evidence 
 
Reiss’s ambition in developing the inferentialist account of evidence is to 
characterise the ways scientific claims are, and should be, inferred. This 
account is meant to articulate the pragmatist paradigm both descriptively and 
reconstructively and allows for the role of pragmatic criteria and diverse 
sources of evidence.59 For Reiss, the term ‘evidence’ conflates two notions: 
supporting evidence and warranting evidence. Supporting evidence is a 
‘mark or symptom’ of the truth of a hypothesis and warranting evidence is a 
‘reason’ for the truth of a hypothesis (ranging from weak reason to guarantor) 
(Reiss 2015b, p. 60). Supporting evidence is a fundamental concept on 
which warranting evidence relies and which can be further classified into two 
types: direct evidence (evidence for a hypothesis) and indirect evidence 
(evidence against alternative hypotheses). In explaining how direct evidence 
and indirect evidence work, Reiss draws upon the ‘hypothetico’ component 
of the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account of evidence without the burden of 
the ‘deductive’ component.  
 
The deductive component burdens the H-D account of evidence with a 
number of difficulties. The standard H-D account states that a claim E is 
evidence for a hypothesis H, given relevant background knowledge B, just in 
 
59 A philosophical account aims to describe scientific practice, meanwhile providing a 
rational reconstruction of the criteria working scientists employ.   
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case H in combination with B entails E.60 However, the H-D account of 
evidence has been considered fraught with defects (see, e.g. Achinstein, 
2001; Glymour, 1980a; Lipton, 2004; Norton, 2003; Reiss, 2015b; 
Woodward, 2011). I do not belabour all of the problems with the H-D account 
and instead focus on the relationship of inheritance between the H-D account 
and the inferentialist account. Specifically, I would like to draw attention to 
three substantial problems (Problems A–C) concerning the component of 
deductive entailment, abandoned by the latter account. In what follows, after 
an introduction of a substitute component for deductive entailment, I shall 
show to what extent the inferentialist account can address these problems.  
 
On the one hand, deductive entailment fails to guarantee that E is evidence 
for H. For one thing, in Problem A, trivial implications would not be regarded 
as evidence in scientific practice. Suppose there is a fabricated law called 
Lepler’s first law, which mistakenly states that the planets revolve around the 
sun in square orbits and that this law entails the existence of the sun. The 
existence of the sun, according to the H-D account, counts as evidence for 
Lepler’s erroneous first law. Alternatively, in Problem B, since any claim 
deductively entails itself, it should be evidence for itself. Nevertheless, one 
should not regard a claim as evidence for itself, in that if the evidence were 
identical with the hypothesis that it purports to support, it would be pointless 
to infer a hypothesis whose truth is already known beforehand.61 On the 
other hand, in Problem C, evidence is not restricted to any claim that can be 
deduced from a hypothesis. As the previous discussion illustrates, well-
designed and well-conducted RCTs, cohort studies, case-control studies, 
 
60 The requirement of the truth of E is included in some versions of the H-D account. For 
instance, Achinstein (2001, p. 147) incorporates the truth of evidence into the basic H-D 
condition. But this requirement is not found in many other versions (see, e.g. Woodward, 
1983; Bird, 2010b).  
61 One can, with the following example, doubt the ‘already-known’ reason. Suppose H: She 
ate the cake that was in the kitchen, E1: H, E2: There are some cake crumbs left on her 
fingers, and E3: it was not possible that any people other than her had been in the kitchen. 
E2 itself is normally regarded as evidence indicating H. But if we know E3 before knowing E2, 
does this mean that E2 is no longer evidence in this situation in the same way E1, identical to 
H, is not evidence for H? Obviously not, though E2 is of no use in indicating H, given 
knowing a sufficient reason E3. For we can find a counterfactual situation in which E2 were to 
be evidence for H, if E3 would not be present, whilst we cannot find any like this for H (E1). 
This distinction can be further made sense of by the notion of evidential warrant 
transmission failure that I have elaborated on in Chapter 3.  
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multiple time series, large-effect observational studies, expert opinions and 
case reports are all accepted as sources of evidence, despite their results 
not being deductively entailed by hypotheses.62  
 
In spite of the numerous problems, many biomedical and social scientists still 
take the H-D method as a standard model of evidential reasoning (Reiss 
2015b, pp. 60-61). According to Reiss's diagnosis, the tension consists in 
deductive entailment as the standard of assessment of evidence; the 
deduction requirement for evidential relationships should be abandoned and 
replaced with what we may call loose implication. Reiss (2015b, p. 61) 
subsequently advances a framework that resurrects ‘the spirit of the 
hypothetico-deductivist theory but does not suffer from the problems and 
counter-examples that beset its logical positivist formulation’. In a similar 
spirit of the H-D method (particularly regarding its ‘hypothetico’ component), 
Reiss (2015b, p. 63) proposes two types of supporting evidence that 
scientists use to reason from evidence to hypothesis: 
  
Direct evidence:  Ed is direct evidence for a hypothesis H if and only 
if Ed is a pattern in the data that one is entitled to expect, supposing 
that H is true.   
   
Indirect evidence: Ei is indirect evidence for a hypothesis H if and 
only if Ei is a pattern in the data that is incompatible with what one is 
entitled to expect, supposing that one of H’s competing hypotheses 
H′, H′′, H′′′ and so on is true.   
 
From the above definitions, an evidential relation between H and E is an 
inductive, rather than deductive, relation, i.e. H need not imply E logically, or 
 
62 Reiss illustrates this point by listing an array of evidence for causal claims. Reiss (2015b, 
p. 349) argues that a causal hypothesis that ‘C causes E’, even with background knowledge, 
does not logically entail claims about certain patterns, such as a correlation between C and 
E, a change in E after an intervention on C, C’s constituting an INUS (Insufficient but 
Necessary parts of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient) condition for E, a 
continuous process from C to E, or a mechanism linking C and E. Nonetheless, as Reiss 
(2015b, pp. 345-346) points out, claims about these kinds of patterns can be evidence for a 
causal hypothesis.  
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vice versa. Reiss (2015a, p. 346) construes evidential relations as those that 
hinge upon ‘our understanding of how the world works’, and he adopts a 
broad view on the nature of evidence, not restricted to statements — 
suggesting that evidence is a pattern in the data that, if a hypothesis is true, 
scientists are entitled to expect to obtain. Under the definitions of supporting 
evidence above, patterns may, if understood broadly enough, embody 
statements, entities, beliefs, figures, indexes and so forth. I am not 
concerned here with the taxonomy of things that can be evidence. If we 
follow customary usage in the philosophy of science, Reiss’s terminology 
‘expect to obtain patterns’ can be understood as ‘loosely imply’, statement-
to-statement relations. Statements, to some extent, can cover those pattern-
related things by making statements about them. Since deduction is a 
relation between statements/propositions, the way of understanding makes 
explicit the distinction between deductive entailment in H-D and loose 
implication in Reiss’s conception of evidence on a syntactic-semantic level.63 
I will therefore use ‘expect’ for epistemic contexts and ‘loosely imply’ for 
logical-linguistic contexts for the rest of the chapter.  
 
One way to understand Reiss’s definitions of supporting evidence is as 
follows: if Ed is a statement loosely implied by H, Ed directly supports H by 
signalling the inferential possibility of H. If Ei is a statement that is compatible 
with H but goes against expectations from H’s competing hypotheses, Ei 
indirectly supports H by undermining the plausibility of H′, by making other 
inferential possibilities implausible. By ‘inferential possibility’, I mean that a 
statement is inferentially relevant to its target via loose implication in a 
particular context. Inferential possibility is not the same as logical possibility, 
the latter of which is realised simply via non-contradiction. Here I use 
‘inferential possibility’ to highlight the contrast between possibility and 
plausibility; in short, for the inferentialist account, inference begins from 
 
63 Another reason for me not to adhere to the term ‘pattern’ used in the definitions of 
evidence is that Reiss takes, for example, murder weapons as patterns. Philosophically, 
anti-realists can assert that objects, to the greatest extent, are inferred through our 
perception, whilst intuitively, the claim that objects such as murder weapons are patterns 
seems odd. To avoid such controversy, ‘loose implication’ is sometimes an adequate 
substitute.   
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possibility and eventually ends at plausibility, as I shall explain.   
 
The distinction between the two types of supporting evidence can be 
understood as a distinction between what I call a projection strategy and an 
elimination strategy. The former is to catch relevant, or inferentially possible, 
hypotheses with an H-D style of fishnet called ‘loose implication’, whilst the 
latter is to sift the plausible hypotheses from the rest through a sieve called 
‘eliminativism’. In more detail, the strategy of direct evidence is captured by 
the standard H-D account of evidence that holds that ‘H entails E if E is 
evidence for H’ and can be modified as ‘H loosely implies E if E is evidence 
for H’ and asks ‘What patterns would one be entitled to expect if H were 
true?’. If H loosely implies E, H is supported by E. Direct evidence aids in 
informing us of what claims are relevant provided that H is true. For instance, 
if it is hypothesised that two events are related causally, they are expected to 
be correlated. Suppose that an event A and another event C1 are correlated 
and there is another event C2 also correlated with A. These correlations 
would provide direct evidence for the hypothesis that C1 and C2 are both 
causes of A.  
 
Being an indicator of inferentially possible hypotheses, direct evidence itself 
does not suffice to indicate that a hypothesis of interest is plausible 
compared to competing hypotheses. Direct evidence could allow competing 
hypotheses that coexist: if H1 loosely implies Ed, H1 is supported by Ed, whilst 
if H2 also loosely implies Ed, H2 is also supported by Ed. The indirect 
evidence strategy helps here, in that it has to do with the elimination of 
alternative hypotheses. Suppose there is something compatible with (not 
necessarily inferentially compatible) H1 but incompatible with H2, this is 
called, according to Reiss, indirect evidence for H1 by eliminating H2. 
 
Direct and indirect evidence can be exemplified by a case where there are 
several possible causes for my toothache. It could result from dental caries, 
periodontitis, cracked teeth or trigeminal neuralgia, whereas the toothache is, 
in Reiss’s terminology, direct evidence for any of these hypotheses of the 
causes of the toothache. After a comprehensive examination, my dentist 
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ruled out tooth nerve-related causes, such as tooth decay, periodontitis and 
a cracked tooth, because he found that the painful tooth had been treated 
with root canal therapy, which indicated that the nerves of the tooth had been 
removed. This is indirect evidence that my toothache was caused by 
trigeminal neuralgia, because the removal of the tooth nerves is incompatible 
with the hypothesis that any dental caries, periodontitis or a cracked tooth 
exists. It follows that whilst direct evidence supports multiple hypotheses, 
indirect evidence plays a role in eliminating alternatives.  
 
Note that Reiss seems to conflate ‘E is expected if H is true’ with ‘H explains 
E’ and ‘H and E are incompatible’ with ‘H cannot explain E’. Carefully 
distinguishing ‘expectation/loose implication’ and ‘inferential incompatibility’ 
from ‘explanation’ and bringing the concept of inferential irrelevance into 
play, can avoid the problem of trivial implication (Problem A above). These 
conflations can be found in many contexts: ’If a genetic factor were appealed 
to in order to explain this observation, there would have to have been a 
mutation in males first and a few decades later in females, a pattern that had 
not previously been observed’ (Reiss, 2015a, p. 353, my italics), ‘These 
confirmed a dramatic increase in lung cancer risk among smokers but could 
not be accounted for by Berkson’s paradox’ (Reiss, 2015a, p. 353, my 
italics), ‘However, the misclassification hypothesis cannot explain 
micropatterns in the data’ (Reiss, 2015a, p. 353, my italics) and so forth. 
These sentences indicate both that if H explains E, then E is expected 
supposing that H is true, and that if H cannot explain E, then E fails to be 
evidence for H, which, according to Reiss, would mean that H and E are 
incompatible. If ‘incompatible’ were understood in a strictly logical sense, the 
definition of indirect evidence would not accommodate what I quoted above, 
because, for example, Berkson’s paradox is logically compatible with the 
epidemiologic trend in lung cancer among smokers.64  
 
 
64 Put simply, Berkson’s paradox is a general pattern where ‘observations on a common 
consequence of two independent causes tend to render those causes dependent, because 
information about one of the causes tends to make the other more or less likely, given that 
the consequence has occurred’ (Pearl, 2000, p. 17). 
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The way of attempting to cash out ‘expect/loosely imply’ and ‘incompatible’ in 
terms of ‘explain’ has some initial appeal, but upon close examination turns 
out to be problematic. Reiss’s definition of indirect evidence is defined as a 
pattern of the data (E) that is incompatible with what is expected, supposing 
that H′ (a competing hypothesis of H) is true (E′). But he occasionally claims 
that ‘[i]ndirect support is given by patterns in the data that are incompatible 
with the truth of an alternative hypothesis’ (Reiss, 2015b, p. 63, italics in 
original), pointing out that E is incompatible with H′, not E′. The first use of 
the term ‘incompatible’ is taken as ‘logically incompatible’, meaning that E 
and E′ cannot both be true. For the second use, I construe ‘incompatible’ as 
inferentially incompatible, as E and H′ are not necessarily logically 
incompatible. Although Reiss does not explicitly define ‘incompatible′ in his 
account, this term in the second use cannot simply be formulated as: H and 
E are inferentially incompatible if and only if H cannot explain E. Whilst the 
inferential incompatibility between H and E does imply that H cannot explain 
E (i.e. if H can explain E, H and E should be inferential compatible), the 
converse does not hold. For example, a hypothesis that K is the murderer 
(Hk) explains neither that K has an alibi (E1) nor that K has human DNA (E2). 
Hk’s failure to explain E1 shows inferential incompatibility between Hk and E1, 
whilst E2‘s being unexplainable in the light of Hk arises from inferential 
irrelevance, upon which I will expand below.  
 
Problems also arise if ‘expect/loosely imply’ is conceptualised as: E is 
expected supposing that H is true (namely, H loosely implies E) if and only if 
H explains E. Although it follows from H’s explaining E, that H loosely implies 
E, it need not be the case that H loosely implies E only if H explains E. To 
illustrate, consider a classic example of causation. Let us suppose Hap: The 
atmospheric pressure drops, Hs: A storm occurs and Eb: A barometer falls. 
Whilst Hap causally explains Eb and thus loosely implies Eb, Hs only loosely 
implies Eb not by virtue of explaining Eb. Loose implication covers more 
situations than does explanation, that is, explanation is logically stronger 
than loose implication, or expectation. Arguably, appealing to ‘explain’ does 
not fully explicate ‘expect/loosely imply’ and ‘inferentially incompatible’ for the 
inferentialist account.   
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To help formulate ‘expectation/loose implication’ and ‘inferential 
incompatibility’ as well as possible, my suggestions are as follows. 
 
Expectation/Loose implication: E is expected supposing that H is 
true (i.e. H loosely implies E) if and only if E, if H is true, is likely enough 
to occur relative to a particular context, i.e. P(E/H&C) > α, where C is a 
related context and α is the standard of occurrence relative to E, H and 
C.  
  
Inferential incompatibility: H and E are inferentially incompatible if 
and only if E is unlikely enough to occur relative to a particular context, 
supposing that H is true, i.e. P(E/H&C) < ε, where ε is the standard of 
non-occurrence relative to E, H and C.  
  
Inferential consistency: H and E are inferentially consistent if and only 
if the occurrence of E, supposing that H is true, is between likely 
enough and unlikely enough relative to a particular context, i.e. ε ≤ 
P(E/H&C) ≤ α.  
 
Inferential irrelevance: H and E are inferentially irrelevant if and only if 
E, relative to a particular context, is equally likely to occur regardless of 
H (or H, relative to a particular context, is equally likely to be true 
regardless of E), i.e. P(E/H&C) = P(E/C), or equivalently P(H/E&C) = 
P(H/C).  
 
These notions can be defined in either qualitative or quantitative ways, as 
shown above; the former is what Reiss may maintain for the inferentialist 
account and the latter is easier to capture at a glance. The context renders 
the standard highly domain-sensitive by which inferential judgments are 
made. Context is an essential element of the inferentialist account, and I will 
come back to this in Section 4.4. Note that the universal lower bound on α is 
required to be greater than 1/2, on the basis that if E is expected, supposing 
that H is true, then E should be more likely to occur than ~E. For example, if 
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a coin toss is expected to come up heads (Eh) supposing that the coin is 
heads-biased (Hb), then P(Eh/Hb) > P(~Eh/Hb), which amounts to P(Eh/Hb) > 
1/2. Similar logic applies to the universal upper bound on ε. If that the coin is 
heads-biased (Hb) and that the tossed coin lands tails (Et) are inferentially 
incompatible, at least P(Et/Hb) < P(~Et/Hb) and thus P(Et/Hb) < 1/2.    
 
To see whether the definitions by reference to ‘likely’ work, reconsider the 
murderer example, in which HK: K is the murderer, E1: K has an alibi and E2: 
K has human DNA, added with E3: K’s DNA is left on the murder weapon 
and E4: K was the victim’s friend. If in a particular context (e.g. legal or 
investigative), E3 is judged to the extent that it is likely enough to occur for Hk, 
Hk loosely implies E3. Since E1 would be extremely unlikely supposing that K 
committed the murder relative to the same context, E1 and Hk are inferentially 
incompatible. If K were the murderer, there would be neither any assurance 
nor denial that K had a friendship with the victim; E4 and Hk are inferentially 
consistent. Lastly, since the murderer is human, HK is equally likely 
regardless of E2; E2 provides no information about the truth of HK and is 
inferentially irrelevant to Hk. Integrating inferential consistency and 
irrelevance into the notions of evidence can complement the inferentialist 
account. 
 
Inferential compatibility is distinct from logical/physical compatibility. H and E 
are logically compatible if and only if it is not the case that the conjunction of 
H and E is necessarily false, and H and E are physically compatible if and 
only if it is possible that H and E are true in accordance with physical laws. In 
these senses, inferential compatibility is (logically) stronger than 
logical/physical compatibility by virtue of implying the latter two types of 
compatibility. That is, if H and E are inferentially compatible, they are 
logically/physically compatible, but not vice versa. For example, the weapon 
is a pattern to be expected if K is the killer, which is logically/physically 
compatible with the hypothesis that the person died by accident. However, 
the accident hypothesis and the weapon found are inferentially incompatible, 
since the weapon is not expected to appear, supposing that the accident 
hypothesis is true.  
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So far I have established three points. The first is to argue that 
expectation/loose implication and inferential incompatibility cannot be fully 
conceptually captured by explanation. The second is to suggest that 
expectation/loose implication, inferential incompatibility, inferential 
consistency and inferential irrelevance can be fleshed out in terms of 
qualitative and quantitative relationships between H, E and context. The third 
is to distinguish inferential compatibility from logical/physical compatibility. In 
what follows I delve into the notion of supporting evidence more deeply. 
 
Armed with loose implication which differs from deductive entailment, can 
Reiss’s notion of supporting evidence be immune to the difficulties 
mentioned above, namely, restricted sources of evidence (Problem C), self-
deduction (Problem B) and trivial implications (Problem A), those that the H-
D method encounters? As regards Problem C, from Reiss’s point of view, 
since a causal claim loosely implies a claim about correlations,65 relations of 
invariance and processes, these implications, which do not count as 
evidence in the H-D account, are admissible as direct evidence for the 
causal claim.  
 
However, in broad terms, a claim deductively derived from a hypothesis is 
expected to emerge on the supposition of the hypothesis, so Reiss’s notion 
of supporting evidence seems to face the same difficulties as the H-D 
method, including self-deduction, like the claim that E is evidence for itself, 
and trivial implications, like the case of Lepler’s first law. Reiss (2015a, p. 
346) gives a simple reason against self-deduction as evidence (Problem B), 
claiming that ‘any statement entails itself, but no self-respecting biomedical 
or social scientist would take the truth of a hypothesis as support for itself’. 
His reason is unconvincing, as it shows that the inferentialist account does 
not fulfil the purpose it sets out, which is, in part, to account for real practices, 
 
65 Correlation neither is nor ‘logically’ implies causation but can be evidence for causation 
(Russo, 2015a). Nor does causation ‘logically’ imply correlation. These claims do not 
contradict the claim that causation ‘loosely’ implies correlation, as loose implication is 
inductive rather than deductive.   
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and it also shows that the H-D advocates can also take advantage of this 
reason to defend the H-D method in this respect.  
 
A possible way to avoid the self-deduction difficulty is to appeal to the 
definitions of supporting evidence. Reiss does not confer legitimacy to self-
deduction, presumably on the basis that evidence is a pattern in the data we 
are entitled to expect to find under the supposition of H. He can just hold that 
in the case of self-deduction, H does not constitute a pattern in the data if H 
is true — or conversely, if E is evidence for H, then E must not be identical 
with H and thus there is no self-deduction. Otherwise, Reiss should bite the 
bullet, admitting that if under the supposition that H is true, H itself is an 
expected pattern, then any whimsy can be evidence for itself. This, however, 
would be absurd.  
 
The appeal to the notion of supporting evidence is not viable. The main 
contention can be that supposing H is true, we are entitled to expect a 
pattern exactly the same as the description in H; does this not mean that if H 
entails itself, then H is evidence for itself? The crux of the problem lies in a 
lack of a clear characterisation of ‘patterns in the data’ and ‘data’. Despite not 
proffering such a characterisation, Reiss (2015b) gives a clear-cut example 
that instantiates a distinction between the two concepts:  
  
I say ‘patterns in the data’ instead of ‘data’ because scientists aren’t 
normally entitled to expect specific data sets. That a coin is biased 
towards heads entitles us to expect that there are more heads in a 
series of tosses but not 17 out of 20. The same is true of causal 
hypotheses. (Reiss, 2015b, p. 76) 
 
Let us consider this example: Hb: The coin is biased, Eh: In a series of 
tosses, the coin comes up heads far more often than tails and D: There are 
17 heads in 20 tosses. Reiss’s idea is as follows. A particular number of the 
heads recorded as the data D is not expected if Hb is true, whilst Eh, a 
pattern in the data, is expected if Hb is true. Accordingly, ‘a pattern in the 
data’ represented by Eh and ‘data’ by D are clearly distinguished. 
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Reiss seemingly has to admit that the notion of supporting evidence still 
confronts the problem of self-deduction when the following example is 
considered. Suppose there is a hypothesis (Hh) identical to Eh. To allow 
maximum latitude for Reiss to avoid the problem of self-deduction, we may 
agree to accept that whether something is a pattern in the data is relativised 
to a hypothesis. It can be argued that Eh is a pattern in the data relative to Hb 
but not relative to Hh. If so, Hh is not direct evidence for itself. However, it is 
hard to conceptualise another pattern, other than Eh, that is expected to be 
found supposing that Hh is true. Nor can D be direct evidence for Hh. 
Supposing that Hh is true, whilst we would assert that we are entitled to 
expect that there are two heads in two tosses (D’), we would hesitate to say 
that we are entitled to expect a specific data set such as D, as there are 
many possible sets of data that constitute heads outnumbering tails in 20 
tosses. Theoretically, any claim between Eh and D in terms of the abstract-
concrete extent can be a candidate for direct evidence for Hh, but it is hard to 
conceptualise such a claim. Considering these issues, judging whether 
something is a pattern in the data or is just the data remains perplexing.   
 
A possible reply is that in the coin example, since Eh is ‘what is perceived’ 
rather than ‘what actually exists’ captured by Hh, Eh is not Hh itself and thus is 
not evidence for itself. This reply, however, involves persistent and 
unresolved debates in metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of 
mind. Perhaps a straightforward solution to the self-deduction difficulty would 
be one mentioned in Chapter 3. That is, scientists do not need evidence to 
establish what is already known; Hh is not evidence for itself insofar as it is 
not possible that Hh remains unknown when Eh is known. This solution can 
be implied by Reiss’s notion of context, which I will visit in Section 4.4. More 
importantly, this solution would not benefit the H-D account: unlike 
expectation/loose implication, which is sensitive to context, the background 
knowledge B involved in the H-D definition does not change the fact that a 
statement entails itself. Thus, Reiss need not draw upon real scientific 
practices themselves to explain the illegitimacy of self-deduction as 
evidence.   
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As regards trivial implications (Problem A above), appealing solely to loose 
implication or expectation is not enough to solve this problem. Entailed 
existential claims are typically not taken as evidence for causal hypotheses. 
However, for the inferentialist account, if an existential claim is entailed by a 
causal hypothesis, then the existential claim constitutes direct evidence for 
the hypothesis by being implied by the hypothesis. The existence of the sun 
should count as a pattern to be expected under the supposition of Lepler’s 
first law and thus serve as direct evidence for Lepler’s first law. Upon 
discussing the problem with the H-D method, Reiss (2015b, p. 40) argues 
that ‘[c]ausal hypotheses do, however, entail existential claims …. the 
existential claim is not relevant to the truth of a causal hypothesis. 
Hypothetico-deductivism is therefore not a good theory of support’. Whether 
Reiss’s reason here is cogent or not hinges upon what he means by 
‘relevant’. As noted earlier, the relevance that he intends is inferential 
relevance, which cannot be fleshed out merely with the notion of loose 
implication or expectation.  
 
In order to insulate the inferentialist account from the problem of trivial 
implication, the notion of inferential irrelevance I have outlined can be 
invoked. A note of caution must be issued: an existential claim can 
sometimes be evidence for hypotheses. To illustrate, consider a case of 
Helicobacter pylori (H. pylori), a bacterium that colonises the gastric and 
duodenal mucosa. Peptic ulcers had been widely believed to be primarily 
caused by stress and spicy food (Hss) before the early 1980s when H. pylori 
was identified (Ehp) and hypothesised as (and actually is) a major causative 
factor of peptic ulcers (Hhp) (Johnson et al., 2007). According to the 
inferentialist account, the existence of H. pylori (Ehp) is supporting evidence 
for Hhp by virtue of being expected to appear supposing that Hhp is true. 
Moreover, Ehp is inferentially relevant to Hhp, because Ehp is more likely to 
appear under Hhp than without. Indeed, the history of how Hhp was confirmed 
is not straightforward: Hhp was well supported by other sources of evidence. 
The findings were that those with H. pylori are more likely to have ulcers than 
those without, i.e. P(ulcers/H. pylori) > P(ulcers/~H. pylori), and that patients’ 
recovery covaries with their taking antibiotics (Thagard, 1998, p. 66). Also, 
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although it was widely held that the stomach was too acid for a bacterium to 
survive, a piece of mechanistic information subsequently became available 
about H. pylori’s capability of neutralising stomach acid by secreting 
ammonia (Thagard, 1998, p. 70). These pieces of evidence jointly justify Hhp, 
which is concerned with the notion of warranting evidence (see Section 4.3). 
The aforementioned sun example is, by contrast, where inferential 
irrelevance comes into play: although the existence of the sun may be direct 
evidence for every competing hypothesis, it is inferentially irrelevant to 
Lepler’s first law, no matter whether we consider Lepler’s first law or not. The 
upshot is that the existential claim, if embodied within all of the competing 
hypotheses, can be disregarded as non-evidence insofar as it is not relevant 
to the inference. Trivial implication does not pose a problem for the 
inferentialist account.  
 
It is noteworthy that the unobservable can serve as evidence if it satisfies the 
requirements of evidence considered in the inferentialist account. Reiss’s 
definitions of supporting evidence apply patterns, which are not necessarily 
observable. The toothache example above applies the observable as 
evidence,66 including the painful tooth and the records of root canal 
therapy.67 However, in some cases the unobservable can function as 
evidence. For instance, Reiss (2015b, p. 62) claims that ‘[c]orrelations, 
similarly, are best thought of as theoretical relations that can be estimated 
using one or another measure (such as the Pearson correlation coefficient) 
but which is not observable as such…’. The marks of causal relationships 
(e.g. correlations) may be unobservable, but this does not necessarily mean 
that these unobservable marks cannot be expected from the data and thus 
cannot be evidence. Rather, they, through inferences, gain the entitlement to 
indicate the truth of the hypothesis on the grounds that they are constructed 
or established by virtue of the observable. 
 
 
66 In this case, whether my toothache is observable or not is debatable. Whilst it is 
observable to me, it is not observable to my doctor unless some kind of behaviourism is 
adopted that reduces ‘toothache’ to certain kinds of behaviour.  
67 The fact that the nerves have been removed is also observable.  
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An ordinary example is when we see a person standing outside shivering on 
a snowy day. We are initially likely to infer that he is feeling cold, which is, to 
some extent, evidence that his clothes cannot keep him warm or that he 
needs to come inside and warm up. The claim that he feels cold, if 
unobservable for us, is not groundless: it is inferred, on the basis of the 
observations and functions as evidence for further hypotheses. Similar 
concerns apply when correlations, theoretical constructs, stem from the 
observations of the corresponding increase (or decrease) among two 
variables, which can be recorded on a spreadsheet. While the data recorded 
in the spreadsheet is evidence for a correlation, correlations, though 
unobservable, can be evidence for causal hypotheses. It can be seen that 
the notion of patterns used to define supporting evidence accommodates 
both the observable and the unobservable as evidence.  
  
4.3  Warranting Evidence 
 
Having discussed supporting evidence, we can now move on to warranting 
evidence, which results from combining direct evidence and indirect 
evidence. While the strategy of direct evidence modifies the standard H-D 
method, the strategy of indirect evidence employs eliminativism. If there is a 
body of evidence in favour of H1 and there are other pieces of evidence for 
eliminating alternative hypotheses H2 and H3, we have a good reason to infer 
H1. Reiss (2015b, p.73) distinguishes four levels of warrant: proof, strong 
warrant, moderate warrant and weak warrant.  
 
Proof:   All relevant competing hypotheses are eliminated. 
Strong warrant:  All salient competing hypotheses and some non-
salient are eliminated.  
Moderate warrant: Most competing hypotheses, some of which are 
 salient, are eliminated. 
Weak warrant: Some competing hypotheses, none of which are 
salient, are eliminated. 
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Note that Reiss here uses the term salient. Salient alternatives are 
‘alternatives for which there exists direct support, [that] contribute more to the 
strength of the warrant than non-salient alternatives because a true 
alternative is more likely to leave traces in the data than a false alternative’ 
(Reiss, 2015a, pp. 357–358). ‘Salient’ is used to mark out competing 
hypotheses that are supported by additional direct evidence beyond the 
direct evidence shared between the target hypothesis and its competing 
hypotheses.  
 
It should also be noted that Reiss does not ascribe more evidential warrant 
to H1 than to H2 merely because H1 acquires more supporting evidence than 
H2. For Reiss, supporting evidence is construed as an ‘indicator of the truth” 
rather than typically seen as the ‘reason for the truth”; it only tells us ‘what 
kinds of facts we have to collect in order to evaluate a hypothesis’ (Reiss, 
2015a, p. 343) and supports a hypothesis ‘without yet constituting a reason 
to infer the hypothesis, even a weak one’ (Reiss, 2015a, pp. 342–343). 
Supporting evidence does not even require that the must-collect facts be true 
propositions,68 so if H1 has more supporting evidence than H2, it is not 
necessary that there be more facts in support of H1 than H2. Warranting 
evidence focuses on a hypothesis that can best survive the process of 
elimination and thus gives a good reason to believe. Competing hypotheses, 
if not eliminated, do not have less warrant than the focal hypothesis, even if 
they have less supporting evidence.  
 
Put differently, even assuming that there are more facts supporting H1 than 
H2, both can be equally warranted unless one of them is eliminated, because 
more direct evidence just tells us more about what would be relevant to the 
hypothesis. For the inferentialist account, the only legitimate way to assess 
 
68 The non-requirement for the truth does not appear to accord with sound common usage: 
Ed and Ei in the definitions of supporting evidence are not required to be true. A way to avoid 
this discord is, I suggest, to distinguish between potential and real supporting evidence in an 
analogous way that Hempel (1965) or Achinstein (2001) made a distinction between 
potential and correct explanation. Therefore, one may claim that E is potential supporting 
evidence just in the case it meets either of the definition of direct or indirect evidence, and 
that E is real supporting evidence just in case it is true beyond being potential supporting 
evidence.  
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the warrant of the focal hypothesis is by assessing to what extent its 
competing hypotheses, sharing the same direct evidence with the focal 
hypothesis, are eliminated by indirect evidence, and not by assessing by how 
much additional direct evidence it obtains insofar as the additional direct 
evidence, if consistent with competing hypotheses, does not eliminate them. 
The role that direct evidence plays in the assessment of warrant is 
determining whether competing hypotheses other than the focal hypothesis 
are salient or not. However, failure to falsify some competing hypotheses 
does not amount to a failure to distinguish the evidential strength between 
them. The latter is what the inferentialist account is silent about and is what I 
will explore in Section 4.5.  
 
Importantly, the epistemic notion of proof here is distinctively different from 
the mathematical or logical notion of proof. The latter notions of proof 
possess deductive certainty, that is, provided that the premises are true, the 
conclusion following from them must be true. As far as evidential support is 
concerned, the epistemic proof is inductively strongest without possessing 
absolute certainty. This kind of proof is fallible even if all competing 
hypotheses have been eliminated. This is because all possible competing 
hypotheses may not be collectively exhaustive (i.e. the combination of H’s 
competing hypotheses under consideration does not necessarily fully cover 
the negation of H), or competing hypotheses that have been ruled out should 
not have been eliminated. The different levels of non-proof warrant are 
distinguished in terms of how many salient hypotheses are eliminated on the 
basis of indirect evidence. Put simply, if epistemic proof is obtained by virtue 
of the elimination of all competing hypotheses, then we have the strongest, 
though still fallible, reasons for a causal claim ‘C causes E’, for example. But 
if only strong (moderate/weak) warrant for this causal claim is obtained, then 
we only have reasons for the causal claim of ‘C is very likely to cause E’ (‘C 
may cause E’/’C might cause E’). 
 
The preceding example of my toothache is a case in point, indicating that the 
strength that warranting evidence gains hinges upon the extent to which 
salient and non-salient hypotheses are eliminated. My dentist initially 
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suspected that my toothache was caused by a decayed tooth (Hd), a cracked 
tooth (Hc), periodontitis (Hp) or trigeminal neuralgia (Ht). The hypothesis (Hd) 
is then directly supported by the fact that he, deducing from X-rays, found 
that there was indeed a cavity. Hd is accordingly a salient hypothesis. By 
contrast, he did not find any crack on the tooth or any problem with the soft 
tissues of my gum. Hc and Hp are non-salient hypotheses, as they do not 
have direct support, except for my suffering from a toothache. Hc and Hp are 
not the only non-salient hypotheses when my dentist could not exclude other 
non-salient hypotheses, such as myofascial pain, psychogenic toothache, 
brain tumour and any other hitherto known non-dental causes. Hd, Hc and Hp 
are all eliminated by the finding that the nerves of the tooth had been 
removed. Ht is thus strongly warranted because the only salient competing 
hypothesis Hd and non-salient competing hypotheses Hc and Hp have been 
ruled out. The dentist finally suggested that I see a neurologist for further 
neural examination. This strong warrant does not arise from a priori relations 
between H and E, as stated in the H-D account, but rather relates to a matter 
of a posteriori investigation.69 From the viewpoint of the inferentialist account, 
only through eliminating competing hypotheses empirically can evidential 
warrant be bestowed upon E.  
 
As noted in Section 4.2, the inferentialist account can be invulnerable to the 
trivial implication problem (Problem A). The existence of the sun is a pattern 
that scientists are entitled to expect to see in the data if Lepler’s first law is 
true, but it is a trivial piece of evidence because of its irrelevance to the 
hypothesis. Warranting evidence offers another way of avoiding Problem A. 
Trivial implications do not serve as warranting evidence or are ignorable in 
the body of warranting evidence, insofar as they hardly provide indirect 
evidence against alternative hypotheses. For instance, even granting that the 
existence of the sun is also direct evidence for Kepler’s first law, it cannot 
differentiate Kepler’s first law from Lepler’s first law, hence contributing 
 
69 Reiss’s conception of evidence is that evidential reasoning lacks universal schemas that 
are applicable everywhere as it is material and idiosyncratic to different settings (cf. Norton, 
2003). In the light of this conception, his inferentialist account of evidence holds that whether 
E is evidence for H is a matter of empirical facts rather than a priori relations described in 
the H-D account. 
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nothing to determining the levels of evidential warrant. Existential triviality 
can be direct evidence for and thus inferentially irrelevant to every alternative 
hypothesis; if so, it is of no evidential importance. Compared to an H-D 
advocate, which offers only one kind of evidence via deductive entailment 
and has to acknowledge that existential triviality is evidence for a hypothesis, 
Reiss can painfully accept that existential triviality is direct evidence, as well 
as denying that it is indirect evidence or warranting evidence. 
 
Having sketched relevance-mediating vehicles in Chapter 1, here I want to 
specify the relevance-mediating vehicles in the inferentialist account. 
Relevance-mediating vehicles can be understood as configurers setting up 
materials or claims in particular ways so that some of the materials or claims 
are labelled evidence. Put succinctly, evidential relations do not already exist 
but emerge from a setting. From the previous discussion, labelling an 
established fact ‘direct’ evidence is to establish its relevance to a hypothesis 
in question, and labelling it ‘indirect’ evidence severs the putative relevance 
of old patterns to an alternative hypothesis.70 The relevance, i.e. inferential 
possibility, is established by loose implication and severed by the negation of 
loose implication. It can be seen that the relevance-mediating vehicles at 
work are loose implication and elimination of possibilities.  
 
Let us illustrate this with the example of the toothache. The claim that I had a 
toothache (i.e. direct evidence) is inferentially relevant to the hypothesis that 
my toothache was caused by trigeminal neuralgia. The claim that my tooth 
had been treated with root canal therapy severed the relevance of my 
toothache to the hypothesis that my toothache was caused by a decayed 
tooth. Warranting evidence, by virtue of supporting (with direct evidence) and 
eliminating (with indirect evidence) inferential possibilities, ensures that the 
remaining hypothesis/hypotheses in question attain certain plausibility, such 
that we have reason to believe them. The hypotheses that my toothache was 
 
70 It is unclear, for Reiss, whether the relevance between an alternative hypothesis and 
direct evidence remains unchanged (i.e. whether the original direct evidence is no longer 
direct evidence for the alternative hypothesis), if the alternative hypothesis is eliminated by 
indirect evidence. If the answer is negative, the removed relevance can still be restored if 
the indirect evidence is refuted.      
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caused by a decayed tooth, that my toothache was caused by a cracked 
tooth, and that my toothache was caused by periodontitis, were all ascribed 
to inferential impossibility in the light of the indirect evidence (i.e. the claim 
that my tooth had been treated with root canal therapy), which rendered 
plausible the hypothesis that my toothache was caused by trigeminal 
neuralgia.  
 
4.4 Context 
 
Having spoken of supporting evidence (consisting of direct and indirect 
evidence) and warranting evidence, in order to illuminate the vague concept 
of ‘patterns in the data’ (or ‘loose implication’ instead) to some extent, Reiss 
appeals to another requirement for the notion of evidence, namely, 
contextual features.  
 
We realise that supporting and warranting evidence merely provide an 
abstract structure not indicative of the meaning of loose implication. That is, 
there is no tangible content about what direct evidence should be expected 
under the supposition that a certain hypothesis is true, nor about in what 
alternative hypotheses the same piece of direct evidence is expected, nor 
about when alternative hypotheses are ruled out by indirect evidence. In this 
sense, claims loosely implied by a hypothesis of interest may vary depending 
upon subjective judgement. This is not the way that scientists conceive, 
understand and adduce evidence: certain types of claims are hardly to be 
considered evidence in the first place. Nor is it the way scientists generate 
hypotheses: any claims that loosely imply a claim about a particular pattern 
can arbitrarily form numerous alternative hypotheses.  
 
If we were to take ‘loosely implies’ without further specification, this could 
mean that numerous impractical claims come out as evidence or 
hypotheses. Before presenting Reiss’s solutions to these problems, let us 
first consider what kinds of constraints are needed on ‘loosely implies’.  
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Constraints ought to be introduced and placed upon the notion of supporting 
evidence in the inferentialist account to avoid or at least curb the surplus 
candidates of evidence. It seems that for the inferentialist account, if we do 
not demand that patterns be genuine or statements about them be true, that 
will give us too much of what is taken to be evidence, as well as too many 
hypotheses to consider. Humans are creatures with a tendency to seek 
patterns, even false ones, in random and unconnected pieces of information 
that we believe to be true. For instance, certain patterns in lottery numbers 
may appear in gamblers’ minds. Patterns may be individually subjective, 
which is an insecure foundation for science, if they are used as evidence. For 
example, a claim made from the imagination about images obtained by 
electron microscopy of an unknown variant virus that can cause the 
trigeminal nerve to transmit pain signals should count, if any, as evidence for 
the hypothesis that my toothache is caused by trigeminal neuralgia. This is 
because the hypothesis, premised on the imagination, loosely implies that 
my trigeminal nerve was infected by the unknown virus. This would bring 
about an unfavourable situation: even if there is no such virus, it is still direct 
evidence for the hypothesis, meaning that any non-existing or false patterns 
can be marks for certain hypotheses. Even where it is hard to distinguish 
between true and false patterns, contested patterns, according to the notion 
of direct evidence, should count as marks for hypotheses. For example, a 
toasted cheese sandwich that emerged with a pattern of the Virgin Mary was 
sold for $28,000 on eBay in 2004, a pattern which might be regarded as 
direct evidence for the existence of God. Arguably, constraints are needed to 
prevent so-called patterns generated from the imagination or excess 
subjectivity. 
 
One option to curb the surplus candidates of evidence is to demand that 
statements about evidence be true. It is not an uncommon demand, as 
evidence is required to be true in Achinstein’s explanationist theory of 
evidence (see Chapter 2), Cartwright’s argument theory of evidence (see 
Chapter 3) and many other accounts of evidence. However, within the 
schemas of direct evidence and indirect evidence used in the inferentialist 
account, whether E is true or false remains unknown. Without a constraint 
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upon the truth of evidence (recall that evidence can be assumed to be 
statements about pattern-related things), statements about whims, fantasies 
or other subjectively identified patterns can all count as direct evidence for 
certain hypotheses, provided that the hypotheses loosely imply the claims 
about these undesirable things.  
 
Constraints ought also to be imposed upon the selection of hypotheses; 
otherwise, direct evidence can support numerous so-called salient 
hypotheses that appear absurd.71 For example, a hypothesis that an 
unknown variant virus caused my toothache is supported by the claim that I 
had a toothache, since someone believes that this hypothesis loosely implies 
the latter claim. This means that taking the unknown virus hypothesis into 
account and comparing it with other commonly known hypotheses (e.g. the 
hypotheses that the toothache was caused by a decayed tooth, that it was 
caused by a cracked tooth or that it was caused by periodontitis) can be 
unproblematic, which is not well-suited for the real practices of medical 
diagnosis. Also, the problem of supported hypothesis surpluses can be 
exposed by modifying Achinstein’s example for the present purpose. 
Suppose my car did not start this morning (E). I hypothesise that at 2:07 last 
night 5 boys and 2 girls replaced 18.9 gallons of petrol in my tank with the 
same amount of water (H). By the definition of direct evidence, under the 
supposition of H, I am entitled to expect to obtain E. However, there is an 
unbridgeable gulf between H and E, and E is ‘far too meager a reason to 
believe the very specific hypothesis [H]’ (Achinstein, 2010a, p. 14). In order 
to prevent absurd hypotheses, constraints are required. 
 
In his notions of evidence, Reiss resorts to context in order to impose the 
constraints mentioned above on a distinctive characteristic, namely loose 
implication, or patterns in the data. Although the definitions of supporting 
 
71 Achinstein (2001, pp. 147–149) expresses parallel criticisms against the H-D view on the 
basis that the H-D view permits numerous ‘crazy’ hypotheses. High probability and 
explanatory connection, he suggests, are required to curb surplus hypotheses. A similar 
concern can be found in Wesley Salmon’s (1966, p. 115) remark: ‘The basic trouble with the 
hypothetico-deductive inference is that it always leaves us with an embarrassing 
superabundance of hypotheses. All of these hypotheses are equally adequate to the 
available data from the standpoint of the pure hypothetico-deductive framework’. 
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evidence, whether direct or indirect evidence, are loose, none of them should 
be discarded. As noted above, constraints are required to narrow the set of 
hypotheses and constrain the set of evidence for a given hypothesis: on what 
conditions are we entitled to restrain the set of candidate hypotheses and 
rule out competing hypotheses? In what circumstances are we entitled to 
claim ‘a hypothesis loosely implies a statement to possibly be evidence’ or 
entitled to expect a pattern in the data? When context is brought into play, 
arbitrarily conceivable patterns and hypotheses can be reduced in number.  
 
Context dictates the application scope of supporting evidence, based on 
‘background knowledge about how the world works, the nature and purpose 
of the inquiry, and certain normative commitments’ (Reiss 2015a, p. 349).72 It 
is my dentist‘s background knowledge, in constraining the set of hypotheses 
and evidence, which enables him to hypothesise that my toothache could be 
caused by trigeminal neuralgia. The first full description of trigeminal 
neuralgia dates back to 1773, before which presumably one would not 
suspect the existence of this type of nerve pain (Prasad and Galetta, 2009). 
It is also my dentist’s background knowledge that enables him to take into 
consideration and dismiss the possibility of a decayed tooth, a cracked tooth 
and periodontitis. Contextual features conformed to by medical practitioners 
prevented my dentist from making an unlikely claim that an unknown virus 
was evidence for my toothache, and from taking into consideration a 
hypothesis that my toothache was caused by an unknown virus. Moreover, 
my dentist’s purpose of inquiry was not to conduct pathological research into 
the causes of my toothache, but to effectively relieve the pain, so causes 
other than the ones commonly seen were not taken into consideration at the 
beginning of the diagnosis. My dentist initially suspected that the cause of my 
toothache was a decayed tooth, presumably because the treatment for a 
 
72 Different purposes of an inquiry can result in different means of evidence collection. Even 
for the same purpose, the truth of a hypothesis is, in practice, not the sole consideration, 
and normative commitments (e.g. value judgements and cost-benefit analyses) should be 
considered. Contextual features other than background knowledge can be illustrated by a 
quote from a medical journal paper: ‘The question is how much evidence is needed to move 
from research to practice, when the matter is life saving interventions in poor settings. The 
yardstick for decision making should take into account the risks and benefits in the local 
conditions, not those of an ideal situation’ (Potts et al., 2006, p. 702). 
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decayed tooth is relatively less time-consuming and is less likely to bring a 
medical malpractice suit. These considerations indicate his value judgements 
(i.e. normative commitments). Thus, contextual features can serve as 
constraints on loose implication, enabling evidence and hypotheses under 
investigation to match our inquiry purposes and value considerations.  
 
In addition to constraining the scope of evidence and hypotheses, context 
conversely enables the formation of evidence. A simple example would be 
selecting the more likely suspect among X and Y, according to a sketch of 
the criminal. There are two hypotheses to entertain: H1: X is the criminal and 
H2: Y is the criminal. Originally, the statements about the striking facial 
features (e.g. a big mole above the lip, thick arched eyebrows, etc.) in the 
portrait are a far cry from the statements loosely implied by each hypothesis 
about who committed the crime, simply because both of the suspects and 
the portrait are not alike. However, when the police officers are informed that 
there are no other suspects at the crime scene, this new piece of contextual 
information (C) enables the portrait to become evidence (E) that the suspect 
with a rather small mole above the lip and thick straight eyebrows is most 
likely to be the criminal. In sum, contexts can function as constraints on 
evidence and hypothesis.  
 
4.5 Tool Assessment of the Inferentialist Account 
 
Now it becomes clear why not all RCTs can be viewed as the strongest 
evidence unless they are well-designed and well-conducted insofar as 
(almost) all competing, other than causal, hypotheses are ruled out (e.g. 
selection bias).73 Poorly designed or poorly conducted RCTs are weakly 
warranted, due to their inability to exclude many competing hypotheses. For 
instance, the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and 
 
73 Selection bias is an error that occurs when the allocation of treatment groups and control 
groups is not randomised. The outcomes of the study result in part from systematic 
differences in characteristics between both groups. Hence the causal conclusion cannot be 
drawn from the outcomes (Last, 2001, p.166). Selection bias is ‘eliminated in an RCT 
because the procedure of random allocation means that the experimenter cannot affect the 
arm that particular patients are assigned to’ (Worrall, 2007b, pp. 453–454).  
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Evaluation (GRADE) defines four levels of evidence quality: very low, low, 
moderate and high, which roughly correspond to the four levels of warrant, 
and the GRADE system also stipulates three factors: large effect, dose-
response relation and plausible confounders or biases that may make us 
underestimate or overestimate the observed effect size — to upgrade levels 
of evidence quality, and five downgrading factors — risk of bias, 
inconsistency, indirectness, imprecision and publication bias (Guyatt et al., 
2011).  
 
In the light of Reiss’s inferentialist account, the operation of all of the factors, 
whether they upgrade or downgrade, hinges upon the increase or decrease 
in their ability to rule out competing hypotheses. For example, the 
convergence of the results between observational studies plays a role of 
indirect evidence in reasonably ruling out the possibility of sheer chance (H-
sc), but the results are still direct evidence for both causal relations (Hcr) and 
selection bias (Hsb). By randomisation, an RCT rules out Hsc and Hsb; an 
RCT is not only direct evidence for Hcr but is also indirect evidence against 
Hsc and Hsb. Thus, the inferentialist account can explain that RCTs are 
ranked higher than observational studies in the hierarchy of medical 
evidence.   
 
Moreover, Reiss’s inferentialist account remains open to a variety of sources 
of evidence, sometimes even as evidentially strong as well-designed and 
well-conducted RCTs. This source of evidence can be seen in observational 
studies (i.e. non-interventional), particularly when the size of effect is too 
large to be ignored. It is acknowledged that in many cases, observational 
studies are unreliable; using them as evidence for causal claims is likely to 
lead us to an erroneous conclusion due to selection bias and other sources 
of bias.74 These biases either make false causal claims or conceal real 
causal relationships, as the confounding factors are not be controlled or 
balanced between the treatment group and the control group. However, in 
 
74 Other sources of bias include: reporting bias, detection bias, performance bias and 
indication bias (Viswanathan et al., 2013). 
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some exceptional cases, the evidence produced can be graded as high-
quality or even strongest, since the effect size of observational studies vastly 
outweighs the conceivable bias of confounders. For instance, there is no 
need to carry out an RCT to show that anyone dropped from an aircraft in 
flight would die and that those with parachutes are very likely to survive 
(Howick, Glasziou, & Aronson, 2009, p. 186). Suppose it is recorded that 1 in 
10,000 people survived jumping without a parachute while 9,900 in 10,000 
people equipped with a parachute stayed alive. The odds ratio of survival 
with a parachute to survival without a parachute is (9,900 / 100) / (1 / 9,999) 
= 989,901, the difference being too large to be explained away by 
confounding factors.75  
 
Through the notions of supporting evidence and warranting evidence, the 
legitimacy of the observational studies on the parachute use as an effective 
means of death prevention can be justified. Let H1 be the hypothesis that the 
parachute can prevent death and H2 be the hypothesis that selection bias 
exists regarding the number of the survivors dropped by parachute. The 
relevant selection bias here is as follows: ‘individuals jumping from aircraft 
without the help of a parachute are likely to have a high prevalence of pre-
existing psychiatric morbidity. Individuals who use parachutes are likely to 
have less psychiatric morbidity and may also differ in key demographic 
factors, such as income and cigarette use. It follows, therefore, that the 
apparent protective effect of parachutes may be merely an example of the 
“healthy cohort” effect’ (Smith & Pell, 2003, p. 1460). Here the ‘healthy 
cohort’ effect arises, when a particular group’s mortality is lower than that of 
another group as a result of the pre-existing differences between the groups 
(e.g. psychiatric morbidity). These differences can cause a different 
proportion of parachute use in each group. This effect produces a spurious 
association between parachutes and reduced mortality.  
 
 
75 Reiss (2015a, p. 355) holds a similar view: ‘Large effects can be a great help to the 
elimination of alternative explanations because alternatives become intolerably implausible’. 
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However, the magnitude of the protective effect of parachutes is not 
attributable to plausible confounders such as selection bias. Suppose that H1 
and H2 are the only two hypotheses to be entertained in light of existing 
background knowledge. Direct evidence here is the difference in the 
numbers of deaths between those jumping with a parachute and those 
jumping without. This piece of direct evidence supports H1 and H2 equally, by 
virtue of being explained by both H1 and H2. Yet, the substantial gap in the 
numbers of deaths constitutes indirect evidence, indicating a divergence 
between both, with H1 implying, while H2 being incompatible with (i.e. not 
being able to explain), this substantial gap (provided that background 
knowledge indicates selection bias is numerically relatively small). There can 
surely be other alternative hypotheses containing other confounders, but the 
observed effect size still overpowers the joint effects of conceivable 
confounders. 
 
A similar example is general anaesthesia. The observed effect size of 
general anaesthesia ‘has swamped the combined effects of any plausible 
confounders … [and] are unlikely to be accountable by selection bias, 
placebo effects or reporting bias’ (Howick, Glasziou, & Aronson, 2009, p. 
187). The lack of RCTs does not prevent the assurance of the effectiveness 
of general anaesthetics in terms of rendering patients unconscious.76 The 
large effect size counts as evidence in the inferentialist account by virtue of 
being loosely implied by the hypothesis that general anaesthesia is effective 
in bringing about unconsciousness.  
 
However, the inferentialist account has its own difficulties and limitations. By 
difficulties, I mean to what extent an account does not accomplish the 
objectives it sets out for itself. By limitations, I wish to define the scope of its 
application by considering where else an account does not perform well. As 
noted above, one difficulty with the inferentialist account is self-deduction as 
 
76 Similarly, it is implausible for the effectiveness of certain treatments, such as ‘Heimlich 
manoeuvre, cardiac defibrillation and parachutes to prevent death’, to be tested in RCTs, but 
their effectiveness is confirmed by other sources of evidence (Howick, Glasziou and 
Aronson, 2009, p. 186).  
 118 
evidence (Problem B). This difficulty applies to a particular situation: 
something satisfies the conditions for evidence but does not count as 
evidence. Another type of difficulty arises because the account does not 
cover all of the evidence used in the scope it is intended for. With respect to 
the inferentialist account, its employment of patterns expected in the data, or 
loose implication, may be too coarse-grained to block alternative low-
probability hypotheses, which would otherwise be disregarded at the initial 
stage of entertaining plausible hypotheses.  
 
To understand the difficulties of the second type, consider a medical vignette 
in which a knowledgeable clinician, upon observing the bulbar symptoms of 
her patient, begins to contemplate possible diagnoses: from relatively 
common neurological disorders to myasthenia gravis (MG), a rare disease 
whose prevalence in the UK is approximately 15 patients per 100,000 
inhabitants (Spillane, Higham and Kullmann, 2012).77 The clinician finally 
decides to exclude MG, not in the belief that the MG hypothesis is false, but 
due to a low pre-test probability, given that the patient has no other known 
symptoms and no relevant medical history, derived from the very low 
probability of MG occurrence. There is no pattern in the data incompatible 
with the MG diagnosis. Probabilities can be helpful and are in fact employed 
in practice when we think about what candidate hypotheses should be 
considered and which ones can reasonably be excluded (tentatively).78 
 
A riposte might be that contextual features can help in the MG case or other 
similar sufficiently investigated settings. As in the toothache case where my 
dentist’s background knowledge enables him to avoid considering unlikely 
hypotheses, contexts can prevent the clinician from taking MG into 
consideration. Reiss could argue that the low-probability MG hypothesis can 
still be accommodated within the qualitative framework of the inferentialist 
 
77 Some philosophers deem this type of reasoning fallacious and call it ‘fallacy of 
probabilistic instantiation’ (e.g. Mayo 2010, p. 196). For example, it is fallacious that we infer 
from the MG prevalence to the probability of a particular individual having MG. But it does 
not fit in well with medical practice.     
78 Whether this example is classified as hypothesis generation (i.e. coming up with 
hypotheses) or hypothesis confirmation (i.e. judging which hypothesis is more plausible) 
does not affect the thrust of the argument.  
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account, when cost/benefit considerations, belonging to contextual features 
(see Reiss, 2015b, p. 72), play into the determination of alternatives as 
relevant.  
 
I acknowledge that this strategy works but in a relatively opaque way. 
Clinically, the infrequent occurrence of MG, the difficulty of diagnosing MG 
and the concomitant low benefit-cost ratio together prevent ordering further 
tests for MG. The exclusion of the possibility of MG in the first place is due to 
its low prevalence and incidence as demonstrated in empirical data. The 
cost-effectiveness judgement is built on the very low prior probability of the 
MG hypothesis, P(MG), and the low posterior probability of the MG 
hypothesis given a test (e.g. blood test, ice test or imaging), i.e. P(MG/test). 
Probabilistic information is sometimes needed and cannot be simply 
replaced by qualitative information in terms of practical considerations, at 
least in clinically evidential reasoning.  
 
Appealing only to contexts without distinguishing the MG case from the 
toothache case is unsatisfactory as to how it works. In the toothache case, 
the unknown-virus hypothesis did not concern my dentist simply because its 
possibility is unprecedented, while in the MG case, the prevalence and 
incidence of MG have been recorded in detail and do not depend on its 
vague possibility. If clinicians do not know such information about MG, they 
will find it hard to avail themselves of the information about the vague 
possibility of MG in giving a diagnosis. My advice is that although 
background knowledge is useful, more detailed information such as 
probabilities, if any, should be made available to extend the reach of 
inferences. The difficulty discussed above shows that the inferentialist 
account is a qualitative one and quantitative information is sometimes useful 
in evidential inferences. 
 
The MG example may not square with the purpose that the inferentialist 
account sets out, as this account is proposed to characterise the rationale for 
establishing generic causality, rather than singular causality (e.g. the MG 
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example), in medical and social sciences.79 Let me first illustrate and 
discount an off-the-mark counter-example to the inferentialist account. The 
example comes from a researcher of public health, Per Lytsy (2017), to 
illustrate that (vague) priors, when empirically well supported, can disregard 
implausible hypotheses. Suppose that two new drugs, A and B, are 
separately compared with placebos to test which drug is more effective on 
disease D. After two large, separate, equal-sized and well-conducted RCTs, 
according to the frequentist null hypothesis significance test (NHST), a 
common measure to judge the effectiveness of treatments, their odds ratios 
are the same, at 1.76 (95% confidence interval, 1.21–2.31, p-value = 
0.0036), which indicates that drug A and drug B are both effective for 
preventing D.80  
 
The equilibrium, however, breaks down when previously known information 
is introduced. Drug A is a ‘well-described pharmacological substance with a 
biologically known mode of action at a receptor level … has a dose-response 
relationship to some physiological system relevant to disease D … and has a 
bioavailability seemingly appropriate compared to other similar and effective 
drugs’ and drug B is ‘a homeopathic remedy … no studies of the 
pharmacological properties … no studies support the existence of a 
biological effect … has been deemed scientifically implausible’ (Lytsy, 2017, 
p. 925).81 These pieces of information concerning mechanisms are hardly 
integrated into the NHST framework, in which drug A and drug B cannot be 
distinguished in terms of their effectiveness. Bayesians, by contrast, can 
 
79 In fact, Reiss (2015a, 2015b), when illustrating the notions of evidence in his inferentialist 
account, uses an example of a murder investigation, which is also concerned with singular 
causation.     
80 The rationale behind NHST is likened to that of the indirect evidence. That data are 
unlikely under the null hypothesis (i.e. exceeding the pre-set confidence interval) leads to 
the rejection of the null hypothesis.  
81 The following quotation regarding descriptions about homoeopathy is excerpted from a 
report by the Science and Technology Committee appointed by the House of Commons 
(2010, p. 5): ‘Homeopathy is a 200-year old system of medicine that seeks to treat patients 
with highly diluted substances that are administered orally. Homeopathy is based on two 
principles: “like-cures-like” whereby a substance that causes a symptom is used in diluted 
form to treat the same symptom in illness and “ultra-dilution” whereby the more dilute a 
substance the more potent it is (this is aided by a specific method of shaking the solutions, 
termed “succussion”). It is claimed that homeopathy works by stimulating the body’s self-
healing mechanisms’.  
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explain their difference in effectiveness, even given the positive outcome of 
the NHST, by assigning both a relatively high prior probability to Ha (drug A is 
effective for preventing D) and an almost zero prior probability to Hb (drug B 
is effective for preventing D)  and by rendering their evidential support 
discernible by factoring in corresponding posterior probabilities. 
 
It seems that the inferentialist account, without appealing to priors, cannot 
employ the information about the mechanisms in this way to judge whether 
drug A or drug B is more evidentially supported or warranted. For this 
account, the outcomes of both studies provide direct evidence for Ha and Hb. 
Being well conducted, both studies also provide indirect evidence to 
eliminate some alternative hypotheses such as selection bias. At this stage, 
it is tempting to claim that both drugs are equally likely to be effective, as the 
hypotheses about the effectiveness of both drugs are supported by an equal 
amount of direct and indirect evidence.  
 
Reiss could possibly make an argument that appeals to his notions of 
evidence, but not to priors, to accommodates the new information concerning 
mechanisms as follows: 
 
P1.  Hb loosely implies that there exist mechanisms responsible for 
the effectiveness of homoeopathy. 
P2.   Scientifically, the mechanisms do not exist.  
Con. Therefore, P2 is indirect evidence against Hb. 
 
However, recall that the foregoing analysis recognises that the reason for the 
large effect size of anaesthetics being evidence for their effectiveness can be 
well understood by virtue of the inferentialist account. Notwithstanding their 
obscure mechanisms, general anaesthetics are clinically effective to a 
considerable degree (Urban and Bleckwenn, 2002). It seems to impale Reiss 
on the horns of a dilemma: he has to admit the effectiveness of both 
anaesthetics and homoeopathy or neither of them. 
 
This dilemma is specious because the lack of mechanisms and the 
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implausibility of mechanisms are related but distinct in the way that the latter 
implies the former, but not vice versa. What prevents the effectiveness of 
homoeopathy from being evidentially warranted is that its mechanisms are 
biologically and pharmacologically implausible.82 Unlike homoeopathy, 
general anaesthetics are still widely used to the extent that their mechanisms 
remain poorly understood, rather than being deemed scientifically 
implausible. Returning to the inferentialist account, the implausibility of the 
mechanisms of homoeopathy is indirect evidence against Hb, while the 
elusiveness of the mechanisms of anaesthetics does not constitute indirect 
evidence against the hypothesis that anaesthetics are effective. This 
distinction can be preserved in the inferentialist account as well as in the 
probabilistic approach.       
 
Up to this point, the off-the-mark counter-example for the inferentialist 
account has been discounted. However, this account does not cohere well 
with much of the medical and social sciences, where probabilities can 
provide more evidential information about generic causation than do loose 
implication and elimination. Let us consider Bayes factors as a case in point. 
In the medical sciences and cognitive psychology, Bayes factors are used to 
evaluate the strength of hypotheses, even when an NHST decides not to 
reject a hypothesis (Kass and Raftery, 1995; Goodman, 1999). An NHST is a 
decision, possibly based on a p-value, to reject or not reject a hypothesis. 
From the Fisherian perspective, if the p-value is smaller than a conventional 
criterion (e.g. 0.05) and is thereby significant, the null hypothesis H0 is 
rejected so that the p-value constitutes evidence against H0. When the p-
value is greater than or equal to 0.05 and is thereby non-significant, H0 is not 
rejected; statistically, it is, however, not the case that the p-value offers 
evidence for H0, because ‘[its] distribution does not change with increasing 
sample size when the null is true and the p-value itself is conditioned only on 
the truth of the null’ (Johansson, 2011, p. 115). For the inferentialist account, 
 
82 That the mechanism by which homoeopathy is purportedly effective is implausible is 
determined by the biological and pharmacological knowledge of the day. The mechanism, if 
any, might be explicated if the future scientific knowledge grants its plausibility. Less ideally, 
this kind of mechanism might not be regarded as impossible, as the science advances, as in 
the case of general anaesthetics.   
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the rationale behind NHST proceeds as follows: the claim that H0 is true 
loosely implies that p-value ≥ 0.05, and the pattern (p-value) in the data is 
supporting evidence (not equivalent to evidence in the statistical meaning) 
for the H0. If the claim that p-value < 0.05 is confirmed, then it is indirect 
evidence for the alternative hypothesis H1 by eliminating H0.  
 
Despite making sense of the p-value, the inferentialist account does not fully 
capture quantitative evidence use in the biomedical and social sciences. 
Before examining this account, let me sketch out the Bayes factor. In 
response to the increasingly wide recognition of the pitfalls of p-values, the 
American Statistical Association (ASA), recommends alternative methods,83 
including Bayes factors, that can replace or at least supplement p-values, 
when their assumptions are met (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016). The Bayes 
factor (BF) is a quantitative measure of relative evidential strength, or 
evidential weight, by comparing two competing hypotheses to see how well 
they fit the data. Regarding hypothesis testing, the Bayes factor can be 
expressed as: BF10 = P(Data/H1) / P(Data/H0), where H0 and H1 represent a 
null and an alternative hypothesis respectively.84 Statisticians recommend, 
for example, that if BF10 > 3, it is at least positive evidence in favour of H1 
over H0 and that if 1 ≤ BF10 ≤ 3, the data are insensitive in the way that they 
do not provide much evidence to distinguish H1 from H0 (Kass and Raftery, 
1995, p. 777). Bayes factors can convey the weight of evidence overlooked 
by the p-value.   
 
The inferentialist account hardly explains the use of the Bayes factor in the 
scientific sphere with the notion of supporting evidence. For illustration, 
consider an example of an ESP experiment, in which a fair coin is tossed to 
see if a particular subject can predict the outcome. Given H0: P(correct 
 
83 These alternative methods include ‘methods that emphasize estimation over testing, such 
as confidence, credibility, or prediction intervals; Bayesian methods; alternative measures of 
evidence, such as likelihood ratios or Bayes Factors; and other approaches such as 
decision-theoretic modeling and false discovery rates’ (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016, p. 11). 
84 A likelihood ratio is a special and the simplest form of the Bayes factor as likelihoods are 
point estimates of the numerator and denominator of the Bayes factor. While the likelihood 
ratio is believed to reflect the objective strength of evidence, the Bayes factor involves 
subjectivity as it depends on priors (Bickel, 2012).  
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guess) = 0.5, H1: P(correct guess) ≠ 0.5 and 220 correct guesses in the 400 
tosses, BF10 ≅ 7.5 is obtained and the p-value is slightly greater than 0.05 
(Berger and Delampady, 1987, pp. 329–330). If the alternative hypothesis H1 
is true, it is expected that BF10 > 3, so the BF10 ≅ 7.5 > 3 in the study is 
direct evidence for H1. However, the concept of direct evidence lacks the 
resources to make a further distinction between positive evidence (3 < BF10 ≤ 
20), strong evidence (20 < BF10 ≤ 150) and very strong evidence (BF10 > 
150) (Kass and Raftery, 1995, p. 777). Nor does the concept of indirect 
evidence capture that of the Bayes factor. Despite evidentially favouring H1 
over H0, the BF10 ≅ 7.5 in the study is not incompatible with the null 
hypothesis H0 in light of the experiment’s p-value > 0.05 if p-value < 0.05 
indicates the incompatibility between the data and the null; the BF10 ≅ 7.5 is 
not indirect evidence for H1. To recapitulate briefly, direct evidence does not 
contribute much to distinguishing degrees of evidential strength, and in the 
inferentialist account, there is no means other than indirect evidence to 
distinguish the levels of evidential warrant. What happens in scientific 
reasoning is that BF10 > 3 supports H1 over H0 not by eliminating H0. 
However, medical researchers and cognitive psychologists can still use 
Bayes factors to distinguish different levels of evidential strength. This is the 
facet of medical and social sciences practice that the inferentialist account 
has difficulty explaining.  
 
It is arguable that advocates of the inferentialist account can embrace 
pluralism on evidential relations to avoid the difficulty of not availing of 
information provided by probabilities to distinguish the plausibility of 
hypotheses. Such pluralists would claim that when there are no good 
reasons to use probabilities, evidential inference proceeds in terms of 
qualitative relations such as plausibility, and they would accept that when 
there are good reasons to use probabilities, quantitative numbers can 
distinguish between the strengths of the evidence. This kind of pluralistic 
stance is similar to the meta-thesis of pluralism on theories of evidence I 
endorse in Chapter 1, in which I propose that a theory of evidence should be 
evaluated against the purpose it is intended to serve. Nevertheless, it is 
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doubtful whether Reiss will side with pluralism on evidential relations unless 
he is content with capturing only many of the evidential relations in the 
biomedical and social sciences, and not all of them. 
 
Now on to the limitations. A major limitation of the inferentialist account is 
that it is silent where competing hypotheses are equally evidentially 
warranted but the evidential strengths can be distinguished via probabilities. 
If most of the competing salient hypotheses except H1 and H2 are eliminated, 
both, regardless of how much supporting evidence they obtain, are assessed 
equally as ‘moderately warranted’. However, the information available may 
reveal the difference in the strength of evidence in favour of them. This is not 
to suggest that Reiss’s qualitative account of evidence does not allow for 
comparatively evidential claims, such as ‘a piece/body of E supports H better 
than H′’ or ‘a piece/body of E supports H better than does a piece/body of E′’. 
If E is loosely implied by H but not by H′, then E supports H more than E 
does H′. If E is loosely implied by H but E′ is not, then E, rather than E′, 
supports H. These kinds of evidential claims are well-suited to the notion of 
supporting evidence.  
 
My point here is simply that quantitative information, if of any relevance, can 
be useful in distinguishing different levels of support for hypotheses, when 
supporting evidence cannot do so. In some cases, H and H′ share direct 
evidence E by loosely implying it, and H and H′ are both supported by the 
same indirect evidence that eliminates some other alternative hypotheses. 
Here we cannot distinguish the levels of evidential support merely by direct 
evidence and indirect evidence. Circumstances appropriate for evidential 
reasoning by quantitative information include probabilistically fully specified 
settings (e.g. cards and dice). Even so, the inferentialist account remains 
silent about circumstances in which we are entitled to infer H from E 
probabilistically.  
 
In addition to epidemiological investigations, we can also lay out different 
evidential strength in probabilistically fully specified settings. Let us consider 
the following examples. Suppose E: an ace has been drawn from a standard 
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deck, H1: The card is the ace of spades, and H2: The card is the ace of 
hearts, diamonds or clubs. The probabilities are wholly known in the 
standard deck, where P(H1/E) = 1/4 and P(H2/E) = 3/4. So P(H1/E) and 
P(H2/E) are not equally probable. It is reasonable to conclude that E favours 
H1 over H2 evidentially, even though H1 and H2 are, in light of the notion of 
direct evidence, equally plausible and each of them is not eliminated by 
indirect evidence.  
 
Another example of the insufficiency of the resources for quantitative 
reasoning is the Monty Hall problem, noted in Chapter 2. This problem is as 
follows:  
 
Suppose you‘re on a game show, and you’re given the choice of three 
doors: Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a 
door, say No. 1, and the host [Monty Hall] who knows what’s behind the 
doors, opens another door, say No.3, which has a goat. He then says 
to you, “Do you want to pick door No.2?” Is it to your advantage to 
switch your choice? (vos Savant, 1990) 
 
In the following argument, the letters Hi and Ej mean the following: 
 
 H1:   The prize is behind door 1.  
 H2:   The prize is behind door 2.  
 H3:   The prize is behind door 3.  
 E1:   The contestant randomly picks door 1.  
 E3:   The host opens door 3, which is not the location of the car.  
 
The problem emerges because the contestant’s initial choice is independent 
of the place of the car, P(H1/E1) = P(H2/E1) = P(H3/E1) = 1/3, but when the 
host opens door 3, P(H1/E1&E3) = 1/3, P(H2/E1&E3) = 2/3 and P(H3/E1&E3) = 
0.85 In terms of the inferentialist account, the probability of H3 conditional on 
 
85 The direct calculation with Bayes’ theorem proceeds as follows: P(E3/H1&E1) = 1/2 (the 
prize is behind door 1, so the host can randomly pick and open either door 2 or door 3); 
P(E3/H2&E1) = 1 (the prize is behind door 2 and the contestant already chooses door 1, so 
the host must open door 3); P(E3/H3&E1) = 0 (the prize is behind door 3, so it is impossible 
for the host to open door 3). Therefore, P(H2/E1&E3) = P(E3/H2&E1)P(H2&E1) / P(E1&E3) = 
[P(E3/H2&E1)P(H2&E1)] / [P(E3/H1&E1)P(H1&E1)+ P(E3/H2&E1)P(H2&E1)+ 
P(E3/H3&E1)P(H3&E1)] = 1 / (1/2+1+0) = 2/3. 
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E1 becomes zero when E3 is further considered on the basis that E3 is 
indirect evidence for H1 and H2 by eliminating H3. As for the remaining two 
doors, according to the inferentialist account, H1 and H2 are equally 
supported by direct evidence E1 in virtue of loosely implying E1, and H2 is 
further supported by direct evidence E3 because of P(E3/H2&E1) = 1, which is 
so high as to imply E3 loosely. Since P(E3/H2&E1) = 1/2, E3 is not direct 
evidence for H2, but it is inferentially consistent with H2. Most importantly, H1 
and H2 are equally warranted because the alternative that either hypothesis 
eliminates (H3) is the same. However, the contestant, on the basis of a new 
piece of evidence E3, should switch to door 2 to win the car as ‘by eliminating 
door [3] … the probability that door [2] hides the prize is 2 in 3’ (Devlin, 
2003). It is concluded that probabilities are informative about the strength of 
evidence in the way that direct evidence cannot disclose this kind of 
information and that indirect evidence sometimes cannot eliminate relatively-
low-probability alternatives.  
 
Another limitation for the inferentialist account is that vague probabilities can 
contribute to evidential information, the importance of which is understated 
and even depreciated in the account. Reiss (2015a) does not believe that 
vague probabilities can contribute to inference about causality, his position 
on which can be found in his footnote.   
 
[T]here are no physical probabilities for conditional statements such as 
“X leaves fingerprints on the murder weapon given X is the murderer” or 
“I and D are correlated given that I causes D”, to assume sharp 
subjective probabilities is hopelessly unrealistic and misleading, and to 
assume vague probabilities is to give up most of the advantages of 
Bayesianism … Possibility and plausibility are the modalities adequate 
for evidential reasoning, not probability. (Reiss, 2015a, pp. 346–347)  
 
Whether or not vague probabilities can contribute evidential information to 
generic causal claims is an open question, but they are of use for singular 
causal claims: evidential reasoning within a range of disciplines regarding the 
past, including historical linguistics, biology, archaeology, and history. 
Bayesianism is generally not applicable to these disciplines, since the priors 
of hypotheses, the likelihoods of evidence given hypotheses, and the 
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probabilities of evidence tend to be uncertain. Even where theories can 
provide accurate estimations of the likelihoods, the posterior probabilities are 
not obtained because the priors are still uncertain. Cases illustrating this type 
of limitation of Achinstein’s, Cartwright’s and Reiss’s theories of evidence will 
be discussed at length in Chapter 5.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In closing, I would like to situate Reiss’s inferentialist account on the 
evidential relationship map introduced in Chapter 1 based on OS (objective 
support), SA (subjective acceptance) and GD (guidance). I conclude that 
although the inferentialist account delivers an account of SA and GD, it pays 
little attention to OS. Supporting evidence guides scientists to employ the 
expectation of patterns in the data, or loose implication, to collect what they 
regard as relevant facts or data, providing GD. Warranting evidence 
emphasises the role of judgements in inferences from evidence to 
hypothesis at the epistemic level, rather than investigating whether evidence 
or a hypothesis is true or not. This shows that the inferentialist account 
involves SA and is silent about OS.86     
 
I have argued that the inferentialist account has its own difficulties and 
limitations. From the tool-based view I endorse, a theory of evidence is 
purpose-specific. To serve the purpose this account sets out, it has to curtail 
the application scope that it originally attempts to reach in the biomedical and 
social sciences in accord with the quantitative evidence use that it cannot 
explain. As regards limitations, this account does not compare hypotheses 
by weighing their probabilities, even though they are not individually precise. 
This kind of evidential appraisal, however, is critical in probabilistically fully 
specified settings and a considerable number of disciplines.  
 
 
86 Reiss (2015b, p. 59) calls the inferentialist account of evidence a theory of inferential 
judgement, which indicates an epistemological approach rather than a metaphysical 
approach. 
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The inferentialist account, essentially qualitative, has several strengths. It 
spells out a typical structure behind scientific reasoning in which scientists 
compare the truth values of competing hypotheses given evidence at hand 
and eliminate hypotheses that are incompatible with the evidence. By virtue 
of the relevance-mediating vehicles of projection and elimination, it is a 
reform of the H-D model.   
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5  
Comparative Approach:  
The Likelihoodist Account of Evidence 
 
 
5.1 The Nature of Evidence  
 
Evidence mainly serves three functions, namely, explanation of the past, 
warrant for generic causal relations, and prediction.87 Where an explanation 
for past events or some natural or social phenomenon is called for, evidence 
features in the support for that explanation. For instance, upon investigating 
a historical or legal case, a historian or lawyer collects evidence, such as 
overlooked documents or the testimony of an eyewitness, as parts of a 
jigsaw of pieces to justify their hypotheses or judgements. Evidence can also 
be intended to offer an empirical ground for the credibility of a hypothesis. 
This role of evidence is commonplace in scientific experiments and 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs) with which scientists and social 
scientists establish causal claims. When it comes to practical use, 
researchers and policymakers infer, or even bet on, the most likely future 
result on the basis of the evidence at hand.88  
 
Philosophical theories of evidence have been surveyed in this thesis, but 
they are either silent about, or do not satisfactorily address, the role of 
evidence in the study of the past. Although they are concerned with evidence 
to establish generic causal claims, evidence to predict policy outcomes and 
evidence for singular events, these theories do not fully capture a crucial 
aspect of evidence use in historical science, i.e. the comparative nature of 
evidence. In disciplines concerning the past, including anthropology, 
 
87 This distinction is parallel to the Humean picture of induction, premised on the principle of 
the uniformity of nature, in which our present observations and memory traces enable us to 
make inferences about retrodictions, generalisations and predictions (Sober, 1988, p. 44).  
88 The three functions of evidence can be roughly expressed as follows: (a) explanation of 
the past: E is evidence that ‘something happened’; (b) warrant for generic causal relations: E 
is evidence that ‘something happens/can happen’; (c) prediction: E is evidence that 
‘something will happen’.   
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archaeology, geology, history and historical linguistics, hypotheses about 
singular causal claims are rarely confirmed in the rigorous way that scientists 
confirm hypotheses about generic causal claims.  
 
Scientists normally establish generic causal claims by employing controlled 
experiments in which shielding conditions are right, such as the blocking or 
controlling of confounding factors to ensure that a variation in outcome stems 
solely from the adjustment of interventions or treatments. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, RCTs take a similar approach: assigning subjects randomly and 
blindly to balance the mean of net effects of confounding factors. 
Researchers studying historical events, by contrast, are typically unable to 
control conditions: instead, they appeal to constraints by theories or 
inductions, elimination of possibilities and comparison of plausibility.  
 
In this chapter, I shall introduce the likelihoodist account of evidence that, I 
will argue, can supplement what is wanting in the historical sciences in terms 
of the exposition of evidential relationships. The setting concerning 
historiography is far from fully specified and rarely well specified. In such a 
setting, there are few, if any, prior probabilities or catch-all likelihoods, which 
Bayesians are obliged to compute or estimate, nor accessible probabilities of 
explanatory connection required in Achinstein’s explanationist theory, nor 
ideal conditions flagged in Cartwright’s argument theory. On the other hand, 
the setting contains more information about likelihoods than Reiss’s 
inferentialist account can say. The features of the likelihoodist account match 
well with evidential reasoning in the historical sciences, which reflects the 
tool-based view about theories of evidence that I endorse from the outset of 
this thesis: a theory of evidence, if good enough, sheds light on specific kinds 
of evidential relationships and functions in specific settings in particular 
fields.  
 
The tool-based view echoes Kyle Stanford’s (2011) pluralistic view on 
evidence, explicitly expressed by the quote below:  
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Philosophers of science have long sought the holy grail of the logical 
form of scientific confirmation, whether inductive generalization, the 
method of hypothesis, conjecture and refutation, Bayes’s Theorem, or 
something else altogether. But I doubt that there is any such holy grail 
to be discovered. Scientific confirmation is a heterogeneous and 
many-splendored thing; let us count ourselves lucky to find it—in all its 
genuine diversity—wherever and whenever we can. (Stanford, 2011, 
p. 898, italics in original) 
 
In Stanford’s view, while standard accounts of evidence, including H-D, 
abductive and Bayesian accounts, may be successful in explaining some 
features of evidence, they fail to capture the projective feature of evidence, in 
particular regarding the historical sciences: projection from known cases to 
unknown cases in the past. To illustrate the latter point, Stanford considers a 
case of how the hypothesis of organic fossil origins (Ho) is well supported by 
projective evidence (Ep) such as water sorting and the mineralisation of 
organic remains, investigated in both the field and the laboratory. These 
accounts of evidence, which he terms the consequentialist accounts, 
essentially regard evidence as phenomena explained or predicted by 
hypotheses by exhibiting those phenomena as ‘deductive or probabilistic 
consequences or implications of those hypotheses’ (Stanford, 2011, p. 888). 
Ho does not explain or predict Ep, but Ep is powerful and convincing evidence 
for Ho in scientific practice, so the consequentialist accounts cannot capture 
projective evidence.  
 
Stanford’s pointing out of the projective nature of evidence aside, in what 
regards evidence use in the historical sciences, I identify evidence in the 
form of comparative support. Beyond that, my aim is to formalise 
comparative evidential reasoning with cases of historical linguistics as a point 
of departure. This type of reasoning, I believe, can be extended to many 
other disciplines concerning the past. I will explicate the likelihoodist account 
as to its strengths, difficulties and limitations, and I will compare this account 
with the theories of evidence mentioned above. I also distinguish different 
types of settings in terms of the extent to which the evidential information 
discloses. Then I focus on the problem with prior probabilities and catch-all 
likelihoods in historical linguistics. Finally, I will present cases of proto-sound 
 133 
reconstruction to illuminate how the likelihoodist account can capture the 
aspect of objective support (OS) in evidential reasoning in historical 
linguistics. 
 
5.2 Objective Support: What Do the Present Data Say? 
 
Before examining particular theories of evidence to see if they cohere with 
the practice of historical linguists, let us recall the three evidential 
relationships proposed in Chapter 1: objective support, subjective 
acceptance and guidance. These can be encapsulated, respectively, in 
terms of how likely a hypothesis is, given the evidence; how confident we 
can be of a hypothesis, given the evidence; and how evidence guides us in 
further investigating hypotheses. These relationships are similar to, but 
distinct from, those put forward by the statistician Richard Royall (1997, p. 4):  
 
(1) What do the present data say?  
(2) What should we believe given the present data? 
(3) What should we do given the present data?89 
 
Suppose you as a physician receive a positive result of your patient’s test for 
a certain disease D. You know the probability of a positive result if D is 
actually present is 0.95. You may literally report to the patient the test result 
with the information about the probability, which relates to (1). Regarding (2), 
you may diagnose the patient with D when you also know D spreads rapidly 
and is commonly seen during this season. However, (3) also involves values: 
you may give the patient a particular treatment when taking its side effects 
and affordability into account.  
 
 
89 The first question is concerned with likelihoodism, which will be explored below. 
Bayesianism answers the second question. The Neyman–Pearson theory of hypothesis 
testing provides general rules as to guiding behaviour in the long run, which is pertinent to 
the third question (Royall, 1997). As can be seen, an answer to the third question demands 
more than an answer to the second question; an answer to the second question demands 
more than an answer to the first question.   
 134 
The three evidential relationships: objective support, concerned with (1); 
subjective acceptance, concerned with (2); and guidance, relatively 
unconcerned with (3), are all evidential relationships intended to characterise 
the concepts of evidence in the historical linguist’s mind and to foreground 
the difference between these concepts and those in the philosophical 
accounts of evidence. I am not concerned here, or more generally in this 
thesis, with (3), as it is beyond the scope of this thesis, although it is worthy 
of investigation. Equipped with the evidential relationships, I will consider a 
canonical case of how to reconstruct Proto-Romance (spoken Latin), the 
proto-language of more than thirty modern Romance languages. This case 
serves both to illustrate how historical linguists entertain hypotheses in the 
light of evidence, and to set the stage for explaining why I claim that for 
historical linguistics, the likelihoodist account of evidence is preferable to 
Achinstein’s explanationist theory, Cartwright’s argument theory, Reiss’s 
inferentialist account or Bayesianism. Let us start by introducing the 
likelihoodist account. 
 
5.3 The Law of Likelihood 
 
The essential aim of likelihoodists such as A. W. F. Edwards (1972), Richard 
Royall (1997) and Elliot Sober (2008) is to answer the previous question (1): 
what do the present data say? Specifically, (a) ‘do the data speak in favour of 
one hypothesis over another?’, or (b) ‘how should we objectively assess the 
strength of evidence?’ Question (a) is concerned with the law of likelihood 
(LL), identified by that name by Ian Hacking (1965, p. 70). I shall call it the 
biconditional law of likelihood (BLL):  
 
 (BLL)  E is evidence in favour of H1 versus H2 if and only if P(E/H1) > 
P(E/H2). 
 
The BLL states both sufficient and necessary conditions for evidence. The 
likelihood of the hypothesis H given information E is the probability of 
predicting or observing E under the assumption that H is true, namely 
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P(E/H). The inequality of the likelihoods of two competing hypotheses 
reflects the relative evidential import of a body of data for both hypotheses, 
and vice versa. From the tool-based view, the evidence meaning is not 
confined to the likelihood inequality, insomuch as there are other accounts of 
evidence that can make sense where the BLL cannot. The LL is the heart of 
the likelihoodist account of evidence. I stick to the following definition of 
evidence, similar to Edward’s (1972, p. 30) characterisation of the LL,90 for 
the remainder of this chapter: 
 
 (LL) E is evidence in favour of H1 versus H2 if P(E/H1) > P(E/H2).91 
 
The BLL implies the LL, and I will use only the sufficient condition for what is 
evidence favouring a hypothesis over another in the BLL. This does not 
influence the points I wish to make. Crucially, assuming appropriate settings, 
the LL, as the core of a relevance-mediating vehicle, can label the 
information at hand as evidence, without the burden of ruling that there are 
no other vehicles that can perform the task.  
 
Likelihoodism holds that evidential nature is inherently comparative — given 
the same data, hypotheses are evaluated against one another and (nearly) 
never in isolation. Advocates of likelihoodist ideas believe that the LL can 
capture the comparative nature of evidence by faithfully reflecting whether a 
hypothesis has greater evidential support than another particular hypothesis. 
Question (b) is addressed with the likelihood ratio, L1(E) / L2(E) = P(E/H1) / 
P(E/H2) = k, which is an objective quantitative measure of the relative 
strength of the evidence. Conventionally, k = 8 represents moderately strong 
 
90 Edward’s (1972, p. 30, italics in original) statement on the law of likelihood: ‘Within the 
framework of a statistical model, a particular set of data supports one statistical hypothesis 
better than another if the likelihood of the first hypothesis, on the data, exceeds the 
likelihood of the second hypothesis’.   
91 There is the likelihood principle (LP), which likelihoodists typically embrace. The LP states 
that ‘two instances of statistical evidence are equivalent if and only if they generate the 
same likelihood function’ (Royall, 2004, p. 126). One difference between the LL and the LP 
is that the former is concerned with ‘the bearing of a single data set on two hypotheses’ 
whilst the latter describes ‘when two data sets are evidentially equivalent’ (Sober, 2008, p. 
35, footnote 16). As the LP will not affect the points that I intend to make, I will not pursue 
this matter in this chapter. For further discussion, see Birnbaum (1962), Steel (2007) and 
Gandenberger (2015).  
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evidence in favour of H1 over H2 and k = 32 represents strong evidence in 
favour of H1 over H2. These values are regarded as benchmarks for 
likelihood ratios suggested by ‘the various possible results of one of the 
simplest of experiments’ (Royall, 2004, p. 123). The precise value of k is 
difficult to calculate where the likelihoods are elusive. Researchers, for 
example Sober (2008), may settle for the inequality of the likelihoods of two 
competing hypotheses, whose evidential meaning is still captured by the LL.    
 
Nonetheless, Bayesians believe that they have more to say about evidential 
relationships. From Bayes’ formula it follows that: 
 
  P(H1/E) / P(H2/E) = [L1(E) / L2(E)] × [P(H1) / P(H2)]. 
 
The likelihood ratio is the factor by which the probability ratio is changed from 
P(H1) / P(H2) to P(H1/E) / P(H2/E). If the likelihood ratio is k, E brings about a 
k-fold increase in the probability ratio, which involves justification. In Royall’s 
words (2004, p. 128), ‘Bayesian statistics is primarily concerned with the 
question of how one’s beliefs should change in response to new statistical 
evidence; that is, its focus is on … “What should I believe?”’. Bayesians 
pursue that which relates to subjective acceptance (SA). 
 
A direct proof of the LL probably does not exist.92 Instead of proving the LL 
directly, the argumentative strategy I employ is to postulate the LL and see 
how well it can explain the cases of historical linguistics. If it is successful as 
well as not refuted by the so-called counter-examples, and if there are no 
counter-examples of historical linguistics, then it is reasonable to claim that 
the LL is confirmed by the cases. This strategy is comparable to those 
adopted in most of the theories of evidence I have examined: laying out the 
definitions and testing them with examples. Having said that, the LL makes 
 
92 Forster and Sober (2004, p. 154) summarise and analyse Royall’s three lines of defence 
of the LL and conclude that ‘none is as strong as one might wish’. Perhaps it is prudent to 
subscribe to Fisher’s (1938, p. 151) and Edward’s (1972, p. 100) suggestions that likelihood 
should be considered a ‘primitive postulate’. 
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intuitive sense in the same way many philosophers embark upon the 
definitions of evidence with their intuitions.93  
 
The LL captures an intuition that if H1 says the present data is more probable 
than does H2, then the data is evidence in favour of H1 vis-à-vis H2. For 
example, the positive result of a medical test evidentially favours the 
hypothesis that the patient has a disease over the opposite hypothesis, 
insofar as the positive result is more probable under the former hypothesis 
than under the latter. To be specific, the term ‘favour’ indicates ‘differential 
support; the evidence points away from the hypothesis that says it is less 
probable and towards the hypothesis that says it is more probable’ (Sober, 
2005, p. 128, italics in original). Note that the following reading of the LL is 
misguided: E supports H1 to a fixed degree, E supports H2 to a fixed degree, 
and by comparing their absolute values, if P(E/H1) > P(E/H2), E supports H1 
more than it does H2. On the correct reading, it cannot be said that E is 
evidence for H1 (to a specific degree) in relation to H1 alone. Although 
specific values can be assigned to P(E/H1) and P(E/H2), it is too hasty to 
conclude that E supports any of them without considering the relative support 
for both hypotheses. 
 
Royall (1997, pp. 67–68) illustrates, via the following scenario, that evidential 
meaning consists in the comparison between H1 and H2 in the light of the 
same data; evidence is embodied in this kind of three-place relation. 
Suppose that a person sends his valet to bring his urn and intends to test 
whether the urn contains 2% white balls (Ht). He draws a ball from the urn 
and finds that it is white (Ew). Ew seems to be a piece of evidence against Ht. 
Suppose further that he keeps two urns in his urn vault: one is the original 
urn and another contains 0.001% white balls (Hz). At the moment, Ew is 
evidence in favour of Ht versus Hz, since Ew is rare under Ht, but Ew is even 
rarer under Hz. Moreover, in order to see that the LL is sensitive to the 
selection of rival hypotheses, we can expand Royall’s example. Suppose, for 
 
93 This kind of argumentative strategy parallels John Rawls’ (1971) when he tested his 
theory of justice with our intuitive judgments in particular moral situations.  
 138 
example, that another person has two urns in his urn vault, one with 2% 
white balls (Ht) and another with 90% white balls (Hn). In this instance, Ew (= 
a white ball drawn) is evidence in favour of Hn versus Ht. P(Ew/Ht) is 
considerably lower than P(Ew/Hn). Two points are made here: firstly, E hardly 
becomes evidence for a hypothesis unless a competing hypothesis is 
present; secondly, whether E is evidence for the focus hypothesis depends 
on the selected competing hypothesis, however great or small the likelihood 
of the focus hypothesis.94  
 
One might wonder if Bayesianism, as a paradigm of statistics and closely 
related to the likelihoodist paradigm, fares well in Royall’s urn scenario 
mentioned above. As described in Chapter 2, no matter whether the 
subjective or objective Bayesian account of evidence requires a precise 
value for the probability of a hypothesis given the data, P(H/E) is not given in 
this scenario. By Bayes’ theorem, which states that 
 
P(H/E) = P(E/H)P(H) / P(E) = P(E/H)P(H) / P(E/H)P(H)+P(E/~H)P(~H),      
 
all we need to know is the likelihood of H given E, namely P(E/H), its catch-
all likelihood, namely P(E/~H), and the prior probabilities of hypotheses, 
namely P(H) and P(~H). The ~H is equivalent to an exhaustive disjunction of 
H’s competing hypotheses H1, H2, H3,…, Hn. Although P(Ew/Ht) and 
P(Ew/~Ht) are available, P(Ht) and P(~Ht) are up in the air. In obtaining both, 
the setting of this scenario needs to be specified more precisely. Suppose, 
for example, that the person has only two urns: one contains 2% white balls 
and the other contains 0.001% white balls, with each of both equally likely to 
be picked. It follows, by Bayes’ theorem, that P(Ht/Ew) = 99.95%, meaning 
that when he observes that a white ball is drawn, he can almost be certain 
that the urn under test is the 2%-white-ball urn.        
 
 
94 The second reason is why Sober (2008, p. 354) discredited the inference form known as 
probabilistic modus tollens.  
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There is a seeming counter-example to the LL that should be dismissed. 
Suppose that there are two decks that look identical on the back, and a card 
is drawn from one deck. Suppose further Hs: the deck is standard; Ht: the 
deck is composed of 52 aces of spades; and E: the card drawn is the ace of 
spades. P(E/Hs) = 1/52 and P(E/Ht) = 1. By the LL, E is evidence in favour of 
Ht over Hs, which lacks intuitive appeal. The Bayesian theory can explain 
this, because the frequency of coming across a trick deck is extremely low 
for an ordinary setting — P(Ht) is much lower than P(Hs) and thus P(Ht/E) < 
P(Hs/E). However, Royall (1997, p. 14) maintains that E is strong evidence in 
favour of Ht over Hs and that this means simply that ‘[E] is not strong enough 
to overcome the prior improbability of [Ht] relative to [Hs]’. In terms of the 
unsuccessful counter-example, some clarification has been made. 
 
Leeds (2000) provides a counter-example to the LL. Suppose that an ace 
has been drawn from a standard deck (Ea). Two hypotheses are presented: 
Hh: the card is the ace of hearts; and Hsc: the card is the ace of spades or the 
ace of clubs. It follows that P(Ea/Hh) = P(Ea/Hsc) = 1, which, by the LL, means 
Ea favours neither Hh nor Hsc. But it would be unsound to say that, 
particularly when we consider the following values: P(Hh/Ea) = 1/4 and 
P(Hsc/Ea) = 1/2. From a Bayesian perspective, also highly intuitively, since 
P(Hsc/Ea) > P(Hh/Ea) and, less obviously, P(Hsc/Ea) > P(Hsc), it is indicated 
that Ea evidentially favours Hsc over Hh.95 In this case, the posteriors, rather 
than the likelihoods, capture our intuitions.  
 
Likelihoodists could defend the LL in the same way Royall objects to the trick 
deck example. For from the likelihoodists’ point of view, Leeds’ counter-
example is flawed: favouring relations of evidence are not mediated by prior 
 
95 Bayesians would not accept a naïve principle like this: E favours H1 over H2 if and only if 
P(H1/E) > P(H2/E). Such a principle would incur an unfavourable situation: if P(H1/E) > 
P(H2/E), we should claim that E favours H1 over H2, even if in a Bayesian sense, E 
disconfirms H1, i.e. P(H1/E) < P(H1), and E confirms H2, i.e. P(H2/E) > P(H2). To illustrate, 
suppose H1: the card is any except for the ace of clubs, H2: the card is the ace of clubs, and 
E: the card randomly drawn from a standard deck is a club. It follows that P(H1/E) = 12/13 > 
P(H2/E) = 1/13, P(H1/E) < P(H1) = 51/52, and P(H2/E) > P(H2) = 1/52. Intuitively, we are 
inclined to say that E is evidence for H2 rather than H1, which shows that the naïve principle 
is problematic. Fitelson (2007, p. 480) reminds us that for Bayesians, the concept of degree 
of probability and the concept of confirmation should be carefully distinguished. 
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probabilities, i.e. P(Hh) and P(Hsc) here.96 Likelihoodists may claim that 
because Ea equally supports Hh and Hsc, i.e. P(Ea/Hh) = P(Ea/Hsc) = 1, the 
difference in their posterior probabilities must result from that in their priors; 
Leeds’ example does not undermine the LL.  
 
Another attempt to put forward a counter-example to the LL is by Branden 
Fitelson (2007, pp. 476–477). Suppose that Es: the card drawn from a 
standard deck is a spade; Hs: the card is the ace of spades; and Hb: the card 
is black. As such, it follows that P(Es/Hs) = 1 > P(Es/Hb) = 1/2 and by the LL, 
Es is evidence in favour of Hs versus Hb. However, it is not intuitively 
appealing. To see why, it is helpful to use Fitelson’s (2007, p. 477) highly 
intuitive principle which involves no priors and should be accepted by 
likelihoodists: 
 
(*)  If E provides conclusive evidence for H1, but non-conclusive 
evidence for H2, then E is evidence in favour of H1 over H2, with E, 
H1 and H2 being empirical claims.    
 
Evidently, Es guarantees the truth of Hb whilst Es offers merely non-
conclusive evidence for Hs. This is claimed to be a counter-example to the 
LL: P(Es/Hb) < P(Es/Hs), but Es is evidence in favour of Hb versus Hs. 
 
However, Fitelson’s counter-example can be blocked by imposing a 
constraint on the LL: H1 and H2 should be mutually exclusive. Insofar as Hs 
and Hb are not incompatible, the LL cannot be applied to this case. From the 
tool-based viewpoint, when a theory of evidence encounters difficulties in 
making sense of the cases that it sets out to explain, it is a natural move 
either to enhance its ability to explain or restrict its scope of application. 
Although most of the representative likelihoodists (Hacking, 1965, p. 63; 
Edwards, 1972, p. 30; Royall, 1997, p. 3) do not place the constraint of 
 
96 In fact, Leeds’ example is not restricted to being represented by posteriors involving 
priors; instead, likelihoods and catch-all likelihoods suffice to represent his example 
(Fitelson, 2007). Even if this is a correct representation, I will argue in Section 5.8 that catch-
alls, if any, are rare and inevitably involve priors in historical linguistics.   
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mutual exclusiveness on the definitions of the LL,97 this constraint enables 
the LL to avoid Fitelson’s counter-example.98 An ultimate means of resolving 
Leeds’ and Fitelson’s counter-examples is to filter fully specified and well-
specified evidential settings out of the scope of the LL. That is, where the 
prior probabilities are well supported, the LL is unhelpful. I will visit this issue 
in Section 5.7. However, comparing composite hypotheses without 
specifying the prior probabilities is not uncommon in science. This calls for 
other methods regarding model selection, including the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1973) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
(Schwarz, 1978). I will ignore the discussion about these methods here, 
since they are not the main concern of this thesis.  
  
5.4 Characteristics of Theories of Evidence 
 
I have scrutinised Achinstein’s explanationist theory, Cartwright’s argument 
theory and Reiss’s inferentialist account in the previous chapters. Now I 
compare them, in addition to Bayesianism, with the likelihoodist account to 
show the fundamental distinctions between these theories of evidence. I 
commence with an example discussed in Chapter 2, before presenting the 
relative strength of the likelihoodist account as far as evidential reasoning in 
historical linguistics, in particular regarding the reconstruction of proto-
sounds.  
 
Suppose that a subject undergoes a test which can detect whether one has 
a certain disease D. Through the procedure of maximum likelihood 
estimation, some relevant probabilities are obtained from the frequency data 
(Sober, 2004, p. 225). If the subject has the disease (Hd), the probability that 
the test yields a positive result (Et) is 95%, namely P(Et/Hd) = 95%. If the 
subject does not have D (~Hd), the probability that the test yields a positive 
result is 1%, namely P(Et/~Hd) = 1%. The prevalence of D in a target 
population is 1/100,000, which is objectively estimated by random sampling; 
 
97 Sober (2008, p. 34) seemed aware of the constraint of mutual exclusiveness when he 
provided examples in which two hypotheses are incompatible.   
98 This constraint on the LL can be seen in Steel (2007) and Chandler (2013). 
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the prior probability P(Hd) = 1/100,000. The posterior probability P(Hd/Et) 
then equals approximately 0.095%. In this well-specified example, ~Hd 
exhausts the competing hypothesis.  
 
Now let us discuss the theories of evidence in sequence to see how they 
would account for the diagnosis example. Since P(Et/Hd) > P(Et/~Hd), 
likelihoodists would consider Et as evidence for Hd versus ~Hd. This is similar 
to what occurs in the trick deck example mentioned above. Royall (1997, p. 
14) reminds us not to confuse evidence and belief; the former is concerned 
with ‘what the data say’ and the latter with ‘what we should believe given the 
data’. Having said that, I will later argue that priors, if objectively available, 
are useful for evidential reasoning. Priors as objective as P(Hd) are, however, 
rarely seen in the historical sciences. When the information about prior or 
posterior probabilities is unavailable, or in Hacking’s phrase when ‘lacking 
other information’ (1965, p. 65), the LL fares relatively well. 
 
A second theory is Achinstein’s (2001, 2010a, 2014) explanationist theory. 
Recall that the explanationist theory states that E is evidence for H given B if 
and only if (a) P(Exp(H,E)/E&B) > 1/2; (b) E and B are true; and (c) E does 
not entail H, where H is a hypothesis, B is background knowledge and 
Exp(H,E) means that there is an explanatory connection between H and E. 
That is, H correctly explains the truth of E, or E correctly explains the truth of 
H, or some hypothesis correctly explains both the truth of E and the truth of 
H. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the probability of there being an explanatory 
connection between H and E given the truth of E and B can be decomposed 
into (1) the probability of there being an explanatory connection between H 
and E given the truth of H, E and B, and (2) the posterior probability, whose 
values may rest on priors and catch-all likelihoods: 
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 P(Exp(H,E)/E&B)  
= P(Exp(H,E)/H&E&B) × P(H/E&B)99  
= P(Exp(H,E)/H&E&B) × [P(H/B)P(E/H&B)] / [P(H/B)P(E/H&B) +   
 P(~H/B)P(E/~H&B)].  
 
In illustrating the explanationist theory, let us consider Achinstein’s (2001, p. 
154) own example. Suppose 70% of patients with particular symptoms (S) 
take medicine (M) and also get relief (R) in seven days, P(R/S&M) = 0.7. 
Among patients with S who take M and get relief in seven days, 60% of them 
get relief because of M, P(Exp(R,M)/R&S&M) = 0.6 (40% of them because of 
other reasons). By Achinstein’s definition of correct explanation, 
P(Exp(R,M)/S&M) = P(Exp(R,M)/R&S&M) × P(R/S&M) = 0.6 × 0.7 = 0.42. 
This means that among patients with S who take M, 42% of them get relief 
because of M; only 42% of the time is M effective in relieving S.   
 
Let us return to the diagnosis example, where the prior P(Hd), the catch-all 
P(Et/~Hd), and the likelihood P(Et/Hd) are available, all of which make Bayes’ 
theorem work in exchange for the posterior probability P(Hd/Et). Clearly, for 
the explanationist theory, Et is not evidence for Hd, because P(Hd/Et&B) is 
too low to boost P(Exp(Hd,Et)/Et&B) > 1/2.100 A follow-up question is whether 
Et is evidence for ~Hd, which amounts to whether P(Exp(~Hd,Et)/Et&B) > 1/2. 
Although P(~Hd/Et&B) = 99.905% is exceedingly high, 
P(Exp(~Hd,Et)/~Hd&Et&B) has to be at least greater than 1/2 in order that 
P(Exp(~Hd,Et)/Et&B) > 1/2.101 The problem is that the information about the 
probability of the explanatory strength is elusive.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, Achinstein does not provide details about how 
to calculate the probability of explanatory connection. In his medical 
example, he simply assumes figures to illustrate his theory. But figures as to 
 
99 For the proof, see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.  
100 Philosophical niceties aside, P(Hd/Et&B) = P(Hd/Et) = 0.095% in this example. 
101 P(Exp(~Hd,Et)/~Hd&Et&B) > 1/2 is entailed with the following proof: given that p = qr, p > 
1/2, 0 £ q, r £ 1, we obtain q = p/r ≥ p > 1/2. By substituting P(Exp(~Hd,Et)/Et&B) for p, 
P(Exp(~Hd,Et)/~Hd&Et&B) for q, and P(~Hd/Et&B) for r, we obtain P(Exp(~Hd,Et)/~Hd&Et&B) > 
1/2.   
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the strength of explanatory connection are not attached to empirical data and 
are hard to compute. In some special cases, where the explanatory 
connection has only one possibility, the probability of the explanatory 
connection is straightforward: unity. For illustration, consider the birthday 
problem first created by von Mises (1939): if there are n people in a room, 
what is the probability of at least two people sharing a birthday? If there are 
366 people in the room (Ea), we can guarantee that there must be a pair 
having the same birthday (H) on the basis that there are 365 days in a non-
leap year (B). For the explanationist theory, Ea is evidence for H given B, 
because P(H/Ea&B) = 1 and P(Exp(H,Ea)/Ea&B) = 1 (i.e. Ea fully explains H).  
 
For Et to count as evidence for ~Hd in the diagnosis example, the 
explanationist theory must provide a way to compute the probability that 
there is an explanatory connection between H and E given H, E and B, 
particularly when we cannot directly see it. What are required more for the 
explanationist theory than for the likelihoodist account are probabilities of 
explanatory connection and posterior probabilities containing priors and 
catch-all likelihoods.   
 
A third theory of evidence under discussion is Cartwright’s (2013) argument 
theory. This theory holds that E is evidence for a hypothesis H relative to an 
argument A if and only if E is a necessary premise in A, which is a valid and 
sound argument for H. For Cartwright, a valid and sound argument ties some 
empirical claims together, in which the claims in the form of the premises and 
the claim appearing as the conclusion are evidence and hypothesis 
respectively.  
 
In the diagnosis example, an advocate of the argument theory may put 
forward an argument as follows: (1) frequency data F1 shows that 95% of the 
subjects with disease D and 1% of the subjects without D have a positive test 
result; (2) if F1 is obtained by the procedure of maximum likelihood 
estimation, F1 can be translated into the likelihoods P(Et/Hd) and P(Et/~Hd); 
(3) frequency data F2 shows that 1/100,000 of the target population have D; 
(4) if F2 is obtained by random sampling, F2 can represent the prior 
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probability P(Hd); (5) if the posterior probability is very low, a subject with a 
positive result is unlikely to have D. It deductively follows from (1)–(5) that 
the subject with the positive result is very unlikely to have D.102 Although this 
argument does not deductively entail ~Hd (the subject does not have D) and 
thus none of the premises is evidence for ~Hd, all of them are evidence for 
the hypothesis that the subject having the positive result is 99.905% unlikely 
to have D. In order to guarantee the truth of the conclusion, it is necessary 
that all of the ideal conditions in the valid argument are met, which demands 
much more than the likelihoodist account.   
 
Next, let’s move on to Reiss’s (2015a, 2015b) inferentialist account. Reiss 
has two main notions of evidence: supporting evidence and warranting 
evidence. Supporting evidence consists of two kinds of evidence: direct 
evidence and indirect evidence.  
 
Direct evidence:  Ed is direct evidence for a hypothesis H if and only 
if Ed is a pattern in the data that one is entitled to expect, supposing 
that H is true.   
   
Indirect evidence: Ei is indirect evidence for a hypothesis H if and 
only if Ei is a pattern in the data that is incompatible with what one is 
entitled to expect, supposing that one of H’s competing hypotheses 
H′, H′′, H′′′ and so on is true. 
 
Depending upon the extent to which legitimate alternatives are eliminated, 
four levels of warranting evidence are distinguished: proof, strong warrant, 
moderate warrant and weak warrant.  
 
 
 
102 In this argument, I do not consider the so-called fallacy of probabilistic instantiation 
(Mayo, 2005), discussed in Chapter 2. Put briefly, from the frequentist perspective, P(Hd) is, 
in fact, concerned with some subject randomly selected from the population, viewed as a 
generic type of event, or a random variable. There is no such thing as assigning probability 
to a unique event, i.e. the subject’s having D. If adopting the frequentist stance, we can 
simply add a premise such as P(Hd) = P(the subject has D) and we will have a valid 
argument.      
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Proof:   All relevant competing hypotheses are eliminated. 
Strong warrant:  All salient competing hypotheses and some non-
salient are eliminated.  
Moderate warrant: Most competing hypotheses, some of which are 
 salient, are eliminated. 
Weak warrant: Some competing hypotheses, none of which are 
salient, are eliminated. 
 
Salient competing hypotheses are those supported by additional direct 
evidence beyond the direct evidence shared between the hypothesis of 
interest and its competing hypotheses. Non-salient competing hypotheses, 
by contrast, are those lacking additional direct evidence.  
 
Applying the notions of evidence to the diagnosis example, we can see that 
Et is direct evidence for Hd by virtue of being expected, supposing Hd is true, 
and Et is inferentially incompatible with ~Hd and thus is indirect evidence for 
Hd. Et lends a certain amount of warrant to Hd by eliminating ~Hd. However, 
the information about P(Hd) supports the opposite. Suppose additional 
background knowledge is available: D is an infectious disease with high 
transmissibility and the subject often goes out in public without taking any 
necessary precautions. If D is highly transmissible to humans and the subject 
does not have D, it is likely that D has a low prevalence. The low prevalence 
of D is expected supposing ~Hd is true and is at best inferentially compatible, 
if not incompatible, with Hd. P(Hd) is direct evidence for ~Hd, not for Hd, but, 
as mentioned, Hd is warranted because Et eliminates ~Hd. 
 
It does not seem reasonable to claim that Hd, rather than ~Hd, is warranted, 
when the subject, though testing positive for D, is 99.905% unlikely to have 
D. While the argument theory and the Bayesian theory can utilise all of the 
quantitative information appearing in the example, the inferentialist account 
cannot fully digest these pieces of information. Note that P(Et/Hd) and 
P(Et/~Hd) are extreme in this example, but if the values are changed, say 
P(Et/Hd) = 60% and P(Et/~Hd) = 40%, the inferentialist account hardly 
employs the information about the likelihoods because the new information is 
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neither expected from nor incompatible with Hd or ~Hd; the new information is 
inferentially compatible with each of the hypotheses. The inferentialist 
account filters out only coarse-grained information but gives up the useful 
quantitative information about likelihoods. 
 
Finally, for Bayesians, either Et is evidence for Hd as long as Hd is more 
probable given Et than without Et, namely P(Hd/Et) > P(Hd/~Et), or Et is 
evidence for ~Hd as P(~Hd/Et) is sufficiently high, for example at least greater 
than half.103 To compute the posterior probabilities requires the prior 
probabilities and the catch-all likelihoods. Fortunately, these probabilities are 
available in this example. Sober (2004, pp. 231–232) doubts it is normal for 
scientific tests, by claiming that ‘Galileo was in no position to assign an 
objective prior probability to [Jupiter’s having moons]’ and that ‘[i]f Newton’s 
theory is false, what is the probability of each of the theory’s specific 
alternatives?’. Cases like the diagnosis example, in which the probabilities 
needed are all specified, are rare in science, especially in the historical 
sciences. 
 
5.5 The Comparative Method 
 
Having spoken of the characteristics of the theories of evidence, I shall 
introduce the methodology of proto-sound reconstruction before using cases 
of historical linguistics to reveal their limitations.  
 
When languages are genetically related, they are descended from the proto-
language, which is ‘the once-spoken ancestral language from which 
daughter languages descend, and, in another sense, the language 
reconstructed by the comparative method that represents the ancestral 
language from which the compared languages descend’ (Campbell & Mixco, 
2007, p. 158). The descendent languages are dialects of the proto-language 
at some point in history prior to becoming different languages, 
 
103 Here I do not consider the merged objective Bayesian account (MOB), as discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
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distinguishable by innovative traits. To illustrate the reconstruction of a proto-
language, for simplicity’s sake, only four of the most widely spoken Romance 
languages (namely, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Italian) have been 
selected. Given that these four languages belong to the Romance language 
family, the aim now is to reconstruct Proto-Romance, from which the 
Romance languages branched off. 
 
Proto-Romance can be, and should be, approximately equated with ‘the 
spoken language at the time when Latin began to diversify and split up into 
its descendant branches, essentially the same as Vulgar Latin at the time’ 
(Campbell, 2013, p.108). Historically, Vulgar Latin, not equivalent to 
Classical Latin, was a language which was ‘used by the illiterate majority of 
the Latin-speaking population’ (Coleman, 1993, p. 2) and which split to 
create the Romance languages. By contrast, Proto-Romance is a 
hypothetical vernacular proto-language of the Romance languages and may 
correspond to an actually spoken dialect of Vulgar Latin. Proto-Romance 
‘has no precise location in time, being situated only in relative time, at some 
point to the earliest divergence required by the diachrony of reconstruction’ 
(Coleman, 1993, p. 2). Ideally, the reconstructed proto-language, derivable 
from its daughter languages, coincides with what must have been an actual 
language, i.e. the once-spoken proto-language. In practical terms, Proto-
Romance may not be perfectly reconstructed. It is nevertheless intended to 
match (a dialect of) Vulgar Latin.104  
 
 
When historical linguists follow genealogical inference, three main types of 
questions are distinguished by Christopher Hitchcock (1998, pp. 430–431):  
 
 Q1:  Do language A and language B share a common ancestral  
  language? 
Q2:  Given that languages A, B and C share a common ancestral  
 language, do A and B share an ancestral language that is not  
 
104 For a detailed account of the reconstruction of Proto-Romance and the relationship 
between Proto-Romance, Vulgar Latin and Classical Latin, see Hall (1950).  
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 shared with C? 
Q3:  Given that A and B share a common ancestral language, what  
 features does the ancestral language have?  
 
Characteristic of the historical sciences is genealogical inference. This type 
of inference has come to the forefront of evolutionary biology, text criticism 
and historical linguistics, which are all ‘stemmatic or comparative disciplines, 
whose task is largely the creation and manipulation of genealogical trees’ 
(Lass, 1997, p. 113). Genealogical inference purports to determine the family 
tree: specifically, which family members are genetically most closely related 
to one other.  
 
The comparative method specifically addresses Q3. In circumstances where 
languages have no written form, the comparative method is regarded as the 
gold standard in historical linguistics for reconstructing ancestral languages 
preceding the advent of writing (Donohue, Denham and Oppenheimer, 2012; 
Dunn, 2015; Hale, 2015; Weiss, 2015).105 This method ‘usually begins with 
phonology, with an attempt to reconstruct the sound system; this leads in 
turn to reconstruction of the vocabulary and grammar of the proto-language’ 
(Campbell, 2013, p. 107). In short, the comparative method is primarily to 
address a question: if the observed languages are genetically related, what 
would their proto-language be like?  
 
The comparative method is not, however, responsible for generating a 
hypothesis that the related languages originate from a single proto-language, 
or for confirming such a pre-existing hypothesis beforehand. That is, prior to 
the application of the comparative method, the genetic relatedness of the 
languages (e.g. Spanish, Portuguese, French and Italian) should be 
hypothesised and confirmed. Nevertheless, the comparative method can 
later be used to examine the initially generated hypothesis by checking 
 
105 The comparative method remains the gold standard, insomuch as ‘[t]he persistent 
superstition that it does not work for unwritten languages or for certain families has been 
refuted again and again — famously for Algonquian in the classic work of Bloomfield (1925, 
1946), continued by Hass (1958), Goddard (1979, 1990), Garrett (2004), Berman (2006), 
and others’ (Kiparsky, 2015, p. 65). 
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whether the sound–meaning pairings between the given languages are 
regular (Weiss, 2015, p. 128). If regularity of correspondences emerges, this 
is considered evidence to confirm a relatedness hypothesis that is previously 
generated because of the geographic proximity, shared history and textual 
records or otherwise of the languages. Contrarily, lack of regular 
correspondences is considered evidence to disconfirm the relatedness 
hypothesis.  
 
Before making explicit the operation of the comparative method, I shall 
introduce linguistic notation. A hyphen after a sound indicates that the sound 
is in an initial position, as k-; a hyphen on either side indicates a medial 
sound, as -k-; a hyphen before the sound indicates a final sound, as -k. A 
statement of the form ‘x > y’ or ‘y < x’ is read as ‘sound x changes into sound 
y’, as the case of k > ʃ. An asterisk indicates reconstructed forms, as *k.  
 
Upon reconstructing a proto-language, historical linguists take three basic 
steps, usually back and forth for revisions (Campbell, 2013, p. 111–128):  
 
Step 1. Assemble cognate lists. 
Step 2. Demonstrate sound correspondences. 
Step 3. Reconstruct proto-sounds. 
Step 4. Check if the reconstructed proto-sounds are plausible in  
 phonology and typology. 
Step 5. Reconstruct morphemes.  
 
Step 1: Historical linguists generally begin by compiling a list of cognates 
from basic vocabulary, including common body parts, close kinship terms, 
low numbers, and frequently experienced aspects of the world (Campbell & 
Mixco, 2007, p. 25). The words with a (nearly) identical meaning are 
supposed to be cognates of a common ancestral word, i.e. the descendant 
varieties of a proto-word. Whether putative cognates are genuine cognates is 
not demonstrable until they show systematic correspondences (Campbell, 
2013, p. 111). Putative cognates, when they are placed together, constitute a 
(potential) cognate set.  
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Step 2: Historical linguists seek systematic sound correspondences in the 
cognate sets. The sounds in the same cognate set are to identify their 
corresponding positions. An example makes this plain. Some provisional 
cognate sets are as follows (Campbell, 2013, p. 110):   
 
 Italian Spanish Portuguese French (Latin) English 
gloss 
1 capra 
/kapra/ 
cabra 
/kabra/ 
cabra 
/kabra/ 
chèvre 
/ʃɛvr(ə)/  
capra ‘goat’ 
2 caro 
/karo/ 
caro 
/karo/ 
caro 
/karu/ 
cher 
/ʃɛr/  
caru ‘dear’ 
  
The words for the same meaning, ‘goat’, are placed in the same row. In 
cognate set 1, it can be seen that the first sound correspondence is 
established as: k- : k- : k- : k-. The k is called a reflex of the original sound of 
the proto-language. The second sound correspondence is -a- : -a- : -a- : -ɛ-. 
For the words of the same meaning, their sounds are paired according to the 
positions of the sounds. The more frequently the same correspondence 
appears in different cognate sets, the more confidence historical linguists 
have in the genuineness of the cognates. For example, there is the same 
sound correspondence k- : k- : k- : k- in cognate set 2, so the cognates here 
are more likely to be genuine because they appear in two sets rather than in 
only one set. The procedure is repeated until all the sound correspondences 
in the languages being compared are identified.    
     
Step 3: Once correspondence sets (but not necessarily all) are established, 
general principles are proposed to determine which proto-sound is plausible 
relative to others. If sounds in each correspondence set appeared 
unanimously, it would be straightforward to reconstruct corresponding proto-
sounds according to the related sounds in agreement. For instance, a proto-
sound *t is naturally reconstructed in view of the sound correspondence (t- ; 
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t- : t-) in the Finno-Ugric languages of Finnish, Hungarian and Udmurt 
(Campbell, 2013, p. 131). However, the linguistic reality is complex. The 
purity of correspondence sets can be affected by conditioned sound 
changes. For example, correspondence sets may be partially overlapping: if 
two correspondence sets (k- : k-) and (k- : ʃ-) are designated, general 
principles and relevant linguistic information are needed to inform us how to 
reconstruct the proto-sound(s).   
  
Step 4: Given the reconstructed proto-sounds, historical linguists check if 
they accord with phonology and typology. Among most of the observed 
languages, the inventories of sounds are phonologically symmetrical with 
congruent patterns and have a typological tendency for particular sounds 
(Campbell, 2013, pp. 124–126). If the reconstructed sound does not agree 
with the general patterns, it will be rendered implausible unless there is 
strong evidence in support of it.      
 
Step 5: Historical linguists use proto-sounds to reconstruct words in the 
proto-language. For example, *kapra ‘goat’ is reconstructed for Proto-
Romance on the basis of the sounds provided by its daughter languages.  
 
From Step 1 to Step 5, through comparing the cognate sets of its daughter 
languages, the proto-language is derivable.  
 
5.6 Limitations of the Theories of Evidence  
 
Below I simplify and sketch the reconstruction inference described by the 
historical linguist Lyle Campbell (2013, pp. 113–118). Let us stay with the 
Proto-Romance family of languages, and consider only the words for ‘goat’, 
for which the counterpart has been reconstructed as ‘capra’. For ease of 
discussion, I repeat the cognate set below:  
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Italian Spanish Portuguese French 
capra 
/kapra/ 
cabra 
/kabra/ 
cabra 
/kabra/ 
chèvre 
/ʃɛvr(ə)/  
 
The present task is to reconstruct the proto-sound for the correspondence 
between the first sounds. We have the following information:   
 
 E1: The correspondence set for the first sounds is k- : k- : k- : ʃ-. 
 
Suppose the hypotheses entertained are as follows:  
 
H1: The proto-sound is *k.  
H2: The proto-sound is *ʃ.  
 
Below I introduce several general principles for the reconstruction of proto-
sounds. The first principle is directionality, which says that ‘some sound 
changes which recur in independent languages typically go in one direction (A 
> B) but usually are not (sometimes are never) found in the other direction (B 
> A)’ (Campbell, 2013, p. 113). This principle can also be called process 
naturalness (Lass, 1997, p. 137). For example, the data show that the direction 
of sound change is generally from k to ʃ, and the converse direction generally 
never happens. In other words, the former direction is more ‘natural’ than the 
latter.  
 
The second general principle, majority wins, is that everything else being equal, 
the sound shared between the majority of sister languages is the original 
sound in their proto-language. In the Proto-Romance case, the 
correspondence between the first sounds is mostly k except French, which is 
ʃ. 
 
The third general principle, economy, is that everything else being equal, 
among alternative sounds, the sound that supposes fewer steps of change is 
the proto-sound. In the case discussed here, if we were to postulate that the 
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first sound in the Proto-Romance is *ʃ, the sound would undergo three 
independent changes from *ʃ to k, each for Italian, Spanish and Portuguese. 
This is more than the one change from *k to ʃ by simply postulating *k for the 
Proto-Romance. The second and third principles can be combined and called 
simplicity. That is, the single-source hypothesis is more parsimonious (in that 
it deploys fewer sound changes) and therefore more evidentially preferable 
than the multiple-convergence hypothesis, with the exception of ‘natural’ traits 
that are widely shared between languages (e.g. prenasal nasalization) (Lass, 
1997, p. 137). 
 
Now let us examine the theories of evidence in sequence to see how well 
they fit in with the foregoing case, in which historical linguists generally 
regard the correspondence set k- : k- : k- : ʃ- (E1) as evidence for the proto-
sound *k in Proto-Romance (H1).  
 
The first theory is Achinstein’s (2001, 2010a, 2014) explanationist theory. 
Suppose that there is a historical linguist who knows that E1 and some 
relevant background knowledge B (e.g. the general principles above) are 
true. In order to determine whether E1 is evidence for H1, what the linguist 
requires, according to the explanationist theory, depends solely upon 
whether P(Exp(H1,E1)/E1&B) > 1/2. However, how to compute the probability 
of explanatory connection, P(Exp(H1,E1)/H1&E1&B), is puzzling. So is the 
posterior probability, P(H1/E1&B), since direct and indirect ways of obtaining 
this value are lacking. Unlike fully specified settings (e.g. a standard deck of 
cards), there is no direct way to know the posterior probability in historical 
linguistics, or even in other historical sciences. Nor is there any indirect way. 
The prior probability, P(H1), is either undesirably subjective if subjective 
Bayesianism is adopted, or dubiously objective if objective Bayesianism is 
adopted, and the catch-all likelihood P(E1/~H1&B) must depend upon the full 
identification of all possible competing hypotheses, all of which are 
implausible in the historical sciences. The distinction between fully/well-
specified and poorly specified settings is made in Section 5.7, and the 
problems about priors and catch-all likelihoods are explored in Section 5.8. I 
shall conclude that Achinstein’s explanationist theory of evidence does not 
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make sense either of the case of reconstructing proto-sounds in Proto-
Romance, or of evidential reasoning in historical linguistics.     
 
The second theory of evidence to be examined here is Cartwright’s (2013) 
argument theory. A valid argument in favour of H1 can be constructed as 
follows:106  
 
P1.  E1: The first sound correspondence is Italian k, Spanish k,  
 Portuguese k, French ʃ. 
P2.   If the principles of directionality, majority wins and economy all 
 converge on the same sound, and there were no non-inheritance 
 factors (e.g. diffusion and chance) that brought about the sound  
 correspondence, the reconstructed sound is the proto-sound.  
P3.  The principles of directionality, majority wins and economy all  
 converge on *k. 
P4.  There were no non-inheritance factors. 
Con. H1: The sound in Proto-Romance is *k. 
 
Ideally, if P1–P4 are met, H1 is deductively entailed; according to the 
argument theory, P1–P4 are evidence for H1. However, as opposed to 
scientific experiments and RCTs, in which confounders are well controlled 
and ideal conditions may be confirmed, historical linguists have meagre 
resources to ensure P4. For example, sounds may resemble one another 
owing to language contact, or languages may develop the same or similar 
traits independently and coincidentally. Although historical linguists can claim 
that inheritance explains E1 better than diffusion or chance, it is difficult for 
them to exclude these possibilities completely. The argument theory is not 
well suited to the practice of historical linguistics, particularly regarding the 
proto-sound reconstruction. 
 
 
106 For simplicity’s sake, I do not take into account partially overlapping correspondence sets 
and phonological and typological considerations.  
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Turn now to Reiss’s (2015a, 2015b) inferentialist account. On the supposition 
of the truth of H1, E1 is, according to the principles of majority wins and 
economy, a pattern in the data that is expected, because in the sound 
correspondence, k outnumbers ʃ and there are fewer changes if *k > ʃ. Thus, 
E1 is direct evidence for H1. Although H2 is inferentially compatible with E1, it 
is eliminated by indirect evidence describing the implausibility of *ʃ > k. Thus, 
the inferentialist account fares well in this case.     
 
However, the inferentialist account turns problematic when we consider 
another case, where historical linguists aim to reconstruct a sound in Proto-
Indo-European. The cognate sets are as follows: 
 
 English Latin Old Irish 
1 father pater athir 
2 fish piscis ĩasc 
 
E2: The correspondence between the first sounds is f : p : Ø (zero). 
 
There are three hypotheses for historical linguists to entertain:  
 
H3: The sound in Proto-Indo-European is *p.  
H4: The sound in Proto-Indo-European is *f.  
H5: The sound in Proto-Indo-European is *Ø.  
 
According to Lass (1997, p. 137), p becomes f or f becomes p, both of which 
are possible, though the former is more common than the latter, and Ø is 
virtually unseen. This shows directionality, so H5 can be ruled out. However, 
neither H3 nor H4 is judged warranted merely by the single, impoverished 
correspondence set E2. Stalemate is broken when extra information is 
added: ‘Choice of a larger outgroup shows that all other Indo-European 
subgroups except Armenian (Greek, Slavonic, Indo-Iranian, Albanian, etc.) 
have /p/. If /f/ were original, there would be multiple convergences; if /p/ is 
original, then only Germanic (and Armenian in part) innovate’ (Lass 1997, p. 
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137).107 On the basis of the information, historical linguists apply the 
principles of majority wins and economy and conclude that the postulated 
proto-sound *p is more evidentially favourable than *f, which indicates that E2 
is direct evidence for H3 and does not count as direct evidence for H4. 
Nevertheless, none of the pieces of information above are inferentially 
incompatible with H3 or H4. Even though there is more direct evidence for H3 
than H4, both should be equally warranted unless one of them is eliminated, 
because more direct evidence just tells us more about what would be 
relevant to the hypothesis. Thus, according to the inferentialist account, there 
is no further indirect evidence and warranting evidence that can evidentially 
distinguish H3 from H4. Since historical linguists have, in effect, reconstructed 
the proto-sound as *p (H3), the inferentialist account does not fully capture 
the aspects of evidential reasoning in historical linguistics.    
 
5.7 Settings Matter 
 
Before delving into the issues of prior probabilities and catch-all likelihoods 
and examining whether the Bayesian theory fares well in the practice of 
sound reconstruction, I shall bring into focus the types of settings in terms of 
information availability. Sober (2008, p. 26) recognises proper priors that 
come from fully specified or well-specified evidential settings, on the one 
hand, but deems other kinds of priors either subjective or ill-defined, on the 
other hand. Fully specified evidential settings amount to complete-
probability-model ones, such as coins, dice or a deck of cards. Well-specified 
evidential settings, by contrast, refer to empirically defensible settings, 
including medical cases, where disease prevalence, test sensitivity and test 
specificity are well supported by frequency data,108 and genetics, where the 
Mendelian theory functions as probability assignments to hypotheses on 
solid empirical ground (Sober, 2008, p. 26). This is why Sober (2005) 
 
107 This is another way to symbolise phonemes. For example, /p/ is identical to p. 
108 In probabilistic terms, disease prevalence can be defined as P(the proportion of a 
population having the disease), sensitivity as P(a positive test / the patient has the disease), 
and specificity as P(a negative test / the patient does not have the disease). If these figures 
are available and correct, we can know the probability that the patient has the disease given 
that his test outcome is positive or negative.   
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suggests that: 
 
The Law of Likelihood should be restricted to cases in which the 
probabilities of hypotheses are not under consideration (perhaps 
because they are not known or are not even “well-defined”) and one is 
limited to information about the probability of the observations given 
different hypotheses. (Sober, 2005, p. 128) 
 
Despite being well suited for poorly specified settings, which are 
commonplace in scientific practice, especially for the historical sciences, the 
LL fails to make full use of information in fully specified and well-specified 
settings. This is one limitation of the LL. Another limitation, as mentioned 
above, is the inability to compare composite hypotheses in terms of the data. 
 
Apart from fully specified or well-specified priors, the credibility of priors of 
other kinds is dubious. Recall that in Chapter 2, I have examined the 
subjective and objective Bayesian theories of evidence and have used 
counter-examples to present their difficulties; from a tool-based point of view, 
neither does its job properly. They need to either restrict their scope of 
application or improve their functions to overcome those counter-examples. 
Here I want to focus on their limitations, such as a hammer hardly replaces a 
screwdriver. In the simplified definitions (leaving out background knowledge 
B), the Bayesian theories states that (1) E is evidence for H if and only if 
P(H/E) > P(H) and/or (2) E is evidence for H if and only if P(H/E) attains a 
certain high level. Clearly, priors enter into both definitions.  
 
5.8 The Problems with Priors and Catch-Alls 
 
Priors, in the subjective Bayesian sense, can undermine the objectivity of 
science. Subjectivists maintain that priors are subject to agents’ beliefs and 
are relatively free of rational constraints as long as they obey the axioms of 
probability. From the subjectivists’ viewpoint, although initial probability 
assignments to parameters or hypotheses would vary substantially from 
individual to individual, their probabilities, as data are increasingly gathered 
overriding the influence of the different priors, tend to converge to a common 
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posterior probability. This is correct, but in a limited way. Consider 
astrophysics as a case in point.109 For parameter estimation, the posterior 
probabilities of a particular parameter may eventually converge, even if 
scientists initially hold different priors representing a blending of their 
subjective beliefs and knowledge. But data are sometimes not sufficient to 
override priors in many different kinds of cases, e.g. ‘for small sample sizes, 
or for problems where the dimensionality of the hypothesis space is larger 
than the number of observations (for example, in image reconstruction)’ 
(Trotta, 2008, pp. 77–78). If priors are assigned based largely on one’s 
beliefs and knowledge, this reflects a turn away from objectivity that 
researchers, including historical linguists, set out to discover.110   
 
Contemporary objective Bayesians place more constraints on priors than do 
subjectivists.111 For example, Jon Williamson (2010) puts forth three norms: 
  
Probability: degrees of belief should be probabilities, 
Calibration:  they should be calibrated with evidence, 
Equivocation:  they should otherwise equivocate between basic  
 outcomes. (Williamson, 2010, p. iii) 
 
109 Many contemporary astrophysicists embrace the Bayesian view of probability, for 
frequentist methods are usually based on a full specification of the probability distributions, 
which may not accurately describe the problem under consideration, and frequentists draw 
on these distributions to describe possible, and unobserved, data, which leads to the 
stopping rule problem (Trotta, 2008, pp. 74–75). In short, for physicists, ‘Bayesians address 
the question everyone is interested in by using assumptions no-one believes, while 
frequentists use impeccable logic to deal with an issue of no interest to anyone’ (Lyons, 
2007, p. 363). I do not consider these issues here, because they are not my main points. For 
further details on the stopping rule problem, see Royall (2004, pp. 126–127) and Howson 
and Urbach (2006, pp. 248–250). 
110 Sometimes subjective priors can be elicited by a route that can be taken as legitimate by 
scientists and objective Bayesians. For example, a claim that there is a 60% chance of rain 
tomorrow is elicited from expert opinions (Williamson, 2010, pp. 17–18). However, experts 
who are the stakeholders of the company may intentionally ‘cook’ extreme numbers. The 
priors elicited from these biased expert opinions can influence the conclusion of the 
investigation and further lead to severe environmental consequences (Dennis, 1996, p. 
1099).  
111 ‘Contemporary’ objective Bayesianism stands in contrast to Carnapian objective 
Bayesianism, which, as noted in Chapter 2, interprets probability as a logical relation 
between propositions and links the logical probability to rational degrees of belief. An 
important distinction between the two standpoints is that ‘[t]he logical interpretation typically 
focuses on equivocation at the expense of calibration, while the [contemporary] objective 
Bayesian interpretation takes the Equivocation norm to be subsidiary to the Calibration norm 
— one should only equivocate to the extent that calibration with evidence does not fully 
determine which degrees of belief to adopt’ (Williamson, 2010, p. 22).   
 160 
 
The probability norm, also shown in subjective Bayesianism, is that beliefs 
should obey the axioms of probability. The calibration norm states that one’s 
degrees of belief (i.e. probabilities) should allow for empirical information; this 
is pertinent to what I mentioned earlier about admissible prior probability 
assignment in response to fully specified or well-specified evidential 
settings.112 Wherever relevant empirical information is present, we should try 
to use priors representing beliefs or hypotheses as far as possible. The 
equivocation norm requires that the (remaining) possibilities that cannot be 
calibrated with empirical information should be assigned equal degrees of 
belief (i.e. probabilities). Let us consider Darrell Rowbottom’s (2015, pp. 62–
64) example to illustrate these norms in turn. Imagine there is a tetrahedral 
(four-sided) die. Given the sample space Ω =  {1, 2, 3, 4}, we believe P(Ω) = 
1, P(∅) = 0 and so forth, which meet the probability axioms. From the 
previous data showing that the frequency of ‘1’ occurrence is 40%, we 
believe P(1) = 0.4; this is calibration. We should equivocate after calibrating. 
By the equivocation norm, we assign an equal probability to the other 
possibilities and believe P(2) = P(3) = P(4) = 0.2.   
 
Priors, in the objective Bayesian sense, can be undecidable. Equivocating 
the probabilities of parameters, events, models, hypotheses or anything on 
which can be conferred probabilities hinges upon the way that their 
possibilities are carved up. Different ways of carving up possibly yield 
inconsistent results; this is the so-called Bertrand paradox. To illustrate how 
the possibilities divided according to the equivocation norm can lapse into 
contradiction, let us consider van Fraassen’s (1989, pp. 302–304) version of 
the paradox: the cube factory.113 Suppose that a factory manufactures cubes 
with side length between 0 and 1 cm in a perfectly random pattern, which 
can be described as a uniform distribution. A cube is then randomly chosen. 
 
112 There is a more sophisticated stance towards subjective Bayesianism, called empirically 
based subjective Bayesianism, which ‘takes the Probability norm together with a further 
Calibration norm as necessary and sufficient for rationality at a particular time’ (Williamson, 
2010, p. 15).   
113 Bertrand paradoxes also include, among others, the book paradox, the wine/water 
paradox and the chord paradox. For details, see Gillies (2000, pp. 37–42).  
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By the equivocation norm, it follows that P(the side length of the cube is 0 to 
0.5 cm) = P(the side length of the cube is 0.5 to 1 cm) = 1/2. However, if an 
area-based method of carving up events is adopted, this implies that P(the 
face area of the cube is 0 to 0.25 cm2) = 1/4, meaning that two different 
probabilities can be assigned to the same event. The implementation of the 
equivocation norm fails to arbitrate between the two inconsistent results in 
similar cases: it is sometimes silent about how to count possibilities of infinite 
and continuous events before assigning equal probabilities to them.114   
 
The equivocation of priors can also be suspect for historical linguists, who 
typically expect finite and discrete events. To illustrate this, imagine that a 
historical linguist, upon reconstructing proto-sounds, attempts to utilise the 
objective Bayesian approach to help calculate and determine whether a 
particular sound, say *k, in a proto-language is sufficiently probable given the 
sound correspondence of its daughter languages, k- : k- : k- : ʃ- (E1). By 
Bayes’ theorem, it follows that P(*k/E1) = P(*k)P(E1/*k) / P(E1). Let us 
assume that the linguist successfully estimates P(E1) and P(E1/*k) in some 
way. Now the question is: how can the linguist estimate the prior P(*k)? 
Suppose the frequency is a good estimate of P(*k). The frequency of *k 
depends upon the kinds of proto-sounds. Even with acquiring this information 
and knowing how many kinds of possible proto-sounds existed, the linguist 
still needs to know how likely each proto-sound is (this is similar to the 
previous tetrahedral dice example).  
 
I would reiterate that calibration should be applied prior to equivocation. Lay 
people would be allowed to assign equal probabilities to each of the proto-
sounds. However, the linguist, with knowledge of phonology and phonetics, 
believes that the plausibility for each proto-sound is likely to vary, but fails to 
estimate P(*k), which is a precise value. Still, even if the linguist is advised to 
equivocate the possible proto-sounds, this would be tantamount to the 
likelihoodist account when the two hypotheses are compared. Suppose 
another alternative proto-sound is *ʃ. It is obtained that P(*k/E1) / P(*ʃ/E1) = 
 
114 Williamson (2010, §9.1) acknowledges that some paradoxes are insoluble.  
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P(*k)P(E1/*k) / P(*ʃ)P(E1/*ʃ), which equals P(E1/*k) / P(E1/*ʃ) on the basis that 
P(*k) = P(*ʃ) = 1 / n, where n stands for the number of all alternatives. When 
one compares the posterior probabilities in this situation, the priors are equal 
and can be cancelled off, and what is left is the likelihood ratio.  
 
There are no priors as such in historical linguistics: if any existed, they would 
not be considered scientifically objective. Historical linguists do not, and 
cannot, confer an objective and precise probability upon hypotheses as to 
the past: how can they know or objectively determine the prior probability of 
the common origin hypothesis or of the diffusion hypothesis for a specific 
language group? Sometimes they may be able to assign vague priors to 
hypotheses instead. For example, the probability of the hypothesis that the 
proto-sound is velar trill is almost zero, as the sound is phonetically 
impossible to pronounce, while the probability of the hypothesis that the 
proto-sound is palatal trill is low because the sound is possible for humans to 
make but linguists have never found them actually being used in any of the 
world’s languages. Equipped with the vague priors, we can obtain the 
inequality of priors. Note that historical linguists would not take any 
inequalities of priors into account. As Campbell (2013, p. 126) puts it, 
‘Certain inventories of sounds are found with frequency among the world’s 
languages while some are not found at all and others only very rarely. When 
we check our postulated reconstructions for the sounds of a proto-language, 
we must make sure that we are not proposing a set of sounds which is never 
or only very rarely found in human languages’. The information about vague 
priors and inequalities of priors is, after all, of little use in historical linguistics 
because of the problem with catch-alls.  
 
Perhaps the problem of priors can be circumvented by using only catch-alls 
and likelihoods. This is Fitelson’s (2007) idea, when investigating the 
common ground between likelihoodism and Bayesianism. He puts forth the 
weak law of likelihood: 
 
(WLL) E is evidence in favour of H1 versus H2 if P(E/H1) > P(E/H2) and  
P(E/~H1) ≤ P(E/~H2). 
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The LL entails the WLL. The proof is as follows:  
 
1. If P(E/H1) > P(E/H2), E is evidence in favour of H1 versus H2. [the 
LL] 
2. P(E/H1) > P(E/H2) and P(E/~H1) ≤ P(E/~H2). [ACP: Assumption for 
Conditional Proof] 
3. P(E/H1) > P(E/H2). [from 2] 
4. E is evidence in favour of H1 versus H2. [from 1&3] 
5. If P(E/H1) > P(E/H2) and P(E/~H1) ≤ P(E/~H2), E is evidence in 
favour of H1 versus H2. [from 2–4 CP: Conditional Proof] 
 
The WLL is logically weaker than the LL, which is why it is called a weak 
version of the LL.115 Since likelihoodists believe in the LL, there is no reason 
for them not to accept the WLL.116  
 
Nevertheless, likelihoodists can maintain that the WLL can be applied where 
catch-alls are available, while arguing that in myriad cases where catch-alls 
are elusive, the LL can serve to determine the inequality of evidential 
strength, but the WLL is not applicable because of the problem with catch-
alls. Now I shall argue that catch-all likelihoods are out of intellectual reach in 
historical linguistics for the following two reasons.  
 
Firstly, alternative hypotheses may not be collectively exhaustive. There are 
a great variety of events where their catch-all hypotheses cannot be 
identified. A catch-all hypothesis, P(~H), is the negation of the hypothesis of 
interest and can break down into a complete collection of its alternative 
hypotheses which are mutually exclusive.  
 
 
115 In Fitelson’s (2007) paper, when he mentioned the LL, he in fact referred to the BLL: E is 
evidence that favours H1 over H2 if and only if P(E/H1) > P(E/H2).  
116 Fitelson (2007) uses the WLL to illustrate that the LL cannot reject his counter-example 
regarding principle (*), which I discussed in Section 5.3.    
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Sober (2008, pp. 28–29) nicely illustrates the exhaustion problem with a case 
from physics. The scientist Arthur Eddington, in an attempt to test the 
general theory of relativity (GTR), measured the extent to which light deflects 
(E) during a solar eclipse in 1919. While P(E/GTR) can be estimated, 
P(E/~GTR), i.e. P(E/the disjunction of hypotheses other than GTR), remains 
unknown insofar as the catch-all hypothesis is hard to fully unpack. In fact, 
Eddington tested the GTR against a specific theory, Newtonian gravity (NG): 
this can be expressed with the inequality of specific likelihoods: P(E/GTR) ≫ 
P(E/NG). Reverting to the primary concern of this chapter, a historical linguist 
hypothesises that one of the sounds in Proto-Romance is *k (H1). Even 
granting that the probability of the data given H1 is available, it seems 
impossible to compute P(E1/~H1) in practice, because the proto-sounds may 
be impossible to fully identify, and the plausibility of each of them is likely to 
be inconclusive. 
 
Secondly, the problem of priors rearises, even if it can sometimes be 
ascertained that historical linguists have exhausted the possibilities of 
competing hypotheses, as, for example, all and only sources of language 
traits, namely inheritance (Hi), diffusion (Hd) and chance (Hc). Given that E is 
a set of language traits, Hd and Hc are mutually exclusive, and P(E/~Hi) is 
equivalent to a weighted average of the individual likelihoods, namely P(E/Hd 
v Hc), it follows that:  
 
 P(E/~Hi) 
 = P(E/Hd v Hc)  
  = [P(E)P(Hd v Hc/E)] / P(Hd v Hc)  
 = [P(E)P(Hd/E) + P(E)P(Hc/E)] / [P(Hd) + P(Hc)] 
      = [P(Hd)P(E/Hd) + P(Hc)P(E/Hc)] / [P(Hd) + P(Hc)].  
 
This formula inevitably involves the priors, namely P(Hd) and P(Hc). As has 
been argued above, priors are elusive, and it is unclear as to how to avoid 
using the priors in this case. This argument also handles the above *k case: 
even if the possibilities of *~k are identified, the problem of the prior is still 
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irresolvable. Thus, the WLL, invoking the catch-alls, is not helpful with 
evidential evaluation in historical linguistics. 
 
On a negative note, I have argued why the explanationist theory, the 
argument theory, the inferentialist account, the subjective Bayesian theory 
and the objective Bayesian theory do not fit well with historical linguistics (cf. 
Tucker, 2004) and that the Bayesian approach carries the burdens of priors 
and catch-alls, which are not required in likelihoodism and are elusive in 
historical linguistics. In a more positive vein, I shall argue that the 
comparative nature built into the likelihoodist account fits well with the 
methodology of historical linguistics. For this purpose, I will attend to the 
cases of sound reconstruction.  
 
5.9 Case Study: Strengths of the Likelihoodist Account 
 
Now I shall demonstrate the strength of likelihoodism for evidential reasoning 
in historical linguistics. Before returning to the previous case that is used to 
examine the explanationist theory, the argument theory and the inferentialist 
account, I formalise and comparatively quantify why one reconstructed 
sound, rather than another, is favoured in the light of a ‘natural’ direction of 
sound change, majority wins and economy. 
 
Inspired by the way that Sober (2008) employs the LL and relevant 
assumptions to demonstrate that the observed trait shared between two 
species evidentially favours the common ancestry hypothesis over the 
separate ancestry hypothesis, I assume that the sounds in the 
correspondence set under investigation concern a dichotomous variable, 
which has two states, r and s. Let X denote a descendant sound and *X 
denote a proto-sound. The events include X = r, X = s, *X = r and *X = s. Let 
P(X = s /*X = r) = θ1, (X = r /*X = r) = 1−θ1, P(X = r /*X = s) = θ2 and P(X = s 
/*X = s) = 1−θ2. We have four assumptions, which I will explain later:  
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(1) θ1 < 1−θ2 and θ2 < 1−θ1. [backwards inequality] 
(2) θ1 > θ2. [from directionality] 
(3) P(X1 : X2 : … : Xk /*X) = P(X1/*X) P(X2/*X) … P(Xk/*X), where k is 
the number of the sounds in a particular correspondence set. 
[sound change independence] 
(4) 0 < θ1, θ2 < 1. [non-extreme probabilities] 
 
From (3), P(X1 : X2 : … : Xk /*X = s) = θ2n (1−θ2)m, where m and n are natural 
numbers and m + n = k. Let m < n and we have 
 
 θ2n (1−θ2)m 
 = θ2n−m θ2m (1−θ2)m 
 = θ2n−m [θ2 (1−θ2)]m 
 = θ2n−m (θ2 – θ22)m. 
 
Since from (1), (2) and (4), 0 < θ1+θ2 < 1 and 0 < θ1−θ2, we obtain  
 
 (θ1+θ2) (θ1−θ2) < (θ1−θ2) 
 ⇒117 θ1 − θ12 > θ2 – θ22. 
 
Then we have  
 
 θ2n−m (θ2 – θ22)m < θ2n−m (θ1 – θ12)m. 
 
From (1), we have 
 
 θ2n−m (θ1 – θ12)m < (1−θ1)n−m [θ1 (1−θ1)]m 
 ⇒ (1−θ1)n−m θ1m (1−θ1)m < θ1m (1−θ1)n. 
 
Therefore, from assumptions (1)–(4), we have  
 
 θ2n (1−θ2)m < θ1m (1−θ1)n. 
 
117 ‘⇒’ stands for ‘logically entails’. 
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Let us revert to the case of reconstructing a proto-sound in Proto-Romance 
on the basis of the following sound correspondence: 
  
E1: Italian k- : Spanish k- : Portuguese k- : French ʃ-. 
 
Historical linguists entertain two hypotheses: 
 
H1: The proto-sound is *k.  
H2: The proto-sound is *ʃ.  
 
As is known, historical linguists have reconstructed *k. The rationale behind 
the reasoning can be spelled out. According to the LL, the task amounts to 
comparing P(E1/H1) and P(E1/H2): if P(E1/H1) > P(E1/H2), then E1 is evidence 
that favours H1 over H2. Let P(E1/H1) = P(k : k : k : ʃ / *k) and P(E1/H2) = P(k : 
k : k : ʃ / *ʃ); we obtain P(k : k : k : ʃ / *k) = θ1(1−θ1)3 and P(k : k : k : ʃ / *ʃ) = 
θ23 (1−θ2). Assuming k and ʃ are the only two possible states, it follows from 
assumptions (1)–(4) that θ23 (1−θ2) < θ1 (1−θ1)3. By the LL, we obtain 
P(E1/H1) > P(E1/H2). Assumptions (1)–(4), with the LL, suffice to show that E1 
is evidence in favour of H1 versus H2. The conclusion of the proof accords 
with the reconstruction suggested by the principles of directionality, majority 
wins and economy. The reconstructed sound *k, relative to *ʃ, is supported 
by evidence.  
 
The above assumptions are not a priori true, but they generally hold in 
historical linguistics. The model entails a backwards inequality, stating that 
P(a ⟶ a) > P(b ⟶ a), where a and b are two different states that a character 
has in a lineage, and P(a ⟶ b) is the probability that a character changes 
from a to b (Sober, 2008, pp. 215–216).118 Assumption (1) obeys a 
backwards inequality: given a descendant’s state, the ancestor’s state is 
most likely to be the same. Assumption (2) is based on the linguistic data, 
 
118 It is worth noting that there is another inequality called the forwards inequality, P(a ⟶ a) 
> P(a ⟶ b). The forwards inequality is ‘highly contingent’, whilst the backwards inequality is 
‘extremely robust’ (Sober, 1988, p. 223). 
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which indicates a relatively natural direction of sound change. Suppose that 
the changes of sounds that linguists endeavour to reconstruct are due to 
language contact. If so, assumption (3) fails to hold. However, the 
comparative method is an effective method that can block or lessen the 
possibilities, other than inheritance, that may bring about sound changes.119  
 
Note that assumptions (1)–(4) suffice for the sound correspondence to be 
evidence that favours the reconstructed *k over *ʃ, but if one of these 
assumptions is not true, this does not necessarily mean that E1 is not 
evidence in favour of H1 versus H2. It may be the case that E1 still supports *k 
more than *ʃ, but some additional or a different set of well-supported 
assumptions are called for. Whether E1 is evidence in favour of H1 versus H2 
depends upon empirical matters of fact.  
 
It becomes more complicated and unsure in this case if a sound can change 
into more than one sound, i.e. multiple states. For example, *k can remain as 
k or change to ʃ, č, and so forth; P(k / *k) + P(ʃ / *k) ≤ 1, as described in 
assumption (5). Let P(ʃ / *k) = θ1, P(k / *k) = θ1*, P(k / *ʃ) = θ2 and P(ʃ / *ʃ) = 
θ2*. We add two additional assumptions:  
 
(5) θ1 + θ1* ≤ 1, θ2 + θ2* ≤ 1. [multiple possible sound changes] 
(6) θ1* > 1/2. [tendency towards non-change] 
 
From (3), P(X1 : X2 : … : Xk /*X = s) = θ!"θ!∗$ , where m and n are natural 
numbers and m + n = k. Let m < n and we have 
  
 θ!"θ!∗$ 	= θ!"%$θ!$θ!∗$ .  
 
From the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means (the AM–GM 
inequality): (a&a!…a'! ≤ (")(#)	…	)(!' , we have  
 
119 Similarities emerging from sheer chance can be dismissed by checking whether there are 
systematic sound correspondences. For example, the m- : m- correspondence postulated by 
the match between mes in Kaqchikel and mess in English does not repeat itself and the m 
sounds coincide by chance. (Campbell, 2013, p. 112). 
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 θ!"%$θ!$θ!∗$  ≤ θ!"%$(θ! + θ!∗)!$/ 22m.  
 
From (2), (5) and (6), we obtain 
  
 θ!"%$(θ! + θ!∗)!$/ 22m ≤ θ!"%$(θ! + 1 − θ!)!$/ 22m = θ!"%$/ 22m 
 ⇒ θ!"%$/ 22m < θ!"%$θ&∗!$ 
 ⇒ θ!"%$θ&∗!$  <	θ&"%$θ&∗!$ ⇒	θ&"%$θ&∗!$ < 	θ&$	θ&∗" . 
 
Therefore, from assumptions (2)–(6), we have  
 
  	θ!"	θ!∗$ < 	θ&$	θ&∗" . 
  
We know P(E1/H1) = P(k : k : k : ʃ / *k) = θ1θ1*3 and P(E1/H2) = P(k : k : k : ʃ / 
*ʃ) = θ23 θ2*. By the LL, we obtain P(E1/H1) > P(E1/H2), which means that E1 is 
evidence that favours H1 over H2. Assumption (6) can be supported by the 
fact that ‘voiceless stop consonants have, by and large, been preserved 
intact in word-initial position throughout the Romance territory’ (Hall, 1964, p. 
551). 
 
However, the three general principles sometimes conflict, and this under-
determination of sound reconstruction can be formalised and comparatively 
quantified with LL. Suppose the correspondence set described in E1 is, in 
fact, the following set:  
 
E1*: ʃ- : ʃ- : ʃ- : k-.  
 
As opposed to *k suggested by the principle of directionality given E1*, the 
principles of majority wins and economy suggest that the proto-sound should 
be reconstructed as *ʃ in the light of E1*. A verdict cannot be reached with the 
LL either. The likelihoods of H1 and H2 are: P(E1*/H2) = P(ʃ : ʃ : ʃ : k / *ʃ) = 
θ2(1−θ2)3 and P(E1*/H1) = P(ʃ : ʃ : ʃ : k / *k) = θ13(1−θ1), respectively. But it, 
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using only assumptions (1)–(4), cannot prove whether H1 or H2 is favoured by 
E1*.  
 
Finally, let us return to the other case, where E2: The correspondence set is 
f- : p- : Ø-, H3: The sound in Proto-Indo-European is *p, and H4: The sound in 
Proto-Indo-European is *f. When the correspondence set is expanded 
according to the information about all other Indo-European subgroups except 
Armenian having p, the same reasoning invoking the LL above can be 
applied to the case on the basis that p outnumbers f in the corresponding 
positions in the languages and that the directionality indicates P(f / *p) > P(p / 
*f). Here, assumption (6) can be supported by another fact that ‘[other 
aspects of Proto-Indo-European], for example the voiceless stops, seem 
phonetically secure’ (Baldi, 2002, p. 18). According to the likelihoodist 
account, E2 is evidence in favour of H3 versus H4.  
 
I have argued that the likelihoodist account can shed light on the evidential 
reasoning in the proto-sound reconstruction. This account has made explicit 
how the principles of directionality, majority wins and economy collaborate to 
turn the data into evidence for hypotheses of proto-sounds and why they fail 
to do so when they disagree. By the LL, as the core of a relevance-mediating 
vehicle, the linguistic data are therefore labelled evidence.   
 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
Reconstruction of the past is therefore, for the most part, being done 
piecemeal. It is worth quoting Sober’s (1988) view at length here:  
 
We must not ask whether the past is knowable, but whether this or 
that specific aspect of the past is knowable. …it would be folly to try to 
produce an a priori argument that shows that evolutionary history 
must always be recoverable. Whether this is true depends on 
contingent properties of the evolutionary process. The folly would be 
greater still to try to mount some general philosophical argument to 
the effect that the past as a whole must be knowable. The history of 
stars, of living things, and of human languages, to mention just three 
examples, will be retrievable only if empirical facts specific to the 
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processes governing each are favorable. This is no global question for 
the armchair philosopher to answer by pondering evil demons or other 
epistemological fantasies. Rather, the pertinent questions are local in 
scope, which the astronomer, the evolutionist, and the linguist can 
each address by considering the discriminatory power of available 
data and process theories. (Sober 1988, p. 5)    
 
The tool-based view of theories of evidence echoes the quote. For the 
historical sciences, there are not many logically strong assumptions of a 
process model on which we can rely. The likelihoodist account of evidence 
does not appeal to the impractical quantitative explanation strength, or the 
highly strict argument, or the narrow-scoped elimination strategy. Rather, this 
account compares hypotheses regarding the past in weighing their 
likelihoods, and explicates sound reconstruction and potentially other 
activities of evidential reasoning in the historical sciences. 
 
I am not claiming that prior probabilities are not informative about evidential 
strength. Instead, priors can sometimes provide additional information about 
the extent to which evidence supports a hypothesis, but only if they are 
grounded on scientific theories or empirical data. For subjective Bayesians, 
priors are estimated and vary depending on individuals, which does not 
cohere with the objectivity we seek. Objective Bayesians, by contrast, can 
follow Williamson (2010) and appeal to the equivocation norm that assigns 
the same probabilities to competing hypotheses independently of us. But this 
assignment is neither true a priori nor secured by scientific theories or 
empirical data. Priors, if any, are scarce; lack of reliance on priors is another 
strength of likelihoodism. 
 
The likelihoodist account of evidence has its own limitations. It is not well 
suited to composite hypotheses and well-specified and fully specified 
settings. This account specifically attends to objective support (OS) but is 
silent about other evidential relationships including subjective acceptance 
(SA) and guidance (GD). Perhaps as Cartwright (2014) points out, when 
evidence is not sufficient to guarantee a hypothesis, or evidence is meagre, 
as commonly seen in the historical sciences, we have to plump for the 
hypothesis. This is an epistemic reality we face. 
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6  
Conclusion 
 
 
Throughout this thesis, I endorse a tool-based view of theories of evidence. 
A theory of evidence is a purpose-specific and setting-sensitive tool, not a 
Swiss army knife. Achinstein’s explanationist theory is a good tool for 
explaining the concept of evidence used in manifold situations in science and 
daily lives. Cartwright’s argument theory is good at reminding us of inferential 
gaps. The Bayesian approach fares well where probabilistic information is 
sufficient. These theories are well suited to fully specified or well-specified 
evidential settings. However, such settings are scarce in the historical 
sciences, where much information is lacking; these theories do not work 
properly in poorly specified settings. Still, there is some information about 
vague likelihood comparison. Reiss’s inferentialist account is a useful tool for 
spelling out why a variety of sources of evidence are deemed legitimate in 
the biomedical and social sciences, but it cannot digest this kind of 
quantitative information. I have argued that the likelihoodist account of 
evidence is a better tool for this purpose.  
 
The likelihoodist account can explicate the comparative nature of evidential 
reasoning in the historical sciences. I have illustrated this point with cases of 
the proto-sound reconstruction in historical linguistics. Despite being an 
appropriate tool for labelling what the information says about hypotheses as 
evidence, this account is silent about whether we are justified in believing a 
hypothesis given the evidence. Even in such poorly specified settings, if 
historical linguists are fortunate in that a volume and diversity of evidence 
mounts up and zeros in on the same hypothesis, they may be justified in 
accepting the hypothesis. However, it is worrying that when the evidence is 
meagre or discordant, historical linguists would require a leap of faith. This is 
not a counsel of despair, but rather honesty about our epistemic reality and a 
spur to the development of better tools for methodology descriptions and 
evidential reasoning.  
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Much work remains. Genealogical inference in historical linguistics is not 
limited to reconstructing the features of proto-languages, but embodies many 
aspects of language change, such as whether the inheritance hypothesis is 
generally evidentially favourable over the diffusion or chance hypothesis, and 
what kinds of rational considerations or constraints would influence working 
linguists’ judgements about evidence. Moreover, archaeology, text criticism, 
history and other fields concerning historiography involve evidential 
reasoning similar to likelihoodism, and whether or to what extent the law of 
likelihood is extendable into those domains merits further investigation. 
Finally, in the historical sciences, it remains an open question as to whether 
there is a meta-analysis that can inform researchers of the direction that the 
evidence leans towards or even evaluate the strengths of the amalgamated 
evidence.  
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